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MEDICAL FUTILITY STATUTES: NO SAFE HARBOR
TO UNILATERALLY REFUSE LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT
THADDEUS MASON POPE*
ABSTRACT
Over the past fifteen years, a majority of states have enacted medical
futility statutes that permit a health care provider to refuse a patient's request
for life-sustaining medical treatment (LSMT). These statutes typically permit
the provider to unilaterally stop LSMT where it would not provide "significant
benefit" or would be contrary to "generally accepted health care standards."
These safe harbors are vague and imprecise, however. Consequently, providers
have been reluctant to utilize these medical futility statutes.
The uncertainty concerning these statutes most likely cannot be reduced.
States have been unable to reach a consensus on substantive measures of
medical inappropriateness. Only a purely process-based approach like that
outlined in the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) has proven effective in
inducing the conduct that medical futility statutes intended. Therefore, while
the specific contours of TADA must be refined, policymakers in other states
should look to the TADA as a model.
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INTRODUCTION
Esther Hutchison is a 97-year-old woman with metastasized cancer in her
liver, kidneys, and lungs. I She will never again be conscious. Her medical
treatment includes mechanical ventilation support and artificial nutrition and
hydration. Pursuant to an advance directive, Mrs. Hutchison's daughter is her
mother's agent for health care decisions. She wants the health care team to "do
everything" to save her mother's life.
But, given her situation, Mrs. Hutchison's health care providers are
uncomfortable with continuing to provide her with life-sustaining medical
treatment (LSMT).2  They want to switch her to comfort care. Several
meetings with the treatment team, ethics committee, social workers, and clergy
have failed to change the daughter's treatment request. Now, the treatment
team wants to withdraw treatment without the daughter's consent. The relevant
health care law seems to authorize this unilateral action,4 but the team and the
hospital are unwilling to proceed. They are reluctant to do what they think is
right and what the law allows.
During the 1990s, a significant number of professional medical
associations and individual health care providers and institutions formally
concluded that, under some circumstances, in cases of intractable conflict such
as Mrs. Hutchison's, it would be appropriate for health care providers to
1. This is a fictional case based on the facts of many cases discussed in this Article.
2. LSMT refers to medical interventions that sustain the patient's life, but are not
effective in helping the patient recover from a terminal condition or persistent vegetative state.
These interventions may include assisted ventilation, artificial nutrition and hydration, renal
dialysis, surgical procedures, blood transfusions, and the administration of drugs. Following the
statutory convention, this Article refers to LSMT as a category. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-
3(8) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 2007). Yet, as Edmund
Pellegrino notes, "[e]ach treatment must be evaluated in terms of its end .... " Edmund D.
Pellegrino, Decisions at the End of Life-The Abuse of the Concept of Futility, PRACTICAL
BioETtucs, Summer 2005, at 3, 5.
3. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
4. This Article uses the term "unilateral action" to describe the situation in which the
health care provider overrides a patient's or surrogate's request for LSMT. Where the provider
acts unilaterally, she acts contrary to the instructions of the legally authorized decision maker.
This usage is consistent with most of the literature. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moseley et al., Futility
in Evolution, 21 CLINIcs GERIATRIC MED. 211, 216 (2005). While the term "unilateral action" is
also sometimes used to refer to a situation where the provider stops LSMT when the patient is
incompetent and no surrogate is reasonably available, this Article does not cover such cases. In
such a situation, there is no overriding authority because the provider typically becomes the
authorized decision maker.
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unilaterally withhold or withdraw LSMT.5 But most health care providers were
unwilling to act on these policies and guidelines without sufficient legal
protection. 6 Many state legislatures responded by enacting statutes that purport
to provide this protection and to authorize health care providers to unilaterally
withhold or withdraw LSMT.7
But, as exemplified in Mrs. Hutchison's case, these unilateral decision
statutes have failed to achieve their intended purpose. Today, even with
explicit statutory authorization and grants of immunity, health care providers
are still reluctant to unilaterally withhold or withdraw medically inappropriate
LSMT.8
Futility disputes are becoming increasingly common. 9 Because providers
want adequate legal authority to make unilateral decisions, it is important to
diagnose the effects, or lack thereof, of the unilateral decision statutes. This
Article reviews the history and effects of the unilateral decision statutes.
Certainly, there are ongoing academic and legislative debates concerning
whether unilateral decision making is even good public policy. Rather than
directly engaging that debate, this Article assesses these statutes on their own
terms.
Part One of this Article provides a brief overview of medical futility °
5. See infra notes 53, 280-82 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 276-90 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 291, 297-310 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 382-83, 387-403 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope
& Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End-of-Life: Getting Beyond the Limits of the Talking
Cure, 23 OHo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 143 (2007) (explaining why mediation has failed as a
mechanism for resolving the growing number of futility disputes).
10. This Article uses the term "medical futility" to describe only a type of dispute. Cf
Anne L. Flamm, The Texas "Futility" Procedure: No Such Thing as a Fairy Tale Ending, 11
LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS J. 11, 11 n. 1 (2004) (using "futility" for "sake of brevity" to
describe situations where patients or surrogates demand LSMT that the health care provider
believes to be un-useful or harmful); John Fletcher, The Baby K Case: Ethical and Legal
Considerations of Disputes about Futility, 2 BIoLAW: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL REPORTER ON
MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE AND BIOENGINEERING S:219, S:231-:233 (1994) (using "futility" to
describe a "type of moral dispute"); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Futility in Medical Decisions: The
Word and the Concept, 17 HEC FORUM 308,309 (2005) (using "futility" as a clinical concept to
describe the point where medical treatment "can no longer serve any recognizable good for the
patient"). The term's pervasiveness in the literature justifies this much. Because the term is so
troubled; however, this Article abandons "medically futile" in favor of "medically
inappropriate" when referring to a type of treatment or intervention. Cf Michael Ardagh,
Futility Has No Utility in Resuscitation Medicine, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 396, 399 (2000) ("The
words futile and futility should be abandoned .... "); Jeffrey T. Berger, Letter to the Editor,
Advance Directives, Due Process, and Medical Futility, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 402,403
(2004) (noting concept of medically appropriate, rather than futility, "integrates the society-
based authority under which physicians operate with the physicians' fiduciary obligations to
patients"); Raanan Gillon, Futility-Too Ambiguous and Peorative a Term?, 23 J. MED. ETHICS
339, 339 (1997) (describing "futility" term as unclear and too complex); Eric M. Levine, A New
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disputes, including both how they arise and how they are resolved. Part Two
summarizes the leading definitions of "medical inappropriateness." These
include brain death and physiological futility, where there is literally nothing
that medicine can offer the patient. Other definitions of "medical
inappropriateness" include concepts that are less scientifically measurable and
more value-laden, including quantitative futility, qualitative futility, and
generally accepted health care standards.
But definitions are not enough. Taking unilateral action has been and still
is fraught with legal risks. Part Three outlines legal constraints on the unilateral
withholding and withdrawing of LSMT. In particular, this Part reviews
potential civil, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions that could result. Then, Part
Four canvasses state legislation that purports to relieve providers from these
constraints by authorizing the unilateral limitation of LSMT.
Part Five examines the effects of these unilateral decision statutes. While
some evidence suggests that unilateral decision statutes facilitate the informal
resolution of disputes, they do not provide a workable solution against
intractable disputes. The unilateral decision statutes were meant to permit
providers to decline to comply with requests for medically inappropriate
treatment. But providers continue to comply with such requests. Not only have
most health care institutions never adopted a futility policy, but most of those
that have a futility policy have never implemented it. Yet, there is a notable
exception in Texas where providers do unilaterally stop LSMT.
Part Six analyzes why the unilateral decision statutes have failed to achieve
their intended objective. In particular, this Part contends that despite statutory
authorization and grants of immunity, providers are "chilled" from unilaterally
stopping treatment because of legal uncertainty. There are three potential
sources of this uncertainty: (1) the vagueness of the state statutes, (2) their
potential federal preemption, and (3) their potential unconstitutionality. Since
Texas providers are subject to the same federal and constitutional restrictions,
this Article posits that the relevant "chilling" uncertainty must come from the
vagueness of the state statutes.
Finally, Part Seven offers some suggestions on how to eliminate this
statutory vagueness. There are two primary options: (1) legislate concrete,
measurable, and predictable clinical criteria; or (2) legislate a concrete,
measurable, predictable process. No consensus exists on the precise,
legislatable measures of medical inappropriateness. Apparently then, only a
purely process-based approach, like the one adopted in Texas, can effectively
protect the conduct that medical futility statutes were designed to protect.
While the current formulation of that process may not be sufficiently fair and
Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of Medical Futility, the Physician's Obligation to
Render Inappropriate Treatment, and the Interplay of the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J. L. &
HEALTH 69, 84 n. 104 (1994-1995) (avoiding use of terms "futile" and "useless" by replacing
them with "medically inappropriate"); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism
Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 121, 202-06
(2005) (discussing the dangers of employing "thick" terms).
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rigorous, Texas's pure process approach wizens (if not eliminates) uncertainty
and should serve as a model for other states.
I. OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
A. Dying in America
Modem advances in science and medicine have made possible the
prolongation of the lives of many seriously ill individuals, without always
offering realistic prospects for improvement or cure.1 "Halfway" technologies
such as mechanical ventilation and artificial nutrition and hydration can sustain
biological life for practically indefinite periods of time but may not themselves
lead to improvement or cure.1
2
As a consequence of the availability of these life-sustaining technologies
most deaths in America occur in an institutional setting such as a hospital.'3
Most of these institutional deaths are the result of an intentional, deliberate
decision to stop LSMT and allow death.14 Nancy Dubler explains that "[d]eath
is a negotiated event; it happens by design. . . . 70% of the 1.3 million
Americans who die in health care institutions do so after a decision has been
made and implemented to forego some or all forms of medical treatment."'
5
11. See Alan Meisel & Bruce Jennings, Ethics, End-of-Life Care, and the Law: Overview,
in LIVING WITH GRIEF: ETHICAL DILEMMAS AT THE END OF LIFE 63,63 (2005) ("Most of the cases
and dilemmas that have shaped the law on end-of-life care have involved patients whose lives
could be prolonged by new medical treatments and technologies, but whose health, functioning,
quality of life, and even conscious awareness itself could not be restored."). See generally,
WILLIAM H. COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR RIGHT TO DIE IN AMERICA 57-71 (2006)
(discussing the ascent of medical technology in futility cases); JOHN D. LANTOS & WILLIAM
MEADOW, NEONATAL BIOETHICS: THE MORAL CHALLENGES OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 18-52
(2006) (describing moral controversies arising from advances in neonatal care).
12. John Lantos, When Parents Request Seemingly Futile Treatment for their Children,
73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 587, 588 (2006); Gay Moldow et al., Why Address Medical Futility
Now?, MINN. MED., June 2004, at 38, 38.
13. See Thomas Wm. Mayo, Living and Dying in a Post-Schiavo World, 38 J. HEALTH L.
587, 587-88 n.3 (2006) (citing S. 570, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2005)) (stating that eighty
percent of deaths in America occur in hospitals).
14. See Arthur E. Kopelman, Understanding, Avoiding, and Resolving End-of-Life
Conflicts in the NICU, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 580, 580 (2006) ("Eighty percent of the deaths
that occur in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) are preceded by decisions to limit,
withhold, or withdraw life support .. "); Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 3 ("[The majority of
patients in modem hospitals today die as a result of a deliberate decision to withhold or
withdraw treatment."); Thomas J. Prendergast & John M. Luce, Increasing Incidence of.
Withholding and Withdrawal ofLife Support from the Critically Ill, 155 AM. J. RESPIRATORY &
CRITICAL CARE MED. 15, 15 (1997) ("[W] ithholding or withdrawal of life support precedes 40
to 65% of deaths in intensive care facilities.").
15. Nancy Dubler, Limiting Technology in the Process of Negotiating Death, I YALE J.
[Vol. 75:1
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B. The Right to Die
For some individuals the possibility of extended life is meaningful and
beneficial. For others, the artificial prolongation of life may provide nothing
beneficial and serve only to extend suffering and prolong the dying process. To
accommodate these varying attitudes, the rise of modem life-sustaining medical
technologies was accompanied by the rise of patient autonomy.16
During the 1970s and 1980s, appellate courts across the country decided
numerous cases in which patients and patients' families wanted to withdraw or
withhold LSMT but health care providers were reluctant to cede to such
requests. 17  These cases firmly established the right of patients to refuse
LSMT.18 These cases also established the right of surrogates to exercise this
right for patients who were incompetent and unable to exercise it for
themselves.19
Today, all states have laws enabling patients and surrogates to refuse
medical care. 0 Patients and surrogates decide whether LSMT is beneficial
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETIcs 297, 297 (2001) (reviewing MANAGING DEATH IN THE INTENSIVE
CARE UNIT: THE TRANSITION FROM CURE TO COMFORT (J. Randall Curtis & Gordon D.
Rubenfield eds., 2001) [hereinafter MANAGING DEATH]); see Thomas J. Prendergast et al., A
National Survey of End-of-Life Care for Critically Ill Patients, 158 AM. J. RESPIRATORY &
CRITICAL CARE MED. 1163, 1163 (1998). See generally COLBY, supra note 11, at 95-107
(discussing the correlation between the increasing life expectancy and the rising use of LSMT).
16. See Matthew S. Ferguson, Ethical Postures of Futility and California's Uniform
Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1230 (2002) ("As we moved into the
1990s, however, patients became consumers of medical technology, often forcing the hands of
their doctors by seeking to determine when treatment should be applied.").
17. See generally ALAN MEISEL& KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHTTO DIE § 2 (3d ed. 2005
& Supp. 2007) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO DIE] (discussing legal development of end-of-life
decision making); CLAIRE C. OBADE, PATIENT CARE DECISION-MAKING: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR
PROVIDERS chs. 7-8 (1991 & Supp. 2006) (providing case law guidance for balancing patient
rights with medical responsibilities).
18. See generally THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 17, at § 2 (tracing the right to die from its
common law roots to Supreme Court jurisprudence); OBADE, supra note 17, at chs. 7-8
(discussing exceptions to the general rule requiring treatment and the legal bases for such
exceptions).
19. See generally THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 17, at § 4; OBADE, supra note 17, at chs.
9, 11. This Article employs the term "surrogate" to refer to all those who are authorized to
make health care decisions on behalf of the patient, whether appointed by the patient herself
(e.g, agents, surrogates), by a court (e.g., guardians, conservators), or by default legal rules (e.g.,
surrogates). Most patients are unable to communicate with providers at the time decisions are
made about stopping LSMT. See MANAGING DEATH, supra note 15, at 364; Seth Rivera et al.,
Motivating Factors in Futile Clinical Interventions, 119 CHEST J. 1944, 1945 (2001) ("None of
the patients were able to participate in the decision-making process of their own care since they
were universally too impaired."). Therefore, these decisions are usually made by surrogates.
20. See generally THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 17, at § 7; OBADE, supra note 17,
at app. A.
2007]
TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW
given their own values and particular circumstances. 21 Health care providers
must generally comply with decisions to refuse LSMT.22
C. Nature of Medical Futility Disputes
23
A medical futility dispute arises when a health care provider seeks to stop
LSMT that the patient or surrogate wants continued. A medical futility
dispute is sometimes referred to as a "reverse right to die," 25 a "right to life," 26 a
"duty to die," 27 or even an "involuntary euthanasia ' 28 situation. In a classic
right to die situation, the patient or the surrogate wants to limit LSMT but the
21. See infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681,683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding
doctor who complied with patient's initial refusal of LSMT could not be held subsequently
liable for patient's death); Osgood v. Genesys Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Genesee
County Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1996), noted in THE RIGHT TO DU, supra note 17, § 11.01 [A] (Supp.
2005) (awarding $16.6 million verdict where the ICU provided LSMT to a patient in
contravention of her agent's demands); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (authorizing battery action for maintaining a PVS patient on a respirator
against her previously expressed wishes); see also Elena N. Cohen, Refusing and Forgoing
Treatment: Liability Issues, in 3 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAw §§ 18.07[1] & 18.07[2] nn.45-
56 (Alexander M. Capron & Irwin M. Birnbaum eds., 2005) (detailing the success of claims for
providing unwanted treatment on various legal grounds); Barriers to End ofLife Care-Not in
My ER, Not in My Nursing Home, 11 L. & HEALTH CARE NEWSL., Spring 2004, at 16, 20
[hereinafter Barriers] (reporting Maryland state agency fined nursing home for failing to heed
resident's advance directive); Amy Lyrm Sorrel, Lawsuit Showcases DNR Liability Twist for
Doctors, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2007/02/05/prl20205.htm (noting that courts in Florida increasingly hold
providers liable for providing unwanted LSMT).
23. There is an enormous literature on the definition of "medical futility" and the ethical
justifiability of unilateral decisions. This Article provides neither a conceptual analysis nor a
normative defense of "medical futility." While these issues provide essential context, this
Article focuses on the effects of the unilateral decision statutes and on the effectiveness of their
safe harbors.
24. See Flamm, supra note 10, at 11 n. 1 (medical futility describes situations where
patients or surrogates demand LSMT which the health care provider believes to be un-useful or
harmful)
25. See, e.g., Mayo, supra note 13, at 602 n.68; see also THE RIGHT TO DiE, supra note 17,
§ 13.01 [B] at 13-4 (referencing the "reverse end-of-life").
26. See, e.g., Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Conflict and Consensus at the End of Life, 35
HASTINGS CTR. REP. (SPECIAL REPORT), Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S19; Leigh B. Middleditch Jr. &
Joel H. Trotter, The Right to Live, 5 ELDER L.J. 395, 397 (1997); Wesley J. Smith, Suingfor the
Right to Live, THE DAILY STANDARD, Mar. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/836zeecs.asp.
27. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., Mary Ann Roser, Debate Heats Up on JO-Day Medical Law, AuSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 10, 2006, at BI.
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health care provider resists. 29 This is represented as situation (3) in the diagram
below. In contrast, in a futility situation, the roles are reversed such that the
health care provider wants to limit LSMT and the patient or the surrogate
resists. 30 This is represented as situation (2) in the diagram below.
Provider: "LSMT yes" Provider: "LSMT no"
Patient/Surrogate: (1) Consensus - no dispute (2) Medical futility
"LSMT yes" dispute
Patient/Surrogate: (3) Classic right to die (4) Consensus - no
"LSMT no" dispute dispute
In a futility dispute, it is the health care provider, rather than the patient or
surrogate, who judges LSMT as unbeneficial.3 1 In other words, it is the health
care provider who wants to stop the train when the patient or surrogate says,
"keep going."
32
Often the surrogate and the health care provider's disagreement over
whether LSMT provides a benefit is caused by a failure in communication; the
surrogate and provider perceive the situation differently.33 In other cases, the
disagreement is normative. 34  Whether for factual or normative reasons,
29. See, e.g., Mayo, supra note 13, at 587.
30. For the sake of economy, this Article assumes that there are only two relevant players:
the patient and the health care provider. Of course, things are actually often far more
complicated. When, as is often the case, the patient is incompetent, it may not always be clear
who is the appropriate decision maker or there may be intra-family disagreement as to the
proper action. See, e.g., In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 (Ga. 1992) (finding hospital could not enter
DNR order where mother agreed to DNR order for daughter but father did not); Lebreton v.
Rabito, 650 So. 2d 1245, 1246-47 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing daughter's lawsuit against
physicians for withdrawing LSMT from father because withdrawal was authorized by
wife/mother but strongly suggesting that her claim had no merit); NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER &
CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS 10 (2004);
Troyen A. Brennan, Ethics Committees and Decisions to Limit Care, 260 JAMA 803, 806
(1988) (remarking that health care provider's recommendation of DNR order for an incompetent
patient is controversial where there was no family present to make decision or family was
divided over choice). Similarly, on the provider side there may be disagreement among
residents, nurses, or attending physicians. See Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 488
A.2d 229, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (reviewing termination of nurse's employmet
for refusing to administer dialysis to terminally ill patient); Arthur U. Rivin, Futile Care Policy:
Lessons Learnedfrom Three Years'Experience in a Community Hospital, 166 W. J. MED. 389,
390 (1997).
31. See K. Francis Lee, Postoperative Futile Care: Stopping the Train When the Family
Says "Keep Going", 15 THORACIC SURGERY CLINICS 481, 481 (2005).
32. Id.
33. See JOSEPH J. FINS, A PALLATIVE ETHIC OF CARE: CLINICAL WISDOM AT LIFE'S END
82-86 (2006); see also infra notes 70-72, 89-92 and accompanying text.
34. Cf FINS, supra note 33, at 82-86 (describing how most, but not all, disagreements
between patients and surrogates or providers are caused by miscommunication).
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however, the provider and surrogate disagree because they have different
goals.35 The patient's goals might include cure, amelioration of disability,
palliation of symptoms, reversal of disease processes, or prolongation of life.
The provider, on the other hand, might judge these goals to be impossible,
virtually impossible, or otherwise inappropriate under the circumstances.36
1. Patient and Surrogate Reasons for Insisting on Treatment
Surrogates are often inclined to request that "everything [be] done."
37
There are many reasons that surrogates insist on continuing treatment that their
health care provider considers medically inappropriate. Surrogates might think
that the health care provider's prognosis is wrong, perhaps distrusting that the
patient is receiving proper care either because of their race or socioeconomic
status38 or because of their provider's financial incentives. 39 A significant
volume of scientific literature demonstrates that patients from racial and ethnic
minorities more frequently and more adamantly demand LSMT.4 °
35. Cf Thomas Wm. Mayo, Health Care Law, 53 SMU L. REV. 1101, 1109-10 n.78
(2000) ("[T]he disagreement is over what constitutes a 'benefit' to the patient ...."). The
Supreme Court observed that when questioning the benefit of LSMT, the relevant question to
ask is "effective at doing what?" LSMT for Nancy Cruzan, after all, was "100 percent effective
at sustaining life." Transcript of Oral Argument at *28, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1989) (No. 88-1503).
36. See infra Part III (providing definitions of medical inappropriateness).
37. See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN & NANCY S. JECKER, WRONG MEDICINE:
DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE TREATMENT 22-34 (1995) [hereinafter WRONG MEDICINE];
John Ellement, Woman Suing MGH Tells Court of Distress, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1995, at
B 18; Donalee Moulton, Death, Denial and the Law, 40 MED. POST (Toronto), May 4, 2004, at
29 ("[Tlhis is the recommendation of a doctor or health-care team not to do anything further, to
stop treatment of not proceed with a treatment. It is a recommendation patients and families
often refuse to accept").
38. See, e.g., FINS, supra note 33, at 78 ("An especially difficult dynamic can arise when
the family believes that the patient's dire condition was precipitated by a medical error or if they
are suspicious that substandard care is being provided because the patient is from a traditionally
marginalized population."); Lee, supra note 31, at 483; Moseley, supra note 4, at 212-13; Mary
Ellen Wojtasiewicz, Damage Compounded: Disparities, Distrust, and Disparate Impact in End-
of-Life Conflict Resolution Policies, 6 AM. J. BIOETHmCS, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 8-12; Pam Belluck,
Even as Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to Prolong Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,2005, at A l
(reporting that some "patients and families ... are skeptical of doctors' interpretations or
intentions").
39. See Pope & Waldman, supra note 9, at 164-65.
40. See, e.g., William Bayer et al., Attitudes TowardLife-Sustaining Interventions Among
Ambulatory Black and White Patients, 16 ETHNIClTY & DISEASE 914 (2006); Ursula K. Braun et
al., Decreasing Use of Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastronomy Tube Feeding for Veterans with
Dementia-RacialDifferences Remain, 53 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'y 242 (2005); Marion Danis,
Improving End-of-Life Care in the ICU: What's to be Learnedfrom the Outcomes Research, 6
NEW HORIzONS 110 (1998); Michael N. Diringer et al., Factors Associated with Withdrawal of
Mechanical Ventilation in a Neurology/Neurosurgery Intensive Care Unit, 29 CRITICAL CARE
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Even if not distrustful of health care providers, surrogates might be in
denial or under a "therapeutic illusion" that the patient can recover or that a
new therapy will come along.41 Access to online medical information makes
surrogates more confident in opposing providers' recommendations.42 Even in
the face of clear and dire medical facts, family members often hold out hope
that the patient will "beat the odds.
'A3
Even when surrogates appreciate that the odds are exceedingly slim, they
may believe that those odds are still worth pursuing. They might believe that
God will perform a miracle.44 They might otherwise be compelled by religious
or cultural traditions.45
MED. 1792 (2001); Kevin Fiscella, Socioeconomic Status in Healthcare Outcomes: Selection
Bias or Biased Treatment, 42 MED. CARE 939 (2004); Joanne Mills Garrett et al., Life-
Sustaining Treatments During Terminal Illness: Who Wants What?, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
361 (1993); Faith P. Hopp & Sonia A. Duffy, Racial Variations in End-of-Life Care, 48 J. AM.
GERIATRIC Soc'v 658 (2000); Hilary Waldman, End-of-Life Care, Viewed in Stark Black and
White, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at FS. But see Amber E. Bamato et al., Racial Variation in
End-of-Life Intensive Care Use: A Race or Hospital Effect?, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 2219,
2219 (2006) (arguing that differences were attributable to the use of hospitals with higher ICU
use rather than to racial differences).
41. See Middleditch & Trotter, supra note 26, at 402-03 (discussing modem "culture's
persistent denial of death's reality"); Stacey A. Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the
Law and Ethics of Treatment, Research, and Public Policy in the Context of Severe Traumatic
Brain Injury, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 2 n.5, 26 n.153 (2005) (discussing "therapeutic
illusions" where patients have "false hopes despite the lack of future benefit").
42. Julie Sneider, Medical Ethics Experts See Shift in Care Disputes, MILWAUKEE Bus. J.,
Apr. 22, 2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2005/
04/25/focus2.html.
43. See Clare Dyer, Doctors Need not Ventilate Baby to Prolong His Life, 329 BMJ 995,
995 (2004) (reporting that two mothers of terminally ill infants rejected medical advice because
their babies were "'fighters'... [and] had lived longer than doctors had predicted .... ); Todd
Ackerman, Hospital Rules to Unplug Baby Girl: Leukemia Patient's Parents Scramble to Find
New Care Facility, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 30, 2005, at BI (reporting that the mother of Knya
Dismuke-Howard, a six-month old girl with leukemia in her brain, multiple organ failure, and a
life-threatening antibiotic-resistant infection stated, "I think she can beat the odds .... She's a
fighter."); Belluck, supra note 38, at Al ("Extraordinary medical advances have stoked the
hopes of families."); Bill Murphy, Life and Death Matter Goes to Court: Comatose Man's
Relatives Fighting State Law, Hospital to Keep Him Alive, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 18,2001, at
A37 (reporting that relatives opposed to removing life support did not "share the conclusion that
[patient's] condition [was] hopeless"). Cf In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("[W]e understand why a parent.., would hold out hope .... If Mrs.
Schiavo were our own daughter, we could not but hold to such a faith.").
44. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("The mother
opposes the discontinuation of ventilator treatment.., because she believes that all human life
has value .... [and] that God will work a miracle if it is his will."); Lee, supra note 3 1, at 483;
Robert Sibbald et al., Perception of "Futile Care" Among Caregivers in Intensive Care Units,
177 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1201, 1204 (2007); Parents Fear Home Delay May Keep
'Miracle'Baby Charlotte in Hospital, BIRMINGHAM POST (UK), Jan. 7,2006, at 3 (reporting that
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The surrogates may feel a sense of responsibility or guilt with respect to
their relationship to the patient.46 They might be too grief stricken to stop
treatment.47 Or they might-consistent with the technological imperative in
parents of Charlotte Wyatt were "committed Christians" who believed that "miracles do
happen")Ed Yeates, Parents Fight to Keep Son on Life Support (KSL TV5 broadcast Oct. 13,
2004) (transcript on file with Tennessee Law Review) (parents sought an injunction to stop
physicians from disconnecting their son from life support even though he was declared dead
because "we performed a miracle and I don't see why we can't do that again").
45. See, e.g., Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57, 62 (Dauphin County
Ct. C.P. Dec. 29, 1995) (No. 872S1995), 1995 WL 924561 (parents opposed to removing
ventilator from daughter because of "religious belief that all human life has value and should be
protected"); James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, ChildAbuse by Whom?-Parental Rights
and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K and Baby Terry Cases, 20 OIo N.U. L.
REv. 821, 841 (1994) ("I cannot make that decision to terminate life. God did not give me that
power." (quoting Brief of Appellant, In re Achtabowski, No. 93-1247-AV, at 39 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 12, 1993) (No. 170251))); Lee, supra note 3 1, at 483; John Carvel, Muslim Family Lose
Right-to-Life Appeal, GUARDIAN, Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/O,,5276201-103690,00.html (noting the "family's religious
conviction"); Bill Murphy, Comatose Man Dies After Battle Over Life Support: Family Cited
Spiritual Beliefs, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 23, 2001, at A29 (reporting that for spiritual and
cultural reasons, the family of Joseph Ndiyob sought an injunction preventing Memorial
Hermann Hospital from removing Ndiyob's life support); Emily Ramshaw, Children Fight to
Save Mom: Carrollton Hospital Seeks to End Care of Woman with Brain Injury, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, at B 1 (injured woman's children believed that their mother,
"Ruthie Webster, [was] deeply religious and believe[d] only God should give and take life");
Kevin Rollason, Jewish Kin Say Pulling Plug Would Be a Sin, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Dec. 11,
2007, at A4 (family of Samuel Golubchuk sought injunction against removing LSMT since
Orthodox Jews believe life must be extended as long as possible); Benjamin Weiser, The Case
of Baby Rena: Who Decides When Care is Futile?-A Question of Letting Go: A Child's
Trauma Drives Doctors to Reexamine Ethical Role, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, at Al
(discussing the religious views of Baby Rena's foster parents).
46. Lee, supra note 31, at 483 ("Many [surrogates] believe it is morally wrong to end a
patient's life intentionally or to allow a patient's life to end without available interventions.");
John J. Paris et al., Has the Emphasis on Autonomy Gone Too Far? Insights from Dostoevsky
on Parental Decisionmaking in the NICU, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHIcs 147, 147
(2006); Jan Hoffman, The Last Word on the Last Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at Fl
("Families often believe that consenting to a D.N.R. order implies they are giving up on their
loved one, signing a death warrant .. "); Ann Wlazelek, Pendulum Swings in Life-Saving
Efforts; Hospitals 'Policies on Doing All They Can to Keep Patients Alive Have Changed, THE
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, June 13, 2004, at Al ("'It's dangerous to give the family the last
word since guilt and a desire to do everything for pop makes it emotionally impossible to stop
treatment."' (quoting Arthur Caplan)).
47. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, Abandoning a Waning Life, 25 HASTINGS CTR.
REP., July-Aug. 1995, at 24 (reporting that Massachusetts General Hospital wrote a unilateral
DNR because "the family's unpreparedness for their mother's death did 'not justify mistreating
the patient."'); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for
Incompetent Patients: An Ethical and Empirical Analysis, 267 JAMA 2067, 2067-68 (1992)
(discussing that many family members find that they cannot let the patient go).
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American medicine48-simply believe that the patient is entitled to
everything.49 Whatever the reason, more and more surrogates want their health
care providers to "do everything to save [the patient's] life."5°
2. Provider Reasons for Resisting Treatment
In some circumstances, health care providers resist surrogate requests that
"everything be done." Such resistance stems from a significant consensus that
some requests for treatment are inappropriate and that health care providers
should not comply with them. 51 While no consensus exists on the specific
48. This is the mindset that because doctors can use a given technology, they should use
that technology. See Kathy Cerminara, Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients
Seeking Last-Chance Therapies (Even When the Answer Is "No '), 15 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-
MED. 285, 296 (2005) (commenting that this "technological imperative" has subordinated the
general availability of health care services to the pursuit of medical research); Robert L. Fine,
The History of Institutional Ethics at Baylor University Medical Center, 17 BAYLOR U. MED.
CTR. PROC. 73, 81-82 (2004) (explaining how medical innovation causes "moral tension" in
regards to "distributive justice and fairness"). See generally VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL
LIvE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE (1974) (describing the limitations that
economics places on how health care resources are allocated in terms of both equity and
efficiency).
49. See, e.g., Kopelman, supra note 14, at 582-85; Alan Meisel, The Role ofLitigation in
End of Life Care: A Reappraisal, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REP. (SPECIALREPORT), Nov.-Dec. 2005, at
S49 ("A vocal proportion of the population ... believes that life per se is a pearl beyond price
and must be preserved at all costs .... This set of beliefs [is] known as 'vitalism'...."); Rivin,
supra note 30, at 392; James W. Walter, Medical Futility-An Ethical Issue for Clinicians and
Patients, PRACTICAL BIOETHICS, Summer 2005, at 1, 1, 6. Particularly where LSMT is covered
by insurance, it is financially easy for surrogates to insist on continued treatment. All the
economic and social costs are external. The insurer pays through other policyholders. Health
care providers, particularly nurses, bear the emotional burden of treating the patient. See Robert
M. Taylor & John D. Lantos, The Politics of Medical Futility, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 9 (1995)
(comparing the benefit to family and friends for prolonging the patient's life and the burden
subsequently carried by the medical professionals and insurance companies); see also Todd
Ackerman, St. Luke's Postpones Removal of Life Support: Man's Family Has Until 3p.m. to
Explore Any Possible Appeals, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12, 2005, at BI ("[T]he family
understands there is no hope... [but] 'the decision when life support is removed should be [the
family's], not a corporation's."').
50. See News Release, Pew Res. Ctr. for the People and the Press, More Americans
Discussing- and Planning-End-of-Life Treatment: Strong Public Supportfor Right to Die 24
(Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/266.pdf (reporting that between
1990 and 2005, the percentage of Americans who want a doctor to "do everything to save life"
increased from 15% to 22%); see also Sneider, supra note 42 ("[M]ore families are challenging
doctors who believe additional medical treatment of a critically ill patient is unwarranted.").
51. For this reason, this Article starts with the controversial presumption that the law
should facilitate health care providers' ability to unilaterally terminate LSMT. However, some
physicians do not resist patient requests for inappropriate LSMT for several reasons. First,
some treating physicians judge that the conflict is not worth the trouble, especially when they
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criteria and conditions under which providers may decline to comply with
requests for LSMT, the appropriateness of unilateral refusals has long been
accepted.52 In fact, a plethora of professional medical associations have issued
policy statements sulporting the unilateral withholding and withdrawal of
inappropriate LSMT.
will soon shift off rounds for that patient. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 47, at 24 (reporting
Catherine Gilgunn's original attending physician eventually deferred to the surrogate's request
to continue LSMT, but a month later, the new attending physician did not); Susan Carhart,
Process Approach to End-of-Life Care Fails to Eliminate Ethical, Political Issues, 11 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 1755, 1756 (2002) ("'[I]t's not worth the hassle .... ' (quoting Stephen
Streat)). Second, some physicians accede to requests for inappropriate LSMT because they do
not want to admit defeat. See, e.g., WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 25-28; ROBERT
ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE: MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 109 (1992) (noting
that doctors are "inclined towards activism"); MANAGING DEATH, supra note 15, at 377; Rivin,
supra note 30, at 392 (discussing the physicians' "attitude that death is the enemy" which leads
to a "compulsion to be thorough and to leave no possibility untried"); Tovino & Winslade,
supra note 41, at 27 (discussing vitalism and the "heroic urge to rescue"). Third, some
providers accede because of their own religious or cultural convictions. Rivin, supra note 30, at
392 tbl.2. Fourth, some agree with the requests out of a "desire to please the patient's family."
Id. Fifth, some providers accede because of reimbursement incentives. See Tovino &
Winslade, supra note 41, at 27.
52. See, e.g., 2 HIPPOCRATES, The Art, in HIPPOCRATES 193 (W.H.S. Jones trans. 1923)
(purpose of medicine includes "to refuse to treat those who are overmastered by their diseases,
realizing that in such cases medicine is powerless"); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 100 (408b) (Richard
W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., 1985) ("But they thought a man constitutionally sickly
and intemperate was of no use to himself or anyone else. They believed that the art of medicine
ought not to be squandered on his ilk and that he should not receive treatment even if he were
richer than Midas."); Lee, supra note 31, at 484 ("According to Hippocrates, 'to attempt futile
treatment is to display an ignorance that is allied with madness."') (citing L. EDELSTEIN,
ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 97-98 (0. Temkin & C.L. Temkin
eds., 1967)).
53. See, e.g., AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS
§§ 2.035,2.037 (2006-2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org; AMA Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care: Report of the Council on Ethicaland
Judicial Affairs, 281 JAMA 937, 938 (1999) [hereinafter AMA Council]; Am. College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee Opinion: Opinion No. 362: Medical Futility, 109
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 791 (Mar. 2007); Am. Thoracic Soc'y, Withholding and
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REv. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 726, 728 (1991);
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba, Statement No. 1602: Withholding and
Withdrawing Life Sustaining Treatment (Jan. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.cpsm.mb.ca/statements/1602.pdf; Soc'y of Critical Care Med. Ethics Comm.,
Consensus Statement Regarding Futile and Other Possibly Inadvisable Treatments, 25
CRITICAL CARE MED. 887, 888 (1997); 2004 House of Delegates Action on Resolutions and
Board Reports, 103 WIS. MED. J. 91, 91 (2004) [hereinafter House of Delegates Action]
(referencing the Wisconsin Medical Society Resolution 1-2004, which "establishes a legally
sanctioned extra-judicial process for resolving disputes regarding futile care"). See generally
BRIT. MED. AssoC., WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT
(2001) (providing guidance for such action).
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The policy statements are primarily motivated by four concerns, the most
significant of which is professional integrity. Physicians do not want to be
indentured servants,54 "reflexive automatons,"'. s "vending machines, 56
"prostitutes, '7 or "grocers ' 8 beholden to provide whatever treatment patients
or surrogates want. After all, medicine is not a "consumer commodity like
breakfast cereal and toothpaste. 59
The medical profession is a self-governing one with its own standards of
professional practice. 60 The "integrity of the medical profession" is an
important societal interest that must be balanced against patient autonomy.6'
54. E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, 24
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 18 ("The physician-patient relationship is not an
irrevocable indentured servitude .... ).
55. WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 58, 103-04 (stating that physicians are not
obligated to do everything a patient wants).
56. WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 9; Lawrence J. Nelson & R.M. Nelson, Ethics
and the Provision of Futile, Harmful, or Burdensome Treatment to Children, 20 CRITICAL CARE
MED. 427,431 (1992).
57. WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 126. Dr. Schneiderman has more recently further
developed this analogy, noting that "there were some things [prostitutes] would not do no matter
how much they were paid." LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN, EMBRACING OUR MORTALITY: HARD
CHOICES IN AN AGE OF MEDICAL MIRACLES 123 (2008).
58. Ellen Goodman, The Shiftfrom Dr. Partner to Dr. Provider, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24,
1993, at 85.
59. George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care-The
Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1545 (1994) (arguing for avoidance of the
scenario where "physicians will do whatever patients want (as long as they can pay for it),
because medicine will be seen as a consumer commodity like breakfast cereal and toothpaste");
see also Tom Tomlinson & Diane Czlonka, Futility and Hospital Policy, 25 HASTINGS CTR.
REP., May-June 1995, at 29 ("[T]he value assumptions made in cases of futility will have to
receive their warrant from . . .values for the profession."). But see Eric Gampel, Does
Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments?, 20 BIOETHICS 92, 97 (2006)
(arguing that while limits on physician autonomy are set by the norms of the medical community
rather than by individual providers, those limits do not extend to the futility context).
60. Gampel, supra note 59, at 97 (referencing the "right of the medical profession to be a
self-governing body, one which defines its own standards of professional practice").
61. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) ("The State also
has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession."); Superintendent
of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,425 (Mass. 1977) ("The interest of the
State in prolonging a life must be reconciled with the interest of an individual to reject the
traumatic cost of that prolongation."); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) ("[Tlhe
unwritten constitutional right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances ...."); Ferguson, supra note 16, at
1239-43 (noting that the UHCDA attempts to protect the ethical integrity of the medical
profession). The legal profession is similar to the medical profession in this respect. While
generally the client is in charge, a lawyer can withdraw from representation if "the client insists
upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant .. " ABA MODEL OF RULES PROF'L.
CONDUCT R. 1. 16(b)(4) (2006). Lawyers also have obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal
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Indeed, patient autonomy "has never been construed as requiring a health
professional to provide a particular type of treatment.', 62 Since the medical
profession determines the goals and values of medicine, it can judge certain
requests as inconsistent with those goals and values.63
In particular, many health care providers do not consider the practice of
medicine to include measures aimed solely at maintaining corporeal existence
and biologic functioning. 64 Under these circumstances, providers feel that
continued LSMT is just "bad medicine.., medicine being used for the wrong
ends., 65 Moreover, health care providers find it gruesome, distressing, and
demoralizing to provide treatment that harms patients.
66
Rules of Civil Procedure-lawyers cannot file frivolous lawsuits even if the client demands it.
See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE THIRD EDITION § 11.11 [1] (3d ed.
2007).
62. Loane Skene, Disputes about the Withdrawal of Treatment: The Role of Courts, 32 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 701,701 (2004) (citing Schwartz, infra note 105, at 32). Nevertheless, other
legal principles (e.g., nondiscrimination) have been construed to require providers to provide
treatment that they deemed inappropriate. See infra Part III.
63. See Gampel, supra note 59, at 97 (stating that a health care provider "may refuse
treatments which the medical profession gauges to be inappropriate, i.e. as being inconsistent
with the basic goals and values of medicine").
64. See, e.g., College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba, supra note 53, at 15-S4
("A patient is not just a physical being, but a person with a body, mind and spirit expressed in a
human personality of unique worth.").
65. See Weiser, supra note 45, at Al (quoting Dr. Murray Pollack).
66. See ZuSSMAN, supra note 51, at 123-38; Robert A. Burt, The Medical Futility
Debate: Patient Choice, Physician Obligation, andEnd-of-Life Care, 5 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 249,
253 (2002); Betty R. Ferrell, Understanding the MoralDistress ofNurses Witnessing Medically
Futile Care, 33 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 922 (2006); Terese Hudson, Are Futile-Care Policies
the Answer? Providers Struggle with Decisions for Patients Near the End ofLife, 68 HOSPITALS
& HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1994, at 26,28; Stacey Burling, Penn Hospital to LimitIts Care
in Futile Cases: Severely Brain-Damaged Patients Won't Get Certain Treatments, as a Rule,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 4, 2002, at A1; Hoffman, supra note 46, at F l ("'[D]oing CPR [to end-
stage patients] felt not only pointless, but like I was administering final blows to someone who
had already had a hard enough life."' (quoting Dr. Daniel Sulmasy)); Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital,
Family Spar Over End-of-Life Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2005, at Al [hereinafter
Kowalczyk, Hospital, Family Spar] ("Howe's longtime doctors and nurses believe[d] ... that
keeping her alive [was] tantamount to torture."); Liz Kowalczyk, Mortal Differences Divide
Hospital and Patient's Family, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28,2003, at Al [hereinafter Kowalczyk,
Mortal Differences] (reporting physician and nurse refused to participate in continued
aggressive treatment of Barbara Howe); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rules on Reviving the Dying Bring
Undue Suffering, Doctors Contend, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at AI ("Doctors and nurses...
describe anger and anguish at being forced by a patient or family to inflict pain on the dying,
knowing that it is to no avail."); Gregory Scott Loeben, Medical Futility and the Goals of
Medicine 98 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with
Tennessee Law Review) ("If such judgments are meant to benefit anyone, it makes more sense
to say that it is the physician... uncomfortable with the role [he is] being asked to play ... ").
Cf TOM L. BEAUCI-AMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHIcs 38 (5th ed.
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Second, in addition to professional integrity, providers resist inappropriate
treatment requests out of concern for the patient. Continued interventions can
be inhumane, invasive, pointless, intrusive, cruel, burdensome, abusive,
degrading, obscene, violent, or grotesque.67 For example, CPR can be painful,
causing rib or sternal fractures in a majority of cases. Health care providers
want to shorten and ease patient suffering; they do not want to cause or prolong
it.
69
A third reason that providers resist requests for inappropriate treatment is
that they do not want to offer false hope. If they acted as though a medically
inappropriate option were "available," this would create a psychological burden
on surrogates to elect that option regardless of their prior wishes.7 Naturally,
families want to at least take all reasonable measures. Yet, it is unfair and
2001) (defending the physician's right to autonomy and "conscientious objection" where the
patient's request for something is "morally objectionable").
67. See, e.g., In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3,4 (Ga. 1992) (failing to reach hospital's allegation
that continued treatment of a patient with degenerative neurological disease would constitute
"medical abuse"); Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 328-29 (Iowa 1998) (ignoring
testimony that doctor's unilateral decision not to attempt CPR was "an act of mercy" because
the patient's prospects for quality of life were "not good"); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134,
137 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (characterizing LSMT as "pointless, even cruel, prolongation of the
act of dying"); Brief of Appellants at 3, In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-
1899), 1993 WL 13123742 ("This tragic case involves a parent's attempt to require physicians
to provide to a dying infant treatment that is medically unreasonable, invasive, burdensome,
inhumane, and inappropriate."); John Altomare & Mark Bolde, Note, Nguyen v. Sacred Heart
Medical Center, 11 ISSUEs L. & MED. 199, 200 (1995) (observing hospital alleged continued
treatment was "cruel and inhumane"); Martha Kessler, Court Orders Hospital to Comply with
Decisions Made Under Health Proxy, 13 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 527, 527 (2004) (reporting
Massachusetts General Hospital successfully argued to a Boston court that CPR for Barbara
Howe would be "severe, invasive and harmful"); Kowalczyk, Hospital, Family Spar, supra note
66, at Al ("' [T]his inhumane travesty has gone far enough .... This is the Massachusetts
General Hospital, not Auschwitz."' (quoting Dr. Edwin Cassem)).
68. See generally WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 94 ("[A]ttempted cardiopulmonary
resuscitation could involve forceful, even violent, efforts at compressing the chest cage to the
point of fracturing ribs .. "); Paul C. Sorum, Limiting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 57
ALB. L. REv. 617, 617 (1994) ("The patient will usually receive the following interventions:
manual compressions of the chest ... ; one or more jolts of electricity to the chest... ; and
intravenous medications and fluids.").
69. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 100-01 ("[P]hysicians ... should be
encouraged or required to refrain from using futile treatments."); Capron, supra note 47, at 24
(unilateral termination can sometimes avoid "mistreating the patient").
70. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 59, at 1543 (calling the provision of mechanical
ventilation to Baby K after birth a "medical misjudgment" that gave the mother a false
impression); Allan S. Brett, Futility Revisited: Reflections on the Perspectives of Families,
Physicians, and Institutions, 17 HEC FORUM 276, 281-82 (2005) (discussing the
"psychologically difficult conundrum for families" in futility cases). But cf Fletcher, supra note
10, at S:224 (suggesting that the court documents in Baby K showed the physicians had certain
reasons to support intubation).
2007]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
deceptive to offer an option where none actually exists.71 If health care
providers offered ineffective treatment, they would risk losing public
confidence.72
Lastly, providers resist inappropriate treatment requests in an effort to
maximize the utility of scarce resources.73 Providers want to be good
"steward[s] '' 74 of both "hard" resources like ICU beds and "soft" resources like
health care dollars.75 While costs have seldom been a consideration in defining
when treatment is inappropriate,76 there is little doubt that costs have been a
major impetus for increasing attention on medical futility.77 Thus, the issue of
71. See Howard Brody, The Physician's Role in Determining Futility, 42 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 875, 876-77 (1994) (unethical to mislead patients by falsely raising hopes);
Hudson, supra note 66, at 28 (quoting Dr. John Popovich's argument that "physicians who offer
futile, meaningless care are charlatans"); Paris, supra note 46, at 150 (discussing how offering
futile options gives false hope and unrealistic expectations to family members ultimately leading
to "demands for more and more interventions and the risk of further complications"); Tomlinson
& Czlonka, supra note 59, at 28, 30 (offering futile care is "a bogus choice, and the offer of it is
a deception"; rather, providers should seek "acceptance" of a plan for a futilityjudgment rather
than "consent").
72. See Brody, supra note 71, at 876-77 (discussing the importance of maintaining the
medical profession's integrity).
73. See Rosenthal, supra note 66, at Al ("Doctors and nurses... question whether futile
resuscitations, which can costs thousands of dollars and tie up precious intensive care beds,
make sense in an era of rising health costs."). Cf WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 42
(treating 14,000 to 25,000 patients in a permanent vegetative state has estimated cost between
$1 billion and $7 billion per year); Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A
Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1597, 1611 (1992) (estimating that
Missouri spent nearly $1 million to keep Nancy Cruzan in a persistent vegetative state for eight
years).
74. S.H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991).
75. See infra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 188-97 and accompanying text. But see Murphy, supra note 43, at
A37 (while Joseph Ndiyob's lack of health insurance and costs approaching $500,000 did not
influence his attending physician's recommendation to stop treatment, the hospital's "medical
futility review committee" did consider "whether the hospital should expend resources on a
terminal patient rather than one who may recover").
77. See Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57, 62 (Dauphin County Ct.
C.P. Dec. 29, 1995) (No. 872S1995), 1995 WL 924561 (noting that a day after learning that
patient's private health insurance was almost exhausted, hospital entered DNR order for
patient); Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Comm. of the
Whole, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Aug. 2, 1993, at 269-70 (statement of Comm'r
King Hill) (noting that "medically ineffective" refers to costs). Mr. Hill explained:
"This says to the physician that you don't have to institute some new radical $200,000
procedure if it's only going to keep the patient alive for two or three months, even though
there may be many articles in the journals that say that's an accepted health-care standard
for a [twenty-two] year old."
Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Comm. of the Whole,
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medically futile treatment is likely to increase in the future as concerns about
costs for such treatment grows.7
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Aug. 2, 1993, at 269-70 (statement of Comm'r King Hill);
see also J.K. MASON & G.T. LAURIE, Medical Futility, in MASON AND McCALL SMITH's LAW
AND MEDICAL ETHICS 539, 571-74 (7th ed. 2006) ("[Tlhe law clearly accepts that resource
allocation forms a proper part of medical decision making."); Hudson, supra note 66, at 26
(noting that "economic losses for the hospital" motivated the futility of care policy at Santa
Monica Hospital); Lantos, supra note 12, at 588-89 (discussing the "fundamental economic
element" involved in futility determinations); Middleditch & Trotter, supra note 26, at 404
("[T]he right to live may have less to do with societal conceptions of death or the legal doctrine
of patient autonomy and more to do with money."); Rivin, supra note 30, at 389 (describing
how the futile care policy developed directly from a review of the medical center's "financial
losers"); Taylor & Lantos, supra note 49, at 7 ("We believe that the futility debate was more
immediately motivated by changes in the way doctors and hospitals are paid."); Benjamin
Weiser, The Case of Baby Rena: Who Decides When Care is Futile?-Who Should Decide
When Treatment is Futile? In Many Cases, Physicians Are Asking Whether Patient Autonomy
Has Gone Too Far, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, at A19 ("It is not a coincidence that futility
emerged as an issue in the mid- 1 980s only after the government limited hospital reimbursement
for many patients."). Costs were similarly a motivation for moving from cardiopulmonary to
neurological criteria for death. See, e.g., Henry K. Beecher et al., A Definition of Irreversible
Coma, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, 205 JAMA 337, 337 (1968) ("Our primary purpose is to define
irreversible coma as a new criterion for death").
78. See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETHICS 3 (6th ed. 2003) ("[T]he Baby K situation may become more typical as a result
of greater pressure on physicians to limit medical costs."); JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF ET AL.,
ELDERLAW: ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 13:26, at 500-01 (2d ed. 1993); THE RIGHT TO DIE,
supra note 17, § 13.01[C] at 13-5, § 13.09 at 13-43; Donald J. Murphy, The Economics of
Futile Interventions, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
INTERVENTIONS 123, 133 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997) (arguing that the
"economics of futile interventions deserves more study"); Ronald Bailey, Pulling the Plug on
Unwilling Patients: Should the High Cost ofLiving Affect Your Chances of Dying?, REASON,
Feb. 10, 2006, available at http://www.reason.com/news/printer/35016.html ("[I]t is clear that
in the real world of limited medical resources that the 'authorities,' whether private or
governmental, will unavoidably be making similar life and death decisions in the future.");
Miran Epstein, Legitimizing the Shameful: End-of-Life Ethics and the Political Economy of
Death, 21 BIOETHICS 23 (2007); Gampel, supra note 59, at 98 (predicting "managerial pressures
on [health care providers] to use and extend the category of futility .. "); Kowalczyk, Mortal
Differences, supra note 66, at Al ("[H]ospitals will go to court more often to remove patients
from life support, 'as health care becomes more of a scarce commodity .... ' (quoting law
professor Charles Baron)); Wlazelek, supra note 46 (.' [B]ecause of the rising cost of health
care, someone like the government or insurers will dictate that if you have X, Y, or Z you will
not get the care."' (quoting Joseph Vincent)); cf CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING (Jan. 2008) (urging less
and more cost-effective use of medical technology).
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3. Limits on Resisting Treatment
Whatever might be their motivations for stopping LSMT, health care
providers generally recognize two important limits on the extent to which they
will resist a surrogate's request for LSMT: (1) comfort care and (2)
accommodation. First, even when LSMT is stopped, providers will continue to
administer comfort care. 79 They will continue to ensure the patient's comfort
by providing services that include oral and body hygiene, reasonable efforts to
offer food and fluids orally, medication, positioning, warmth, appropriate
lighting, and other measures aimed at relieving pain and suffering or respecting
the patient's dignity and humanity.80 In short, stopping treatment does not
mean stopping care.
Second, even when they consider continued LSMT to be inappropriate,
providers will generally make a short-term accommodation of the surrogate's
wishes.8' Providers will respect patient treatment goals such as providing time
to resolve personal matters, grieving, and allowing time to say goodbye.82
Brain dead patients are oftentimes maintained on life support for several hours
or days as a matter of sensitivity to religious, cultural, or moral values.
83
79. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-573(a) (1993) ("Notwithstanding the [unilateral
decision] provisions . . . , comfort care and pain alleviation shall be provided in all cases.");
MINN. STAT. § 145B. 13(1) (1991) (upon withdrawal of LSMT, there should be a "a continuation
of appropriate care to maintain the patient's comfort, hygiene, and human dignity and to
alleviate pain"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-67(b) (1991) (decision to forego LSMT does not
impair care and comfort obligations); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.642 (2005) (care to provide comfort
and cleanliness should be administered after withdrawal of LSMT); Pellegrino, supra note 10, at
309 ("Care [and] comfort ... are never futile.").
80. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145B.13(1); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.642.
81. See, e.g., Erich H. Loewy & Richard A. Carlson, Futility andits Wider Implications:
A Concept in Need of Further Examination, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 429,429-30 (1993)
(defending extending treatment for a reasonable time to allow family to come to terms with the
situation, because while medically inappropriate, treatment may have social value).
82. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 17, § 13.08[A] at 13-40 ("[T]reatment might be
rendered despite its certain or probable lack of medical benefit occurs when the patient or family
has personal, 'non-medical' reasons for wanting the treatment...."); WRONG MEDICINE, supra
note 37, at 166; Carhart, supra note 51, at 1755 ("'[W]hy not just leave the machines on for two
weeks?' (quoting health law attorney Shirley Paine)); Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:236
(arguing that physicians should be permitted to discontinue treatment "after a grace period of
adjustment"); Pellegrino, supra note 10, at 315-16 (urging a "permissive" rather than an "overly
rigorous" application of futility because the family needs "time to adjust" and a patient might
like to see "a grandchild born, or have a last meeting with family or friends"); Skene, supra note
62, at 701 (arguing for the "broader aspect of patients' 'best interests'); Tomlinson & Czlonka,
supra note 59, at 29 (providers must consider "nonbiomedical goals"); David M. Zientek, The
Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: An Exercise in Futility?, 17 HEC FORUM 245, 253
(2005) (urging certain goals to be respected, such as "support[ing] life until a child overseas in
the military can return home for a last visit" or "continu[ing] life support to allow for spiritual
preparation for death").
83. See Dority v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288, 289 (Cal.
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D. The Resolution of Futility Disputes
The disagreement between surrogates and providers regarding continued
LSMT produces a significant number of futility disputes each year.
84
Fortunately, the vast majority of these disputes are resolved internally and
informally through good communication and mediation practices. 85  The
standard dispute resolution process consists of six roughly chronological
stages.86 Most futility disputes are resolved within the first five stages.87
Ct. App. 1983) (describing hospital policy of keeping brain dead children on life support "until
the parents were emotionally able to realize what the medical opinion was"); Lorry R. Frankel &
Chester J. Randle Jr., Complexities in the Management of a Brain-Dead Child, in ETHICAL
DILEMMAS IN PEDIATRICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 135, 137 (Lorry R. Frankel et al. eds.,
2005) ("On rare occasions, life support will be continued for a few more hours, pending arrival
of other family members."); Myra J. Edens et al., Neonatal Ethics: Development of a
Consultative Group, 86 PEDIATRICS 944, 947 (1990) ("[T]reatment is continued for a period of
time to allow the parents to come to terms with the hopelessness of [the] ... condition."); Rasa
Gustaitis, Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 81 PEDIATRICS 317, 319 (1988)
("[C]hildren have not infrequently been kept alive on life-support equipment for the sake of
others .... "); George J. Annas, When Death Is Not the End, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1996, at 19
("Maintaining a corpse in an intensive care unit for a few days may be reasonable as a matter of
sensitivity to religious or moral beliefs .... "); Yeates, supra note 44 (reporting that parents
tried to maintain the life support of their six-year old boy after he was declared dead by the
doctors). In some jurisdictions this is required by statute or regulation. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:6A-5 (1991) (exemption to accommodate patient or family's religious beliefs); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 400.16(e)(3) (1987) (allows for accommodations for an
"individual's religious or moral objection" to determinations of death).
84. One study found 974 futility disputes in sixteen hospitals over an average four-year
period. See Emily Ramshaw, Bills Challenge Care Limits for Terminal Patients: Some Say 10
Days to Transfer Isn't Enough Before Treatment Ends, DALLAS MORNINGNEWS, Feb. 15, 2007.
According to the American Hospital Association, there are 5,700 hospitals in the United States.
American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on US Hospitals, at 1 (2007),
http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2007/pdf/fastfacts2007.pdf. If the study's sample is
representative, then that rate of fifteen futility disputes per hospital per year means that there are
tens of thousands of futility disputes nationwide. However, there is reason to think that this
sample is not representative. One reason is that the sample is from Texas, a state where
physicians became more willing to resist inappropriate treatment requests after enactment of an
effective statutory safe harbor. See Robert L. Fine & Thomas Wm. Mayo, Resolution of Futility
by Due Process: Early Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 138 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 743, 745 (2003) [hereinafter Fine & Mayo] (upon passage of the statutory safe
harbors, futility consultations increased 67%); see also infra Parts V.C, VII.B (discussing the
Texas Advance Directives Act).
85. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
86. These stages track the process recommended by the AMA and endorsed by most
regional and facility policies. See AMA Council, supra note 53, at 939 (discussing the steps of
fair process in futility cases).
87. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing that few cases ever reach the
final stage of the process and thus, are presumably resolved in one of the previous stages).
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Nevertheless, a small but significant number of cases do proceed to the sixth
and final stage, where the provider must unilaterally decide whether to stop
treatment."8
Stage One: Ensure Good Communication by the Health Care Team. It is
best to avoid a futility dispute in the first place through careful
communication--clarifying the8goals of treatment, its possible outcomes, and
the patient's values and wishes. Many commentators argue that much more
can and should be done in this respect.9 Nevertheless, through education and
persuasion, the surrogate and the provider usually reach agreement. 9' Most
disputes are avoided or resolved at this stage.92
Stage Two: Bring in a Consultant. If the health care team is unable to
convince the surrogate to end LSMT, then the team typically employs an
individual consultant or mediator to negotiate an agreement between the
physician and patient.93 Professor Nancy Dubler explains that a bioethics
mediator "facilitates a discussion between and among the parties to the
88. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
89. See Chad Bowman, Disputes Over End-of-Life Care Treated Increasingly with
Mediation, 9 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1527, 1527 (2000) ("'If you communicate well enough,
often enough, and clearly enough, you will not have futility issues."' (quoting attorney Shirley J.
Paine)); Ursula Braun et al., Defining Limits in Care of Terminally Ill Patients, 334 BMJ 239,
239 (2007) ("Doctors should make clear that good medical care does not always mean doing
everything that is technically possible .. "); Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at 745 ("Most end-
of-life consultations ease the transition from curative to a palliative model of care and occur in
the absence of any particular conflict between parties."); Stanley A. Nasraway, Unilateral
Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Therapy: Is It Time? Are We Ready?, 29 CRITICAL CARE MED.
215, 217 (2001) (recommending "preemptive actions" to prevent conflicts from taking place).
90. For example, some commentators recommend that health care providers should not
offer non-indicated options because the family will feel guilty if they do not do everything. See
supra notes 46-50, 70-71 and accompanying text. Alternatively, providers should offer
inappropriate options only as a time-limited trial to be stopped if unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Tovino & Winslade, supra note 41, at 52-53.
91. Lantos, supra note 12, at 589 ("Generally, in such situations, doctors explain [the
situation] to the patients or their surrogates, the latter understand and accept the situation, and
treatment is withheld or withdrawn."). Of course, some disputes may be resolved not only
though persuasion but also through manipulation and coercion. Cf THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra
note 17, § 13.09 at 13-41 ("Some (perhaps most) futility cases can be resolved at the bedside,
without the necessity of litigation, by acquiescence of one of the parties to the view of the
other ... ").
92. See Robert L. Fine, The Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: Politics andReality,
13 HEC FORUM 59, 71-72 (2001) (reporting that "within a day or two of learning of the [dispute
resolution] process," families often agree to substitute comfort care in place of LSMT); Giles R.
Scofield, Medical Futility: Can We Talk?, 18 GENERATIONS 66, 67 (1994) (reporting evidence
that 94% of patients agree with their physician's recommendation to not attempt LSMT);
Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 59, at 34 ("[A]lmost all cases are resolved at this [first]
stage.").
93. See generally Pope & Waldman, supra note 9, at 155-58 (reviewing the relevant
literature on mediation in futility disputes).
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conflict[,]" helping the parties "to identify their goals and priorities and to
generate, explore, and exchange information and options."94 For many futility
disputes, "mediation can provide a process to assist in the formation of a care
plan that meets the needs of the patient and family and respects professional
commitments. 95
Stage Three: Go to the Hospital Ethics Committee. If the provider and
surrogate still disagree about the appropriate treatment for the patient, the
provider will typically ask the institutional ethics committee to intervene.96 The
committee usually, though not always, agrees with the treating physician's
recommendation to stop LSMT. 97
Upon receiving the committee's decision, the surrogate may agree to
terminate care.98 This acquiescence might stem from the passage of additional
time and the opportunity for more careful deliberation, making the surrogate
feel more secure about such a decision. 99 Moreover, if the ethics committee
indicates that it will authorize the unilateral withdrawal of treatment, the
surrogate may likely feel relieved from the burden of that decision.100
Stage Four. Change the Decision Maker. In some cases, the health care
provider may doubt that the surrogate's decision reflects the patient's actual
94. Dubler, supra note 26, at S24-S25.
95. Id. at S25.
96. See Hudson, supra note 66, at 26 ("The bioethics committee gets involved in about 2
percent of cases.., because by the time an ethics committee conference is scheduled, the issue
has often been resolved. . . or the patient dies before the conference is held.").
97. See, e.g., Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at 745 tbl.3 (reporting that one hospital's
ethics committee agreed with the attending physician 90% of the time).
98. Zientek, supra note 82, at 250. Doctor Zientek reported that "[o]f the 43 cases
deemed futile, in 37 cases the family agreed to withdrawal of treatment, while in six cases they
refused to accept withdrawal. Of these six cases, the families of three agreed to shifting to
comforting measures a 'few days' after receiving the committee's formal report." Id.; see Fine
& Mayo, supra note 84, at 745 (reporting that family decision makers accepted the committee's
judgment 86% of the time); Belluck, supra note 38, at Al ("Ethics committees resolve most
cases, often through repeated family discussions over weeks or months.").
99. See Robert D. Truog & Christine Mitchell, Futility-From Hospital Policies to State
Laws, 6 AM. J. BIOETICS 19, 20 (2006).
100. See Robert L. Fine et al., Medical Futility in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit: Hope
for a Resolution, 116 PEDIATRICS 1219, 1221 (2005) ("[T]he family was relieved because they
had 'put up the good fight' ... but now the decision was out of their hands."); Fine & Mayo,
supra note 84, at 745 ("'If you are asking us to agree with the recommendation to remove life
support from our loved one, we cannot. However,... if the law says it is OK to stop life
support, then that is what should happen."'); Lantos, supra note 12, at 589 ("The concept of
futility... has a moral role in helping absolve patients or surrogates of the moral obligation to
continue treatment."); Hoffman, supra note 46, at F l ("Families often believe that consenting to
a D.N.R. order implies they are giving up on their loved one, signing a death warrant, turning
their backs on hope."); Wlazelek, supra note 46 ("'It's dangerous to give the family the last
word since guilt and a desire to do everything for pop makes it emotionally impossible to stop
treatment."' (quoting Arthur Caplan)).
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preferences or best interests.101 Under these circumstances, providers may try
to switch the legally authorized decision maker to one that will agree with their
recommendation to cease LSMT.102 One strategy providers sometimes employ
to make the switch is to argue that LSMT constitutes abuse or neglect where it
primarily imposes burdens such as pain. 0 3 That is a difficult task because the
provider is usually not questioning whether the surrogate's decisions truly
reflect the patient's preferences or whether the surrogate is acting in the
patient's best interests. 104 Rather, the provider is just disagreeing with the
decision maker's determination.'05
101. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
102. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993) (remarking that mother's
treatment decision need not be respected if it "would constitute abuse or neglect"); Causey v. St.
Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1076 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 1998). The Causey court noted that
if a surrogate insists on inappropriate treatment, "the usual procedure ... is to transfer the
patient or go to court to replace the surrogate or override his decision. The argument would be
that the guardian or surrogate is guilty of abuse by insisting on care which is inhumane [or that
the surrogate is not fulfilling their statutorily provided role]." Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1076 n.3.
103. See, e.g., Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1031 (discussing whether continuing LSMT
constituted abuse); In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (Ga. 1992) (discussing but declining to decide
whether LSMT constituted "medical abuse"); see also Gustaitis, supra note 83, at 318-19
(suggesting use of child abuse laws to override parental requests for inappropriate treatment).
104. See, e.g., In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *3, *21 (Mass. Prob. &
Fam. Ct. Dept. Mar. 22, 2004) (refusing Massachusetts General Hospital's request to replace
Barbara Howe's daughter as her proxy); State of Minnesota District Court -Probate Court
Division County of Hennepin Fourth Judicial District, 7 Issues L. & Med. 369, 372 (1991)
(discussing In re Wanglie, where the court denied the hospital's request for conservator because
the patient's husband was the appropriate person to articulate her wishes); Weiser, supra note
45, at A18 (reporting how the district court rejected the hospital's attempt to replace a mother
who was demanding LSMT with a court-appointed guardian); cf In re Guardianship of Schiavo,
No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (denying Theresa
Schiavo's parents' motions to transfer guardianship from her husband). But see In re
Guardianship of Mason, 669 N.E.2d 1081, 1085-87 (Mass. App. 1996) (affirming probate
court's entry of DNR order and overriding patient's son's decision because he was in "denial
about the deterioration [of] his mother"); Bopp & Coleson, supra note 45, at 825-26 ("Baby
Terry's parents had 'specific incompetence' to choose Baby Terry's medical treatment.") (citing
Brief of Appellant at 5, In re Achtabowski, No. 93-1247-AV (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993)
(No. 170251)). Judicial hostility to surrogate shopping in these cases does seem to be waning.
See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Futility Cases, 9 MARQ.
ELDER'S ADVISOR (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1078983.
105. See Robert L. Schwartz, Autonomy, Futility, and the Limits of Medicine, 1
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHcs 159, 161 (1992) (arguing that whether Mr. Wanglie was his
wife's best substitute decision maker was the wrong question). Professor Schwartz posits that
"[t]he real question... [should have been] whether the continuation of ventilator support and
gastrostomy feeding were among the reasonable medical alternatives that should have been
available to Mrs. Wanglie or her surrogate decision maker, whoever that might be." Id. at 161-
62.
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Frequently, surrogate decision makers are often replaced in child abuse
cases where the parent is the alleged abuser. 0 6 In such cases, it is naturally
assumed that the parent would not be acting in the best interest of the child by
insisting on continued LSMT. This assumption arises particularly where the
child's death could result in murder charges against the parent. There is no
such clarity in the typical futility case.
Stage Five: Attempt Transfer. If the surrogate cannot be replaced and the
provider and surrogate still do not agree, then the health care provider should
do one of the following: (1) find a new provider or (2) attempt to transfer the
patient to another institution willing to comply with the surrogate's treatment
requests. 0 7 While this is rarely successful, it does sometimes resolve a few
additional disputes. 1
08
Stage Six: Implement the Unilateral Decision to Stop Treatment. Only
after diligently making all of the foregoing attempts to resolve the conflict
should a provider take unilateral action to stop LSMT against the wishes of the
patient or surrogate. 109
106. See, e.g., Tabatha R. v. Ronda R., 564 N.W.2d 598, 602, 605 (Neb. 1997). In that
case, the Department of Social Services took temporary custody of an infant in a persistent
vegetative state and requested withdrawal of LSMT over parents' objections; consequently, the
court ruled that parental rights must first be terminated since this would result in the death of the
child. Id.; Pam Belluck, Custody and Abuse Cases Swirl Around a Troubled Girl on Life
Support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,2005, at A18 (reporting Massachusetts juvenile court granted DSS
request to remove life support from child in their custody against the wishes of child's adoptive
parents); Clackamas County Judge to Rule on Brain-Damaged Baby, COLUMBIAN, Apr. 24,
2004, at C8 (reporting state advocate for brain damaged baby took custody of child and
requested juvenile court to grant a DNR order); see also Child & Family Servs. of Cent.
Manitoba v. R.L., 123 Man. R. (2d) 135, 154 D.L.R. (4th)409 (Man. App. 1997)(allowing the
providers to enter a DNR at the direction of Child & Family Services over the parents'
objections).
107. Most. institutional and professional association model futility policies provide for
transfer. See sources cited supra note 53. This is consistent with the law of tortuous
abandonment, which requires that physicians assist their patients in finding a new provider
before terminating a treatment relationship. See, e.g., Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225,
227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (dealing with the problem of a disruptive dialysis patient and the lack
of accepting institutions); Stella L. Smetanka, Who Will Protect the 'Disruptive' Dialysis
Patient?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 53, 71-79 (2006) (discussion of cases and "no duty to treat").
Transfer is also required by most state health care decision making statutes. See sources cited
infra note 369.
108. See infra notes 339-52, 369 and accompanying text.
109. See MICHAEL D. CANTOR ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, Do-
NOT-REsuSCITATE ORDERS AND MEDICAL FuTILITY: A REPORT BY THE NATIONAL ETHICS
COMMITTEE OF THE VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 1, 8 (2000) [hereinafter VHA-NEC
REPORT] (arguing that unilateral decisions "should be reserved for exceptionally rare and
extreme circumstances after thorough attempts" to resolve disagreements have failed); THE
RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 17, § 13.04[B] at 13-22 ("[S]ometimes only litigation can break the
impasse between demanding families and resistant health care professionals."); Timothy Bowen
& Andrew Saxton, New Developments in the Law-Withholding and Withdrawal of Medical
20071
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While most cases will never reach this stage," ° a significant percentage
will."' One recent five-year study of sixteen hospitals found that in
approximately sixty-five cases, the hospitals decided to unilaterally stop
LSMT. 112  Another study of nine hospitals found that they decided to
unilaterally stop LSMT in 2% of 2,842 cases."l3 Furthermore, there are strong
reasons to suspect that the rate of intractability and unilateral hospital action
will rise.' 1
4
II. LEADING DEFINITIONS OF "MEDICAL INAPPROPRIATENESS"
"Medical inappropriateness" is a term with a contentious history because
commentators argue it has different meanings in different contexts. While there
is a consensus that LSMT is inappropriate where the patient is brain dead or
where the requested treatment simply will not work (i.e., physiological futility),
these definitions cover only a tiny fraction of the relevant cases.' 1 5 In most
disputes, providers employ a notion of quantitative or qualitative futility,
considering either the likelihood that the treatment will succeed or the quality
of life that it can provide the patient.'' 6  These definitions of medical
inappropriateness, however, are value-laden determinations, lacking consensus
support from the medical community, the bioethical community, and the
public." 7
Treatment, 14 AusTL. HEALTH L. BuLL. 57, 60 (2006).
110. See Brennan, supra note 30, at 807 ("In all cases [where unilateral DNR orders were
entered], the families either ultimately accepted this reasoning or ceased insisting that invasive
procedures be used.").
111. See Pope& Waldman, supra note 9, at 158-61; see also Fine, supra note 48, at 79
(noting that five of twenty-nine cases went through the whole process, although two died and
three agreed to withdraw before treatment was unilaterally stopped); Daniel Garros et al.,
Circumstances Surrounding End of Life in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit, 112 PEDIATRICS
1171, 1173 (2003) (in 1 out of 68 cases, no complete agreement could be reached between the
surrogates and providers).
112. Ramshaw, supra note 84. About half of the patients in the study died or were
transferred to other facilities before treatment was actually stopped. Id.
113. Tex. H.R. Comm. on Pub. Health, 80th Leg., Interim Report, at 36 (2006) [hereinafter
Interim Report] (citing written testimony of Greg Hooser).
114. The reasons for surrogate insistence are becoming more prevalent. See supra notes
37-50 and accompanying text. At the same, provider resistance may increase with changes in
reimbursement and an increased focus on palliative care.
115. See infra notes 118-56 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 157-66, 175-77 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 167-73, 178-211 and accompanying text.
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A. Brain Death
Perhaps the clearest case of medically inappropriate care is LSMT
requested for a brain dead patient.11 8 Since the 1950s, health care providers
have been able to artificially maintain respiration and circulation even for a
patient whose brain had completely and irreversibly ceased to function. 19 In
light of this possibility to maintain breathing and a heart beat with technology,
the previously accepted standard for determining death-the cessation of
cardiopulmonary function-was too limited. 120 Consequently, every state soon
adopted the cessation of all brain function as an alternative method for
determining death. 121
There is a consensus that it is ethically, legally, and medically appropriate
to stop LSMT for a brain dead patient.122 The adoption of the Uniform
Determination of Death Act has "alleviate[d] concern among medical
practitioners that legal liability might be imposed" for stopping LSMT for a
brain dead patient. 173 Indeed, defining a patient as dead provides such legal
clarity that many have argued for broadening the statutory standards for the
determination of death. 1
24
118. See David C. Blake, Bioethics and the Law: The Case of Helga Wanglie: A Clash at
the Bedside-Medically Futile Treatment v. Patient Autonomy, 14 WHITTIER L. REv. 117, 126
(1993).
119. See James L. Bernat, The Whole-Brain Concept of Death Remains Optimum Public
Policy, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 35, 35 (2006).
120. See id.
121. Id. at 36; Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective of Death: An
Introduction to the Forced Symmetry Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 39, 43-48 (2006).
122. See, e.g., Gallups v. Cotter, 534 So. 2d 585, 589 (Ala. 1988) (affirming summary
judgment for defendants on outrage claim); Dority v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
193 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Cavagnaro v. Hanover Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 728,
731 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (finding insurer need not pay medical and hospital
expenses after brain death because not incurred for treatment); In re Long Island Jewish Med.
Ctr., 641 N.Y.S.2d 989, 992 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that hospital can withdraw LSMT
from brain dead child over parent's objections); Alvarado v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
547 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), vacated by 550 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (finding condition of infant did not constitute brain death as defined by statute); Marshall
B. Kapp, Legal Liability Anxieties in the ICU, in MANAGING DEATH, supra note 15,
at234.
123. In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (Wash. 1980) (citing Uniform Brain Death Act § 1,
12 U.L.A. (Supp 1980)).
124. Some have proposed extending the definition to include patients in a permanent
vegetative state and anencephalic infants. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism,
Exoticare, and CoercedAltruism, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 883,886 n. 11, 888 n.22 (1995). But
see Alexander Morgan Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separate the Dead from the Dying, 17
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Feb. 1987, at 5 ("It would be unwise to amend the Uniform Determination
of Death Act to classify anancephalics as 'dead."'); David T. McDowell, Note, Death of an
Idea: The Anencephalic as an Organ Donor, 72 TEx. L. REv. 893, 930 (1993) (arguing that
society would be "worse off" if the legal definition of death were extended to include the
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B. Physiological Futility
Apart from brain death, the narrowest and perhaps most clearly defined
definition of medically inappropriate care is referred to as "physiological
futility.' 12 Physiologically futile interventions are inappropriate because they
do not produce a measurable effect on the patient. z6 In essence, the requested
treatment has a zero percent chance of being effective.1
27
Physiological futility is true to the etymological origins of the term
"futility."' 128 The Latin wordfutilis refers to "actions or instruments which were
inherently leaky and therefore ill-suited for achieving [their] desired ends.'
' 29
The classic illustration offutilis comes from Greek mythology; the daughters of
King Danaus were condemned to Hades and forced to draw water in leaky
containers. 130 Because of the leaks, the daughters could not achieve the goals
of their actions.'
31
Commentators have offered a multitude of colorful examples of
physiological futility, including the following: 132 (1) prescribing laetrile or
anencephalic). As Roger Dworkin notes, "Definition is dangerous because it allows us to avoid
analysis and do bad things to persons without concern by defining them out of existence."
ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 112
(1996).
125. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:232 (discussing the narrow meaning of
treatment that is "physiologically ineffective"); Dale L. Moore, Challenging Parental Decisions
to Overtreat Children, 5 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 311, 315-16 (1995) (briefly explaining the
concept of physiologically futile treatment).
126. Moore, supra note 125, at 315-16. Sometimes this can be known ex ante as a matter
of science. Other times, physiological futility cannot be determined until after one or more
failed attempts with a specific patient.
127. Id. at 316 ("[A] clear example of treatment that is 'futile' in the 'physiologically
futile' sense: it simply did not (and was not destined to) work.")
128. See SusAN RuBIN, WHEN DOCTORS SAY No: THE BATTLEGROUND OF MEDICAL
FUTILITY 42 (1998).
129. Id.
130. See PLATO, supra note 52, at 59 ("These they bury in the mud of Hades; some are also
compelled to fetch water in a sieve.")
131. See id. This assumes that the leaks were so substantial that all the water drained out
between the river Styx and the destination. If the leaks were slower such that not all of the
water was drained, then the daughters could have achieved their goal, at least to some degree.
This situation would be analogous to qualitative futility. See infra Part II.D.
132. See, e.g., Causeyv. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072,1074 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
The court argued that "[t]he problem is not with care that the physician believes is harmful or
literally has no effect. For example, radiation treatment for Mrs. Causey's condition would not
have been appropriate. This is arguably based on medical science." Id.; FINs, supra note 33, at
79-80 (offering examples such as "infus[ing] septic patients with fluids and pressors to hold a
blood pressure[,] .... intubation in a patient with an obstructing tracheal mass[, or] ....
'call[ing] the code' . . . [i]f one can not get a rhythm or bring the pH up to normal range");
Moore, supra note 125, at 315-16 (CPR on patient with renal failure who had not had dialysis);
Morreim, supra note 124, at 894, 896 (offering examples where disability would render the
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pasque-flower tea for cancer,1 33 (2) prescribing antibiotics for a viral illness,
134
(3) performing a heart transplant for a patient dying of liver failure, 35 (4)
performing CPR in the presence of cardiac rupture or severe outflow
obstruction, 136 (5) offering chemotherapy for an ulcer, 37 (6) giving a penicillin
shot for a head cold, 138 (7) performing an appendectomy to calm a patient's
fears that they may have appendicitis, 39 and (8) treating the dead with
mechanical ventilators and pressors.14
0
With physiological futility, the provider does not make any assessment that
the effect is unlikely, too small, or not worthwhile.' 4' The provider does not
characterize whether the effect is a "benefit" or not. 142 Instead, health care
providers can readily ascertain physiological futility based solely upon their
clinical knowledge. 143 Thus, there is no room for normative disagreement. 144
treatment "utterly pointless").
133. Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:232; Schwartz, supra note 105, at 160.
134. Levine, supra note 10, at 74; see also Robert M. Veatch& Carol M. Spicer, Medically
Futile Care: The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 15, 18 (1992)
(prescribing antibiotics for the common cold).
135. Taylor & Lantos, supra note 49, at 4.
136. Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:232. A similar example entails a blood transfusion
where the recipient is hemorrhaging at a rate that exceeds the maximum rate of transfusion.
Levine, supra note 10, at 74; see also American Heart Association, 2005 American Heart
Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular
Care-Part 2: Ethical Issue, 112 CIRCULATION IV-6, IV-7 (2005), available at
http://circ.ahajoumals.org/cgi/content/full/1 12/24_supp/IV-6 ("[A]II patients in cardiac arrest
should receive resuscitation unless... "[n]o physiological benefit can be expected because vital
functions have deteriorated despite maximal therapy (e.g., progressive septic or cardiogenic
shock)."); Veatch & Spicer, supra note 134, at 18 (CPR is physiologically futile where
performed on a patient who last breathed three hours prior to administering the care).
137. Wesley J. Smith, Death by Ethics Committee: Refusing to Treat Lives Deemed
Unworthy of Living, NAT'L REv., Apr. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/smithw/smith200604271406.asp.
138. Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of"Right to Die" Case, 325
NEw ENG. J. MED. 511, 512 (1991).
139. THERIGHTTODIE, supra note 17, § 13.07[B] at 13-38; see also WRONG MEDICINE,
supra note 37, at 157 ("Nor is a surgeon obligated to perform a prophylactic appendectomy to
assuage a patient's fears that her recurrent abdominal pains are due to appendicitis.").
140. FINs, supra note 33, at 79-80 (offering examples such as "infus[ing] septic patients
with fluids and pressors to hold a blood pressure").
141. See Gampel, supra note 59, at 96 (contrasting refusals to provide physiologically
futile treatment with refusals because the treatment is "inappropriate ... [and] the risks
outweigh the potential benefits, or because the patient's request is irrational or ill-considered
given the low odds or limited benefit involved").
142. See id.
143. See Levine, supra note 10, at 79 ("Characterizing a treatment as 'useless' based on the
extremely low chance that a physiological effect will occur requires an opinion that this low
probability is not worth pursuing, not a scientific determination that the physiological effect
sought is scientifically impossible.") (emphasis added).
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The basis for refusing treatment is an empirical one: the treatment simply will
not work. 145 Even the biggest opponents of unilateral decision making concede
that "[r]efusals of requests for such 'physiologically futile care' would be
proper and professional.'
146
However, this objectivity comes at a steep price because physiological
futility has a very limited applicability. 147 First, the vast majority of cases are
not as clear-cut as those described in the previous four paragraphs. Decisions
on withholding and withdrawing treatment are usually based on mere
probabilities as opposed to certainties. 148 Most providers find it difficult to be
certain that there is a 100% probability that any given intervention will have
zero effect. 1
49
Second, physiological futility has limited applicability because it is too
demanding, requiring the absence of an "effect" on any part of the patient's
anatomy, physiology, or chemistry.' 50 Because technology permits many
"effects," such as keeping a heart beating, obtaining true physiological futility
rarely occurs. 151 One must be careful to distinguish between physiological
144. Because physiological futility is so much more easilyjustified, hospitals often attempt
to characterize (or mask) the care that they seek to unilaterally withdraw as physiologically
futile. Cf Gampel, supra note 59, at 96. For example, Baylor Hospital argued that mechanical
ventilation for Tirhas Habtegiris was "medically inappropriate, on scientific grounds alone."
Yet, Baylor conceded that it would "keep [the] suffering patient alive." Baylor Health Care
System, Tirhas Habtegiris Case: Baylor Response, http://www.baylorhealth.com/
articles/habtegiris/response.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Baylor Response].
More convincingly, Massachusetts General Hospital argued this theory of medical
inappropriateness to the jury in the Gilgunn case. Capron, supra note 47, at 26 (noting the
defendants argued that "CPR 'could not produce the desired physiological change' . . . [and]
would not only be ineffective but would be harmful").
145. See Moore, supra note 125, at 315-16.
146. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 137.
147. See FINS, supra note 33, at 80-81 ("[T]he narrowness of the physiologic definition is
also its greatest weakness .... "); Bowman, supra note 89, at 1527 ("'With the exception of a
small number of cases, it's not possible to say with certainty that care will provide no benefits."'
(quoting Dr. Gregg Bloche)); Brett, supra note 70, at 293 ("[T]he vast majority of contentious
cases do not involve physiologic futility."); Gampel, supra note 59, at 94 ("[I]f clinical certainty
of a zero chance of success were required, there would be little if any room for the use of the
concept of futility in medical practice."); Levine, supra note 10, at 82 n.92 ("Treatment is
strictly physiologically futile only when it is certain that the physiological effect sought from the
treatment cannot be achieved").
148. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 14, 97, 136 (discussing the inaccuracies of
assessing "quantitative probabilities" in health care); Bowen & Saxton, supra note 109, at 59
(noting that published guidelines for the withdrawal of LSMT contemplate probabilities).
149. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 14 ("[O]ne can never be absolutely certain of
the outcome.").
150. See FINs, supra note 33, at 80 ("[T]he physiologic definition is the narrowest
definition of medical futility. It is a clinical determination based on narrow physiologic
parameters.").
151. See id. ("A physiologic definition simply asks whether the infection could be resolved
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futility, where there is no effect, and the more typical situation of qualitative
futility, where there is some effect, albeit one judged to offer no meaningful
"benefit."'' 5 2 Therefore, physiological futility is a narrow category covering few
cases.
153
While many states explicitly permit the unilateral termination of
physiologically futile interventions, no state with a unilateral decision statute
relies solely on a physiological futility standard of medical appropriateness.1
5 4
New York's standard most closely resembles this idea, articulating that
"'[m]edically futile' means that cardiopulmonary resuscitation will be
unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or that the patient will
experience repeated arrest in a short time period before death occurs.' 55 Yet,
even the language of this statute recognizes that the CPR might work, just not
for a sufficient time to be considered worthwhile.1
56
with antibiotics. If so, the treatment is not physiologically futile, even though the "restoration"
of health will be a pre-morbid state of severe cognitive impairment.").
152. Cf id. at 80-81 ("[P]atients are more than their physiology.").
153. See, e.g., Causeyv. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
("Strictly speaking, if a physician can keep the patient alive, such care is not medically or
physiologically 'futile;' however, it may be 'futile' on philosophical, religious, or practical
grounds.").
154. For example, Maryland allows providers to refuse "medically ineffective treatment."
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-61 l(b)(l) (West 2007). But even Maryland makes clear
that this is not limited to physiological futility but also includes medical procedures that, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, will not do the following: "(1) Prevent or reduce the
deterioration of the health of an individual; or (2) Prevent the impending death of an
individual." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (n) (West 2007); see also GA. CODEANN. §
31-39-2(4) (2006) ("'Candidate for nonresuscitation' means a patient who ... (C) Is a person
for whom cardiopulmonary resuscitation would be medically futile in that such resuscitation
will likely be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or will only restore
cardiac and respiratory function for a brief period of time .. "); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
3131.4(C)(2) (West 1999) (providing that CPR is not required where it would not prevent
imminent death); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.580(b) (West 2005) ("Administration of such
nutrition and hydration is not medically feasible or would itself cause severe, intractable or
long-lasting pain."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.635(c) (West 2005) (LSMT is not required
where it would not benefit the patient or only cause them pain); S.D. CODIlED LAWS § 59-7-2.7
(2004) (artificial nutrition or hydration may be withheld or withdrawn if "the attending
physician reasonably believes that the principal's death will occur within approximately one
week" or that the nutrition or hydration "cannot be physically assimilated by the principal").
155. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(12) (McKinney 1993). This statute permits unilateral
decisions only in the absence of a contrary decision. See infra notes 376-77 and accompanying
text.
156. Therefore, this statute employs a standard of "imminent demise futility," not
physiological futility because the "patient will die shortly regardless of the intervention." Amir
Halevy et al., The Low Frequency of Futility in an Adult Intensive Care Unit Setting, 156
ARcHIvEs INTERNAL MED. 100, 101 (1996); see Amir Halevy & Baruch A. Brody, A Multi-
Institution Collaborative Policy on Medical Futility, 276 JAMA 571, 571 (1996).
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C. Quantitative Futility
While a physiological standard of medical inappropriateness is objective, a
quantitative standard is subjective.157  Though it seemingly possesses the
precision of mathematics, a quantitative standard cannot be determined by
reference to science alone; a quantitative standard can only be set through
"reasonable consensus."' 58 It is "not so much a realistic, factual or scientific
concept as it is a pragmatic or useful one."' 59
Some evidence suggests that a quantitative standard of medical
inappropriateness is practically implementable.160 Proponents note that clinical
studies and scoring systems can provide enough information about their
likelihood to provide an empirical basis for establishing some percentage
thresholds.' 6' Indeed, percentages have been developed for certain patient
populations.'62
Furthermore, proponents of a quantitative standard of medical
inappropriateness contend that the standard is not only workable but also
ethically justified. 163 By employing such a standard, the provider is only
determining whether the requested treatment can achieve the patient's goals.
This determination would not necessarily challenge those goals.'6
In fact, this is a well-established role for health care providers because they
already interpret conditions specified in patients' advance directives. 65 If the
advance directive states, "Treat me as long as x," then health care providers
must determine when or whether x is obtainable. 166 For example, if the goal
157. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 162 ("This proposal is not an 'objective'...
definition.").
158. See id.
159. Lisa Anderson-Shaw et al., The Fiction of Futility: What to Do with Policy?, 17 HEC
FORUM 294, 295 (2005).
160. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 148 (discussing the use of clinical studies
and scoring systems to determine overall probabilities of a treatment's effectiveness).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., L. Esserman et al., Potentially Ineffective Care-A New Outcome to Assess
the Limits of Critical Care, 274 JAMA 1544, 1544-51 (1995); A. Rauss et al., Prognosis for
Recovery from Multiple Organ System Failure: The Accuracy of Objective Estimates of
Chances for Survival, 10 MED. DECISION MAKING 155-62 (1990).
163. See, e.g., Nancy S. Jecker, Medical Futility: A Paradigm Analysis, 19 HEC FORUM
13, 25-29 (2007).
164. See, e.g., AMA Council, supra note 53, at 937; Anderson-Shaw, supra note 159, at
301; Rivin, supra note 30, at 389 (defining "futile care" where "further treatment ... cannot,
within a reasonable possibility, cure, ameliorate, improve, or restore a quality of life that would
be satisfactory to the patient") (emphasis added); Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 59, at 33
(criticizing the precise formulation of Rivin's policy).
165. See infra note 166.
166. The New Jersey advance directive statute, for example, permits patients to indicate
that they want LSMT withheld or withdrawn where it "is likely to be ineffective or futile in
prolonging life, or is likely to merely prolong an imminent dying process." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
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for a patient in a persistent vegetative state were full recovery, a provider could
determine that continued treatment would be quantitatively futile. In contrast,
if the goal were family contact before death, continued treatment might not be
quantitatively futile.
However, a quantitative standard of medical inappropriateness suffers from
two serious problems. First, where should legislatures set the threshold
percentage for quantitative futility? One percent? One-tenth of a percent?
Any level is likely to be controversial and arbitrary. Second, even if lawmakers
are able to settle upon a threshold percentage, then how exactly do doctors
ascertain whether that threshold standard is satisfied with respect to a particular
patient? Any quantitative threshold would be impossible to apply with
precision across a wide variety of patients and cases.
Where, if at all, should the threshold percentage be set? The most
prominent proponent of quantitative futility, Lawrence Schneiderman, argues
that "a treatment should be regarded as medically futile if it has not worked in
the last 100 cases ....167 Tomlinson and Czlonka argue that "[a]ttempted
resuscitation is futile when it provides no meaningful possibility of extended
life or other benefit for the patient. 1 68 But what possibility is "meaningful"?
Certain scholars believe that a provider must offer even a chance of "' 1 in a
million.'"169 Setting a threshold of probability not worth pursuing is a value
judgment. 70 Moreover, it is a value judgment about which there is considerable
variability.171
26:2H-67(a)(1) (West 2007) (emphasis added). The "likeliness" of these conditions occurring is
determined by the health care provider.
167. WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 97; cf Morgan County Dep't Human Servs. v.
Yeager, 93 P.3d 589, 591 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (commenting on physician's testimony that
"the likelihood of resuscitating [the patient] would be approximately one out of a hundred" and
thus justified DNR order).
168. Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 59, at 33. Setting the percentage threshold also
requires determining what constitutes a benefit. In Causey, the defendant physician "agreed that
with dialysis and a ventilator Mrs. Causey could live for another two years... [but] that she
would have only a slight (1% to 5%) chance of regaining consciousness." Causey v. St. Francis
Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
169. GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHics: ACCOUNTS OF CASES THiAT
HAVE SHAPED MEDICAL ETHICS, WITH PHILOSOPHICAL, LEGAL, AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS
11 (2d ed. 1995).
170. See, e.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327,332 (Iowa 1998) (refusing to dismiss
medical malpractice and lost chance action based on physician's unilateral DNR order,
explaining "even a small chance of survival is worth something"); Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1074
("Placement of statistical cut-off points for futile treatment involves subjective value judgments.
The difference in opinion as to whether a 2% or 9% probability of success is the critical point
for determining futility can be explained in terms of personal values, not in terms of medical
science."); Ferguson, supra note 16, at 1229 ("It appears to be a technical assessment of the
limits of our technology, but these limits often become confused with the moral propriety of
applying a particular technology."); id. at 1234 ("Simply because a treatment is only of marginal
success does not mean that it ought not be pursued. Such reasoning belies a moral decision
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Furthermore, even if policymakers could settle on a percentage threshold
definition of medical inappropriateness, it would be difficult to employ with
sufficient precision because "[p]rognostication is difficult on a case-by-case
basis." 72 Thus, as applied to any particular patient, available measures from
scholarly studies are very imprecise. 1
73
D. Qualitative Futility
When applying either a physiological futility or a quantitative futility
standard of medical inappropriateness, the provider starts with the patient's
own goals and determines whether those goals are sufficiently achievable.
174
However, when applying a qualitative futility standard of medical
inappropriateness, the provider questions whether the patient's goals
themselves are worthwhile.175 For example, LSMT for a patient in a persistent
vegetative state can sometimes sustain the patient's life for a very long time.
176
being made about the value of percentages and scientific assessments of success .... ); cf
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. App. 1986) ("Who shall say what the
minimum amount of available life must be? Does it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20
months, or 15 to 20 days... ?").
171. See Lee, supra note 31, at 482; Karen Trotochaud, "Medically Futile" Treatments
Require More than Going to Court, CASE MANAGER, May-June 2006, at 60, 61 ("Although
most physicians believed a roughly 5% chance of survival equated to futility, the range was
from 0% to 60%...."). Of course, the likelihood for a specific patient can be clarified through
a time-limited trial.
172. Lee, supra note 31, at 482; see James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-
Setting: Developing Malpractice "Safe Harbors" As a New Rolefor QIOs?, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1017, 1027 (2006) (discussing the "widespread existence of clinical uncertainty").
173. See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1993) (observing that "statistical life
expectancy data had little predictive value when applied to a particular patient with
individualized symptoms, medical history, character traits and other variables"); Gampel, supra
note 59, at 94 ("It is rare in clinical practice to have reliable numbers based on scholarly
studies."); Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 59, at 31 (arguing that quantitative futility creates
"the illusion of specificity" because it fails to consider "individual clinical circumstances");
Trotochaud, supra note 171, at 61 ("Although [scoring] systems can be helpful in predicting
outcomes of populations of patients, they fail to be specific enough to be of significant help in
predicting outcomes for an individual patient."); see also BERNARD Lo, RESOLVING ETHiCAL
DILEMMAS: A GuIDE FOR CLINICIANS 75-76 (2d ed. 2000) (noting the likelihood of successful
CPR is often mistaken); Louise Swig et al., Physician Responses to a Hospital Policy Allowing
Them to Not Offer Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 44 J. AM. GERIATRICs Soc'Y 1215, 1217
(1996) (reporting 58% of those patients considered by their physicians to be unlikely to benefit
from CPR were later discharged); Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992) ("[P]hysicians are often highly unreliable in estimating the
likelihood of success of a therapeutic intervention.").
174. See supra notes 141-46, 157-66 and accompanying text.
175. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 9 (questioning whether a patient's request
coincides with the goal of medicine).
176. See, e.g., Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004) (noting Theresa Schiavo
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Assuming that life itself is the goal, LSMT is neither physiologically nor
quantitatively futile for a patient in a persistent vegetative state because
providing LSMT really will achieve this goal. In contrast, LSMT for a patient
in a persistent vegetative state might be qualitatively futile because the life
sustained is not "worth" sustaining.
177
Qualitative futility has three distinct forms: (1) LSMT is inappropriate
when its prospective benefits are outweighed by its associated burdens to the
patient, (2) LSMT is inappropriate when its prospective benefits are not worth
the required health care resources, or (3) LSMT is inappropriate when it simply
cannot provide the patient a quality of life worth living.
1. Burdens Outweigh the Benefits
The first form of qualitative futility asserts that LSMT is medically
inappropriate where the prospective benefits of treatment are outweighed by
their associated burdens. 78 For example, for a patient that is unable to derive
any pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or other satisfaction from life, the benefits
of prolonged life may be outweighed by pain and suffering.'
79
Since this standard has enormous intuitive appeal, providers employ it with
some regularity. For example, Seattle providers were unwilling to provide
was in a persistent vegetative state for nearly fifteen years).
177. See In re Finn, 625 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (noting doctor
unilaterally entered DNR order for a patient on grounds that CPR would be medically futile
because the patient was "profoundly retarded and would likely be more severely retarded after
the administration of CPR" and therefore that patient's life would not be "worth living").
178. See Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 3 ("[W]hen the capabilities of medicine to cure,
ameliorate, or reverse a disease process have been exhausted[,] ... continuance of treatment
under those circumstances may impose further suffering and other burdens on the patient-
physical, emotional, and fiscal."); Linda B. Siegel, When Staff and Parents Disagree: Decision
Making for a Baby with Trisomy 13,73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 590, 591(2006) (describing baby
who "was suffering significantly" and "did not appear to get any pleasure from life");
Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 59, at 33 (defining attempted resuscitation as "harmful"
where "harm inflicted on the patient is grossly disproportionate to any possibility of benefit");
see also Morreim, supra note 124, at 898. Under the circumstances, a compelling case can be
made that a surrogate demanding such continued aggressive treatment should be stripped of
decision making authority. See supra notes 101-06.
179. Some have referred to this qualitative standard as the "unbearable situation." ROYAL
COLLEGE OF PAEDIATRICS AND CHILD HEALTH, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT IN CHILDREN: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTICE 29 (2d ed. 2004). Others have defined
the treatment to be "inhumane." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2)(iii) (1990).
180. An "objective" or "best interests" standard is well-established for proxy decision
makers in circumstances where they have little or no evidence of the patient's preferences. See,
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.580(1)(b) (West 2005) (providing an exception to the administration
of nutrition or hydration if it causes "severe, intractable or long-lasting pain"); id. §
127.635(1)(c) (allowing withdrawal of LSMT if it creates no benefit to patient's condition or
causes "permanent and severe pain"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.7 (2004) (allowing
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long-term dialysis to Ryan Nguyen, "since it would prolong agony with 'no
likelihood of a good outcome."'81 Baylor Regional Medical Center at Plano
withdrew LSMT from Tirhas Habtegiris because the care was
"disproportionately burdensome" 18 2 and was only "increasing her suffering."'
83
Similarly, D.C. Children's Hospital wanted to withdraw LSMT from Baby
Rena because she had no prospect for recovery or positive interaction with her
environment and had to be "constantly sedated" to soothe her continuous
pain. 184
In one of the earliest reported futility cases, providers argued that further
intervention for "Baby L" would be inhumane and that continued LSMT
"would only add to her pain, without helping.' ' 85 Because Baby L was blind,
deaf, quadriplegic, and could not otherwise interact with her environment,
maintaining her on a respirator provided no opportunity for improvement or
cure, but only more seizures, infections, and cardiac arrests. 86 Baby L "could
experience nothing but pain.'
' 87
2. Resources Outweigh the Benefits
The second form of qualitative futility also weighs the prospective benefits
of treatment. Yet, unlike the first form, which balances the benefits against the
burdens of treatment for the patient, the second form balances the benefits
against the health care resources used to provide the treatment. 88 Under this
theory, LSMT is medically inappropriate where it is not worth the requisite
resources that are better spent elsewhere. 1
89
withdrawal or withholding of artificial nutrition or hydration if "the burden of providing [it]...
outweighs its benefit, provided that the determination of burden refers to the provision of
artificial nutrition or hydration itself and not to the quality of the continued life of the
principal"). As a standard, qualitative futility has been employed not only to patients without
subjective preferences but also to patients who have exercised preferences for continued LSMT.
181. Alexander M. Capron, Baby Ryan and Virtual Futility, 25 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-
Apr. 1995, at 20.
182. Baylor Response, supra note 144.
183. Baylor Health Care System, Tirhas Habtegiris Case: Medical History,
http://www.baylorhealth.com/articles/habtegiris/history.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
184. Weiser, supra note 45, at Al.
185. Joan Beck, Use Medical Technology to Save Every Damaged Baby?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 18, 1990, atA13; see also John J. Paris et al., Physicians'RefusalofRequested
Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1013 (1990) (reporting
conclusion of ethics committee meeting that because Baby L "could experience only pain[,"
further LSMT was "not in the best interest of the patient").
186. Beck, supra note 185, at A13.
187. Id.
188. See AMA Council, supra note 53, at 938 ("Another context in which futility questions
come up is resource allocation. Some commentators argue that elimination of futile care is good
for both patients and allocation of resources.").
189. See Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 59, at 32 ("Many interventions are not
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Commentators have articulated both a modest and a robust version of
resource-focused qualitative futility. The modest version focuses on hard
resources like ICU beds.190 When these resources are needed by other patients
with better prospects, then it is inappropriate to give those resources to the
patient with the poorer prospects.19' This modest version of resource-focused
qualitative futility is similar to the concept of "triage" where emergency room
providers do "not work on a first come, first serve basis," but serve the most
urgent or severe yet treatable injuries and illnesses first "to avoid [any] delay in
treatment.' 92 The modest version of resource-focused qualitative futility is
employed in a few states.
193
While the modest version of resource-based qualitative futility is well-
grounded, the robust version of resource-focused qualitative futility is more
controversial. Rather than looking to the allocation of hard resources, the
robust version examines the allocation of soft resources like health care
dollars. 194  In many cases, families allege that providers make unilateral
costworthy because they consume too many resources relative to their benefit, not because they
offer no benefits at all."). Some commentators have referred to this as "[t]herapeutic
extravagance... mean[ing] the provision of high-cost treatments that offer little or no benefit."
Tovino & Winslade, supra note 41, at 2-3 n.5.
190. See, e.g., Amy Iggulden, Premature Babies Are Blocking Beds, Says Royal Medical
College, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/03/27/nprem27.xml (reporting that the Royal College of
Obstetrics and Gynaecology felt that very premature babies were "'bed blocking' by "taking up
intensive care space that could be used by healthier babies"); Roy Lilley, A Bad Time to Be Very
Young or Old, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xm=/opinion/2006/03/28/do2802.xm ("[T]he
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.. .[suggests that] [b]abies born at 25 weeks
• . . should be left to die . . . [because] more weight [should] be given to 'economic
considerations."' ).
191. See sources cited supra note 190.
192. See STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 6.18 (3d ed.
2006) (describing the process of "triage"); JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS, MANAGING PATIENT FLOW: STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING 120-29 (2004).
193. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.9 (West 1998) ("Nothing in this section
shall require the provision of treatment if the physician or other health care provider is
physically or legally unable to provide or is physically or legally unable to provide without
thereby denying the same treatment to another patient."); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990(C)
(1992) ("Nothing in this section shall require the provision of treatment that the physician is
physically or legally unable to provide, or treatment that the physician is physically or legally
unable to provide without thereby denying the same treatment to another patient.").
194. See, e.g., Mary Ann Roser, Austin Doctors Want to Withdraw Care from Vegetative
Patient (Terri Schiavo Type Situation)-Family Objects and Says Woman Is Still Aware;
Seeking Transfer to Another Facility in Texas, AUSTIN A.-STATESMAN, Apr. 28, 2006,
available athttp://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1623122/posts (reporting in the case of
Lang Yen Thi Vo that the patient's daughter "sees a financial reason behind the decision [to
withdraw care] .... Her mother will soon exhaust her Medicare and Medicaid benefits.").
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withdrawal decisions based on financial reasons. 95 Providers, on the other
hand, almost always deny that money is a relevant factor.' 
96
Whether or not providers determine LSMT to be inappropriate based in
whole or in part on its cost, most commentators agree that neither resource
consumption nor rationing is a legitimate ground for making life-and-death
decisions for individual patients.1 For example, a treatment that has a 2%
195, See, e.g., id.
196. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("The Hospital has
stipulated that it is not proposing to deny ventilator treatment to Baby K because of any lack of
adequate resources or any inability of Ms. H to pay for the treatment."); Burke v. Gen. Med.
Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin), 2 W.L.R. 431,444-45 (2005) (explaining that the case
was not "about the prioritisation [sic] or allocation of resources" or concern over "significant
cost implications"); WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 53 (noting that Wanglie's providers
"avoided seeking court permission to withdraw treatment on another patient who happened to
be in the hospital at the same time in a similar condition-but who happened to be on welfare");
Schwartz, supra note 105, at 161 ("[Helga Wanglie's] hospitalization cost nearly 1 million
dollars, which was paid by Medicare and her private medigap insurance carrier. Neither
objected to the care for financial or cost-benefit reasons, and the cost properly did not enter into
the judicial analysis of the case."); Frank Bruni, Care vs. Cost: Suit Against Pa. Hospital on
Life Support Raises Questions, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETrE, Mar. 10, 1996, at Al (reporting that
the CEO of Hershey Medical Center denied that the financial cost of caring for Brianna
[Rideout] or the fact that her insurance was running out influenced the decision to remove her
ventilator); Kowalczyk, Mortal Differences, supra note 66 (reporting Massachusetts General
Hospital executives denied that they were motivated to stop Barbara Howe's LSMT because
Blue Cross stopped paying); Roser, supra note 194 (reporting in the case of Lang Yen Thi Vo
that the hospital "had no idea of Vo's financial status and that it was not a factor"); Baylor
Response, supra note 144 ("The hospital did not stop treatment because of economic
considerations.... The same course of action followed in this case has in the past been followed
with privately insured patients .... ). While costs may not be the basis of the unilateral
decision, they may be the reason other institutions refuse to accept transfer of the patient. See,
e.g., Murphy, supra note 43, at A37 (reporting that while the family of Joseph Ndiyob
eventually found a Los Angeles hospital willing to accept him, the hospital "recanted when it
learned he lacked health insurance"); Smith, supra note 26 ("[P]atients who would be refused
care under futility protocols would usually be the most expensive to care for and thus, given the
economics of managed care, probably unwelcome in another institution."). For some, it is
unnecessary to even consider the legitimacy of cost-based inappropriateness, because other
more acceptable standards are available. See Hudson, supra note 66, at 32 ("Some treatments-
such as keeping a patient in a persistent vegetative state alive, even if it costs only 10 cents a
day-are not what medicine is about." (quoting Lawrence Schneiderman)).
197. AMA Council, supra note 53, at 938 ("Efforts to understand futility should not make
use of resource-saving criteria, and rationing needs should not motivate declarations of
futility."); Dubler, supra note 26, at 297 ("[F]inancial disincentives.., must not be permitted to
contaminate decisions about death."); S.Y. Tan et al., Creating a Medical Futility Policy,
HEALTH PROGRESS, July-Aug. 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi qa3859/is 200307/ain9263834/pg_1 ("Resource consumption, inability to pay, or
rationing are not legitimate criteria to be used in defining medical futility."); Tomlinson &
Czlonka, supra note 59, at 32 (relying on costs to define, rather than just to prompt
consideration of medical inappropriateness, will poison communication, credibility, and trust).
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chance of extending a patient's life ten days at a cost of$1 million may be too
expensive. However, the consideration of cost, alone, would not make the
treatment medically inappropriate.
3. Treatment Cannot Provide a Worthwhile Quality of Life
The third form of qualitative futility does not weigh the prospective
benefits of treatment against either the prospective burdens or the required
resources.' 98 Instead, providers determine that the expected outcome of the
requested treatment is of no value, without regard to either burdens or
resources. 199 The provider judges the expected outcome to be of no value
200
because of the patient's extremely poor condition or prognosis.
The most notable situations, in which providers consider continued LSMT
to be qualitatively inappropriate, exist when a patient is permanently
unconscious, totally dependent on intensive medical care, or both.2
Permanent unconsciousness means a condition that, to a high degree of medical
certainty, will last permanently without improvement. In this condition,
patients have no thought, sensation, purposeful action, social interaction,
awareness of self, or awareness of their environment.2 °2
But cf HALL ET AL., supra note 78, at 600 (suggesting that futility may be a mask for rationing
and driven by the concern about scarce health care resources); Lantos, supra note 12, at 589
("[T]he only downside to trying a treatment that is unlikely to work is economic. It will be a
wasted expenditure. To the extent that this is the case, futility determinations collapse into
rationing decisions."); Mildred Z. Solomon, How Physicians Talk about Futility: Making Words
Mean Too Many Things, 21 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 231, 232-33 (1993) (explaining that medical
futility denotes "both efficacy and evaluative judgments about the wisdom of pursuing further
treatment").
198. See AMA Council, supra note 53, at 937 (without considering benefits or resources,
the physician simply "sees dying as inevitable and wishes to pursue the goal of comfort care").
199. See id. at 938 (examining the qualitative approach of the "worth-the-effort quality of
life" standard).
200. See id. at 937 (providers may decline intervention as futile if the intent is only to
prolong dying).
201. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-39-2(4)(B) (Supp. 2007) ("'Candidate for
nonresuscitation' means a patient.., in a noncognitive state with no reasonable possibility of
regaining cognitive functions."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a) to (b) (2006) (permitting
providers, in the absence of a contrary patient or surrogate request, to unilaterally stop LSMT
for a patient who is in a persistent vegetative state or terminal, incurable and comatose or
mentally incapacitated); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.580 (2005). This provision similarly permits
providers, in the absence of a contrary request from the patient or surrogate, to unilaterally stop
LSMT for a patient who is "permanently unconscious" or who "has a progressive illness that
will be fatal and is in an advanced stage," if the patient "is consistently and permanently unable
to communicate by any means, swallow food and water safely, care for the person's self and
recognize the person's family and other people, and it is very unlikely that the person's condition
will substantially improve." Id.
202. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(18) (2005) ("'Permanently unconscious' means
completely lacking an awareness of self and external environment, with no reasonable
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Withholding LSMT as medically inappropriate based on a quality of life
assessment is a heavily criticized standard.2°3 While some accept that an
individual may make a personal choice to forgo LSMT, it is highly
controversial for a health care provider to make this decision on the patient's
behalf.2 4 The controversy arises because health care providers can be poor
predictors of a patient's quality of life.20 5 The point at which life becomes
"worthless" is not known to the patient's health care provider "any better than
[it is] known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone
directory.,20 6 A health care provider may judge the patient's quality of life to
be far less than the patient would.0 7 Nonetheless, "people with physical,
sensory, and cognitive impairments can and do obtain many satisfactions and
rewards in their lives. 20 8 For this reason, Professor Felicia Ackerman rejects
quality of life determinations:
possibility of a return to a conscious state, and that condition has been medically confirmed by a
neurological specialist who is an expert in the examination of unresponsive individuals.")
203. Cf Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432
(Mass. 1977) ("To the extent that this formulation equates the value of life with any measure of
the quality of life, we firmly reject it.").
204. See Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End ofLife Reform
Uphold a Disabled Person's Interest in Continued Life?, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REP. (SPECIAL
REPORT), Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S31. Dr. Asch questions the autonomy of the patient's choice and
argues that "clinicians and policymakers [should be prompted] to question how truly
autonomous is anyone's wish to die when living with changed, feared, and uncertain physical
impairments ...." Id. at S33; see also ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, ASSISTED SUICIDE: A DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE 48 (1997) ("The pressures upon
people with disabilities to choose to end their lives ... are already way too common in our
society. These pressures are increasing and will continue to grow .... ").
205. See Susan Dorr Goold et al., Conflicts Regarding Decisions to Limit Treatment: A
Differential Diagnosis, 283 JAMA 909, 912 (2000) (noting the uncertainty of prognostications
made by doctors).
206. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
207. See Asch, supra note 204, at S35 (questioning the basis of a provider's decision to
end LSMT contrary to the patient's and the patient's family's wishes because the provider felt
that continued treatment was "inhumane").
208. Id. at S32; see also In re Finn, 625 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
("Although Leonard's life as a developmentally disabled person may seem a small possession
from the perspective of some, it remains his possession and 'no person or court should
substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another."' (quoting
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988))); A
Nat'l Health Serv. Trust v. D, [2000] EWHC FD 00P10551 (Fam), [2000] 2 FLR 677, 687
(Eng.) (describing child with terminal illness who "has a delightful smile and can indicate
pleasure and displeasure"); Lewis Smith, Victoryfor Dying Boy's Family, THE TIMES, Mar. 16,
2006, at 4 (reporting High Court in London refused application to withdraw ventilator from a
18-month old baby with spinal muscular atrophy because even though the baby was paralyzed,
he could still experience pleasure from sight, touch, and sound).
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It is as presumptuous and ethically inappropriate for doctors to suppose that
their professional expertise qualifies them to know what kind of life is worth
prolonging as it would be for meteorologists to suppose their professional
expertise qualifies them to know what kind of destination is worth a long
drive in the rain.20 9
Some commentators refer to this as the problem of "therapeutic illusion"
because providers may not recognize possible benefits of treatment.210
Furthermore, a qualitative standard of inappropriateness, unmoored from any
demonstrable weighing of benefits and burdens, is obviously subject to
abuse.21
E. Summary ofDefinitions of "Medically Inappropriate"
Despite an exhaustive debate over the past fifteen years, only brain death
and physiological futility are fully supported by a consensus in the medical,
legal, and bioethical communities as acceptable definitions of medical
212
inappropriateness. However, these are not the relevant conditions in the vast
majority of futility disputes. The typical case involves a living patient for
213
whom LSMT can produce some effect.
In order to define a treatment as medically inappropriate, a health care
provider typically must question whether the expected effect on the patient is
beneficial and worthwhile. There is no consensus about this.214 Many
209. Felicia Ackerman, The Significance of a Wish, 21 HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug.
1991, at 27, 28 (emphasis omitted). But while people may find satisfaction despite severe
physical or mental handicaps, this is not possible where they are irreversibly unconscious. See
WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 18.
210. Tovino & Winslade, supra note 41, at 2 n.5.
211. Cf ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAzI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF GENOCIDE 45 (1986) (describing the Nazi Germany program whereby the disabled, labeled as
"life unworthy of life," were euthanized).
212. Cf Robert S. Chabon, The Case of BabyK, 311 NEwENG. J. MED. 1383, 1383 (1994)
("Within the medical profession itself there appear to be disputes about whether physicians must
provide medically inappropriate interventions on a patient's or surrogate's request."); Fletcher,
supra note 10, at S:232 (comparing the narrow, objective definition of futility as physiologically
ineffective with the broad, subjective definition of "nonbeneficial"); William Prip & Anna
Moretti, Medical Futility: A Legal Perspective, in MEDICAL FUTILrrY AND THE EVALUATION OF
LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 136, 137 n.2 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds.,
1997) (examining roots of notion that brain death defines actual death).
213. Cf Prip & Moretti, supra note 212, at 137 (describing the progression from patients
demanding assisted suicide to patients challenging the physician's decision to stop LSMT).
214. See Jeffrey P. Bums & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST
1987, 1988-89 (2007) (reviewing "problems inherent to definitional approaches to futility");
Bryan Rowland, Communicating Past the Conflict: Solving the Medical Futility Controversy
with Process-Based Approaches, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 271,284 (2006) ("Even
those who accept the concepts of quantitative and qualitative futility disagree on how to draw
the dividing line between futile and non-futile care.").
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providers are unable to reduce medical inappropriateness to an algorithm
"contained within the four comers of a formula."'15 Consequently, medical
inappropriateness can only be identified the way beauty is perceived, "in the
eye of the beholder," 21 6or the way pornography is identified-we know it when
we see it.
21 7
III. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF LSMT
Employing these ad hoc definitions of medical inappropriateness, providers
often want to stop LSMT unilaterally when they are unable to secure surrogate
consent; however, the unilateral withholding and withdrawing of LSMT is
remarkable in three important respects.218 First, it tyically results in the
patient's death.219  Second, it is rare and unusual. 0 Third, and most
significantly, it devalues patient autonomy.
221
Before the 1970's, this devaluation of patient autonomy did not seem so
remarkable.222 Historically, it did not matter so much what the patient wanted
because health care providers just provided the treatment that they thought was
right.223  But today, providers generally must comply with treatment requests
made by or on behalf of their patients.224 Autonomy has become the
touchstone.
This nonconsensual aspect of unilateral termination is the most
distinctive.225 Both without patient or surrogate consent and typically even over
215. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,444 (Cal. 1963).
216. Cf Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985) (discussing the
subjectivity of the "plain meaning" of a statute granting judicial review of a lower court's
decision).
217. Cf Jeffrey Bums, Does Anyone Actually Invoke Their Hospital Futility Policy?, 12
LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHics J. 3, 3 (2005) (comparing futility to Potter Stewart's remark of
pornography: "I know it when I see it" (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring))).
218. See Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Who Decides Whether a Patient Lives or
Dies?, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, at 30, 32 (revealing these three aspects through the last days of a two-
year-old patient).
219. See id. at 32, 34.
220. See id. at 32.
221. See id.
222. See RuTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONsENT 76-101 (1986).
223. See id.
224. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("[T]he law recognizes that
an adult has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to his or her own health care
. ...."); id. § 4733 (stating that health care providers are required to comply with the requests of
their patients or surrogates); Ferguson, supra note 16, at 1237 ("[T]wenty-five years of patients'
rights development indicate that unilateral actions are not the standard. The unilateral
withdrawal of care.., violates our sense of patient autonomy ... ").
225. MASON & LAURIE, supra note 77, at 601 ("An act of involuntary euthanasia involves
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vehement opposition, the provider causes the patient's death.226 Consequently,
taking unilateral action can expose the health care provider to civil, criminal,
and disciplinary sanctions.227
A. Civil Sanctions
Health care providers who make unilateral decisions to stop LSMT may be
subject to a wide array of civil sanctions. Reported cases show claims for
patient neglect and abuse,228 infliction of emotional distress, 229 and breach of
contract.230 However, the causes of action most often utilized in response to
unilateral decisions are the following: (1) lack of informed consent, (2) medical
malpractice, and (3) wrongful death.
ending the patient's life in the absence of either a personal or proxy invitation to do so.");
Brenda Fastabend, Virginia's Involuntary Euthanasia Problem, VSHL LIFESAVER, Aug. 1999,
available at http://www.vshl.org/education/euthanasia/5 4/5 _44 VirginiaInvoluntary_
EuthanasiaProblem.shtml (referring to "medical futility" as "involuntary [passive]
euthanasia"). Where patients decline LSMT through contemporaneous decisions, advance
directives, or surrogates, this is known as "voluntary passive euthanasia." Medical futility is
characterized as "passive" where providers withhold or withdraw LSMT, but take no affirmative
action such as a lethal injection. Medical futility becomes "involuntary" when LSMT is stopped
without the patient's or surrogate's consent.
226. See Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 218, at 32.
227. See infra notes 228-75 and accompanying text. The following discussion is qualified
in three respects. First, this Article does not distinguish the liability of the individual provider
from that of the institutional provider. Second, while the Article assumes that the provider has
already implemented the unilateral decision, in addition to these expost sanctions, the patient or
surrogate may seek injunctive relief. Third, the Article focuses here on state law. For discussion
of federal law constraints, see infra notes 439 to 464 and accompanying text. For a thorough
analysis of futility disputes in court, see Pope, supra note 104.
228. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (Ill. 1990).
229. See, e.g., Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 830 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Idaho 1992);
Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30
Pa. D. & C.4th 57, 62 (Dauphin County Ct. C.P. Dec. 29, 1995) (No. 872S1995), 1995 WL
924561; Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Capron, supra
note 47, at 28 (discussing Gilgunn v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., No. CIV.A.92-4820 (Suffolk
Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 1995)); Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 218, at 30, 32 (citing Bland v.
Cigna Healthplan of Tex., No. 93-52630 (Harris Cty., Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 1995)).
230. See, e.g., Gamble v. Perra, No. E2006-00229-COA-R3-CV, slip. op. at 2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2007). There is also potential exposure for providers under state disability laws.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.135 (2006) ("When determining the best interest of a patient
under this chapter, health care treatment may not be denied to a patient because the patient has a
disability or is expected to have a disability.").
23 1. See infra notes 232-54 and accompanying text. At least one court has suggested that
unilateral decisions to terminate would constitute tortuous abandonment. Bryan v. Rectors &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Such reprehensible disregard for
one's patient . . . would . . . constitute . . . the well established tort of abandonment.").
However, abandonment claims are weak for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that the physician-
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1. Lack of Informed Consent
Patients and surrogates have brought informed consent actions against
health care providers that implemented unilateral decisions to stop LSMT.232
For example, in Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center, the hospital withdrew a
ventilator from a two-year-old girl, not only without her parent's consent, but
also "against their vehement and desperate opposition." 23F The court overruled
the hospital's motion to dismiss the parent's informed consent cause of
action.2 The case subsequently settled for an undisclosed sum.
235
The doctrine of informed consent requires health care providers to obtain
consent to discontinue a patient's treatment.236 In a typical futility dispute, the
patient relationship would be terminated completely and unilaterally. See THE RIGHT TO DIE,
supra note 17, at § 11.03[d]; Prip & Moretti, supra note 212, at 142. While a provider may
decline to continue LSMT, the provider must continue comfort care. See sources cited supra
note 79 and accompanying text. Second, if treatment were medically inappropriate, then the
treatment relationship would have already ended because the provider's services were no longer
necessary. See Levine, supra note 10, at 88 (arguing that if the treatment is medically
inappropriate, then physician's services were no longer necessary).
232. See, e.g., Morgan, 417 N.W.2d at 235 (DNR order without patient's consent); Causey
v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1075-76 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing that while
the physician explained the situation to the patient's family, he withdrew the treatment "despite
the lack of any consent"); Strickland, 735 P.2d at 75 (patient removed from respirator without
consent); Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 678 N.W.2d 347,352 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (dismissing
informed consent claim against hospital because it had no independent duty to obtain consent;
only doctors are required to obtain informed consent), rev'd on other grounds, 700 N.W. 2d 158
(Wis. 2005); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992)
(remanding case for trial on whether doctors should have sought parental consent for DNR order
from a patient just a few weeks shy of 18).
233. Rideout, 30 Pa. D. & C.4th at 69-70.
234. Id. at 73.
235. See Email from Thomas W. Hall to Thaddeus M. Pope (May 4, 2007) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review).
236. Informed consent also requires health care providers to disclose information about the
treatment and its alternatives. However, providers probably have no duty to advise the patient
or surrogate of the option to continue treatment that the provider considers inappropriate.
Physicians need not disclose information about unreasonable options. They need not disclose
information about procedures and interventions that are not within the medical standard of care.
See FAY A. ROzOvSKy, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.02 (4th ed. 2007)
(describing the characteristics of a "valid consent" and what disclosure is required by the
provider); see also Peter D. Jacobson & C. John Rosenquist, The Introduction ofLow-Osmolar
Agents in Radiology: Medical, Economic, Legal, and Public Policy Issues, 260 JAMA 1586,
1588-89 (1988) (discussing the requirements of informed consent for radiologists implementing
a new contrast media); Paris, supra note 185, at 1013 ("[A] physician who merely spreads an
array of vendibles in front of the patient [or family] and then says, 'Go ahead and choose, it's
your life,' is guilty of shirking his duty, if not of malpractice." (quoting F.J. Ingelfinger,
Arrogance, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1507 (1980))). Furthermore, in a futility conflict, the
patient's surrogates are typically already aware of the treatment options that the health care
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surrogate demands the continuation of treatment in opposition to the provider's
wishes. 237 Therefore, the provider who unilaterally discontinues treatment fails
to obtain consent and overrides the surrogate's explicit opposition.238
2. Medical Malpractice and Negligence
In addition to causes of action for lack of informed consent, patients and
surrogates have brought medical malpractice and negligence actions against
health care providers that made unilateral decisions to stop LSMT.2 39 For
example, in Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center, a physician and hospital
withheld LSMT from a 3 1-year-old quadriplegic, comatose patient with kidney
failure over the strongly expressed objections of her family.240 While the
family members pleaded an intentional tort cause of action, the court allowed
241the case to proceed as a medical malpractice case.
The heart of a medical malpractice claim is that the provider failed to
administer the care and skill ordinarily exercised by members of their
profession practicing in the same or similar location under similar
circumstances.242 Therefore, providers should not be exposed to malpractice243
liability if stopping LSMT really is the standard of care. Because the medical
provider judges medically inappropriate. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir.
1994); Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075-76.
237. See, e.g., Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593; Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075-76.
238. See, e.g., Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593; Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075-76.
239. See, e.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 328 (Iowa 1998) (allowing husband
to proceed with malpractice action against physician and hospital that unilaterally decided not to
attempt CPR on his wife); Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1072; Kelly v. St. Peter's Hospice, 553
N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (reviewing plaintiff's medical malpractice claim
alleging that physician and facility failed to provide "sufficiently aggressive" treatment to
patient with metastatic breast cancer); Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 75 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987); Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 678 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)
(dismissing medical malpractice against hospital that intentionally refused to treat premature
infant because plaintiff failed to identify an expert); see also Litz v. Robinson, 955 P.2d 113,
114 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (hearing "alleg[ation] that the defendants breached their duties as
physicians by wrongfully withholding life sustaining procedures"); King v. Crowell Mem'l
Home, 622 N.W.2d 588,591-92 (Neb. 2001) (hearing medical malpractice action alleging that
the defendant nursing home classified the decedent as a DNR patient even though their
instructions were to use "'any and all medical measures"'); Gamble v. Perra, No. E2006-00229-
COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (wife "alleged that her husband could have
lived longer, but for his lack of treatment by defendants").
240. Causey, 714 So. 2d at 1073.
241. Id. The trial court found that, as a medical malpractice action, the claim must first be
presented to a medical review panel. Id. As a result, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action as
premature. Id.
242. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 264-65 (2d ed. 2000).
243. See id. § 6-2 at 269 (describing how guidelines establish the standard of care and
therefore provide a shield against liability); see also id. § 16-77 at 905 ("[H]ealth care providers
must offer patients only that range of treatments that is medically indicated under the
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standard of care is custom-based, malpractice liability would not seem to
present an obstacle to unilaterally stopping LSMT.24 Although providers do in
fact collectively set the standard, three implementation realities dispel this
245notion.
First, "the practical difficulties of proving just what is the prevailing
medical custom break down this protective theory in the real world.",
246
Second, to the extent the standard of care is ascertainable, unilaterally stopping
LSMT is not now the standard of care.247 As Justice Brennan observed,
"[c]urrent medical practice recommends use of heroic measures if there is a
scintilla of a chance that the patient will recover .... 248 Third, by continuing
to give such care, providers are creating and perpetuating the very standard
with which they do not want to comply.
249
3. Wrongful Death
In addition to informed consent and medical malpractice actions, patients
and surrogates have brought wrongful death suits against health care providers
that made unilateral decisions to stop LSMT.25° In Velez v. Bethune, the
physician unilaterally terminated the life support of a severely impaired
infant.2 51 The court held that the parents had a valid claim for wrongful
death.252 The court stated that "Dr. Velez had no right to decide, unilaterally, to
discontinue medical treatment even if, as the record in this case reflects, the
child was terminally ill and in the process of dying. That decision must be
circumstances."); Laurence J. Schneiderman & Alexander Morgan Capron, How Can Hospital
Futility Policies Contribute to Establishing Standards of Practice?, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHics 524, 529 (2000) (arguing that any one of various standards is sufficient if
a "'respectable minority"' of physicians would stop LSMT); cf Kelly, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 907-08
(patient's husband failed to present evidence that treatment departed from acceptable medical
practice).
244. FuRRow, supra note 242, § 6-2 at 265, § 16-77 at 905.
245. Id. § 6-2 at 265.
246. Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 127 (1991).
247. FuRRow, supra note 242, § 16-77 at 906.
248. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 314 (1940) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Middleditch & Trotter, supra note 26, at 399-400 (finding that use of
mechanical feeding and breathing devices for patients in a persistent vegetative state as the new
custom).
249. See FuRROW, supra note 242, at § 6-2 at 269.
250. See, e.g., Kranson v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1985);
Velez v. Bethune, 466 S.E.2d 627, 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic &
Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Idaho 1992) (affirming award of compensatory and punitive
damages); Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 328-29 (Iowa 1998); Belcher v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 830 (W. Va. 1992).
251. Velez, 466 S.E.2d at 628.
252. Id.
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made with the consent of the parents. 253 While both the imminence and
inevitability of the infant's death may have been relevant to the amount of
damages, neitherProperly factor into whether the physician had committed an
intentional tort.
B. Criminal and Regulatory Sanctions
In addition to civil sanctions, health care providers that make unilateral
decisions to stop LSMT may be subject to an array of criminal and regulatory
sanctions, including charges for patient neglect,255 adverse peer review,25 6 and
even murder.257
1. Murder
For health care providers, withholding or withdrawing LSMT, even with
consent, and thereby facilitating death, was once considered a serious crime.
2
1
8
A health care provider's omission to continue treatment fits the literal definition
of murder: an intentional act done with the knowledge that the patient would
die.259 However, that concept was eventually rejected in both cases andstatutes.26°
253. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
254. Id.; see also Wendland, 574 N.W.2d at 331 ("That a terminally ill victim would have
died on Tuesday, the next day, does not prevent the defendant's conduct from being a cause of
his death on Monday, but would obviously be quite relevant to the question of damages.").
255. See., e.g., Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 700 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Wis. 2005) (citing
WIS. STAT. § 940.295(l)(J) (1997-1998)).
256. See, e.g., Warthen v. Toms River Comty. Mem'l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 230 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (reviewing termination of nurse's employment for refusing to
administer dialysis to terminally ill patient); Irene Hurst, The Legal Landscape at the Threshold
of Viability for Extremely Premature Infants: A Nursing Perspective, Part I, 19 J. PERINATAL &
NEONATAL NURSING 155, 162 (2005) ("Hospital administrators warned Dr. Jacob that he should
reconsider his recommendation [not to resuscitate, contrary to hospital policy] or lose his
privileges at the Hospital and be subject to a peer review."); Arthur E. Kopelman et al., The
Benefits of a North Carolina Policy for Determining Inappropriate or Futile Medical Care, 66
N,C. MED. J. 392, 394 (2005) ("[T]he legislation... [gives] assurance that they are not making
a decision that will be questioned by their colleagues or other healthcare peers."); Mildred Z.
Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views on Life-Sustaining
Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993) (describing health care providers' "fear of
sanction from peer review boards").
257. DWORKIN, supra note 124, at 112; see Barber v. Super. Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
258. See DWORKIN, supra note 124, at 112.
259. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 6.2 at 435-36 (2d ed. 2003);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIvE CRIMINAL LAW, § 14.2 at 428 (2d ed. 2003).
260. See, e.g., UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (UHCDA) § 13(b) (1993) ("Death
resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of health care in accordance with this [Act] does
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In Barber v. Superior Court, for example, physicians withdrew LSMT, at
the family's request, from a patient in a vegetative state likely to be
permanent. 261 The Los Angeles District Attorney prosecuted the physicians for
murder, but the appellate court rejected the charges because the physicians
stopped LSMT with the consent of the authorized decision maker.
Cases like Barber differ from the futility context in two material respects.
First, physicians do not have patient or surrogate consent to cease LSMT.263
The Barber court's holding-that the providers were under no duty to continue
ineffective treatment-meant only that the authorized decision maker was
under no duty to request such treatment.264 The court's ruling did not mean
that the health care provider had no duty to provide LSMT when requested.265
Second, in contrast to the Barber situation where the surrogates and providers
were in agreement, somebody will always be angry enough to complain to the
authorities in a futility case.2 S6
Unilateral decisions to stop LSMT have thus led to homicide charges267 and
at least one conviction. 268  Admittedly, health care providers are rarely
convicted.269 Yet, they must still expend considerable time and resources in the
investigation and litigation process.27°
not for any purpose constitute a suicide or homicide .... "); Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
261. Barber, 195 Cal Rptr. at 486.
262. 1d. at 486, 493.
263. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
264. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486, 493.
265. Cf Marcia Angell, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide-The Ultimate
Right, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 50, 51 (1997) ("[S]witching off the ventilator of a patient
dependent on it... would be considered homicide if done without the consent of the patient or
a proxy.").
266. See Ann Alpers, Criminal Actor Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of
the Dying, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHics 308, 311, 320 (1998) (noting how state authorities typically
react only in response to complaints).
267. MAsON & LAURIE, supra note 77, at 545-47, 582; Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:229
(noting one unilateral decision in Virginia led to a charge of homicide and an investigation by
the State Board of Medicine).
268. See State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213, 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing
convictions of murder for failing to resuscitate Mr. Wilt and of attempted murder for over-
prescribing pain medication for Ms. Leach). At least one district attorney in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin has announced that he will investigate and prosecute deaths caused by the unilateral
withdrawal of LSMT. Telephone interview with Dr. Michael Katzoff, Medical Director, Sleep
Disorder Center, St. Luke's Medical Center.
269. Joseph P. Pestaner, End-of-Life Care: Forensic Medicine v. Palliative Medicine, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHIcs. 365, 366 (2003) ("[T]o criminally convict a palliative care provider of a
homicidal act essentially requires in admission of guilt.").
270. See MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION (TEACHER'S MANUAL) 112-19 (2003). Dr. Naramore, for
example, got his conviction reversed on appeal. Id. at 118-19. Nevertheless, he suffered a host
of adversities, including: (1) losing his staff privileges, (2) losing his medical license, (3) losing
his reputation, (4) incarceration pending trial, and (5) difficulty getting another job. Id. at 115-
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2. Statutory Damages
Statutory damages are far less serious than murder charges, but they are
nevertheless significant. State health care decision statutes normally require
compliance with a patient's or surrogate's decision.271 Many states allow for
statutory damages and attorney's fees when intentional statutory violations
occur.
2 72
If a unilateral decision to stop LSMT is intentionally made to interfere with
the patient's autonomy in making health care decisions, then that unilateral
decision can constitute a statutory violation resulting in fines,273 disciplinary
action, or both.274 In one case, the patient's estate brought a $2.5 million civil
action based on violation of the state Health Care Decisions Act when the
University of Virginia Hospital entered a unilateral DNR order.275
C. The Chilling Effect of Legal Constraints
While these legal sanctions may not be very probable, they exert a276
substantial chilling effect on extremely risk averse health providers. As put
16, 119.
271. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808(b) (2006).
272. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 327E-10(a) (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
A, § 5-810(a) (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-221(1) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-78(b)
(West 1992); N.M. STAT. § 24-7A-10(A) (2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-411(a) (2007);
UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 10 (1993).
273. See Marah Stith, The Semblance ofAutonomy: Treatment of Persons with Disabilities
under the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 39, 71 (2006) (stating that
the civil penalties imposed are "extremely low").
274. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-21 (LexisNexis 1993) ("A physician who
knowingly violates this chapter is subject to disciplinary sanctions ... as if the physician had
knowingly violated a rule adopted by the medical licensing board .... ); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
65-28,107(a) (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-78(a) (West 1992); Fletcher, supra note 10, at
S:229 (reporting one unilateral decision led to a an investigation by the State Board of
Medicine). On the other hand, some have suggested that if providers follow a process and are in
accord with professional guidelines, it is unlikely they will be found to have committed a
disciplinary offense. See WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 89-94 (suggesting that it is a
legal myth that providers will always be subject to legal liability for stopping LSMT).
275. Amended Motion for Judgment at 1-3, Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., No. CL95-060 (Fauquier County, Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 1995).
276. See Pope & Waldman, supra note 9, at 170-85; see also GARRISON & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 270, at 70 ("Doctors egregiously over-estimate the risks of being sued by their
patients."); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 57, at 126-28; ZUSsMAN, supra note 51, at 181
("[U]nfortunately, because of a fear of being sued at a later date, most physicians really are
willing to provide every available technology to a patient...."); Kapp, supra note 122, at 232
("[L]aw-related anxieties ... are palpable, powerful influences on ... medical care .... ");
Rowland, supra note 214, at 307 ("Legal considerations are of paramount concern when
discussing the discontinuation of care."); Carl E. Schneider, Regulating Doctors, 29 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1999, at 21; Connie Zuckerman, Milbank Memorial Fund, End-of-Life
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by Professors Robert Weir and Larry Gostin, "Because the professional
responsibility of hospital attorneys is to protect the hospital's legal and financial
interests, they are frequently inclined to give advice on cases that is unduly
conservative. ... ,,27 This ultra-cautious approach is no less true in the context
of futility disputes.278 In 1993, the National Center for State Courts observed
that there was "no consensus ... on the legal ramifications associated with
[futility],
27 9 Before statutory authorization for unilateral decision making in
the mid-i 990s, 280 legal uncertainty was rampant and the fear of liability
discouraged most institutions from adopting futility policies.
281
Nonetheless. by the early 1990s, a few hospitals had formally adopted
futility policies. 82 Yet even these hospitals never fully implemented the
Care and Hospital Legal Counsel: Current Involvement and Opportunities for the Future 3
(1999), available at http://www.milbank.org/end.html ("Legal considerations ... strongly
influence how clinicians think about end-of-life care.").
277. Robert F. Weir & Larry Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for
Nonautonomous Patients: Ethical Standards and Legal Liability for Physicians After Cruzan,
264 JAMA 1846, 1846 (1990); see also Alan J. Weisbard, Defensive Law: A New Perspective
on Informed Consent, 146 ARCIIVES INTERN. MED. 860,860 (1986) ("[T]he lawyer's... advice
is likely to become ultracautious and may tend to conflict with the responsible practice of
medicine....").
278. See COORDINATING COUNCIL ON LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION
MAKING BY THE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING
MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 147 (2d ed. 1993).
279. Id.
280. See infra Part IV.
281. See, eg., WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 32 ("Physicians often... fear the legal
consequences of forgoing treatment .... "); Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:229. Professor
Fletcher recalls, "On coming to the University of Virginia in 1987, 1 observed many clinicians
overtreating hopelessly ill patients primarily due to fears of legal liability. Also, clinicians were
acutely aware of the lack of legal backing if they refused to acquiesce .. " Id.; see Moldow,
supra note 12, at 3 ("Fear of legal action has previously discouraged many institutions from
adopting policies in the area of medical futility .... "); Sibbald et al., supra note 44, at 1203
(reporting from a survey of ICUs: "When participants were asked why they followed the
instructions of families or substitute decision makers instead of doing what they feel is
appropriate, almost all cited a lack of legal support."); Weiser, supra note 45, at Al (describing
how physicians' wanted to unilaterally withdraw LSMT from severely ill infant, but were
prevented by hospital's rules); see also ZUSSMAN, supra note 51, at 178 ("'I wish,' she
concluded, 'the family didn't have the final say. But in 1987 they do .... '). Marshall Kapp
argues that the legal risks in the early 1990s were not serious, yet concedes that physicians had
"overblown anxiety." Kapp, supra note 122, at 175; see also Hall, supra note 246, at 119
("[T]o the extent that a crisis is in fact widely perceived, it has the quality of a self-fulfilling
prophecy....").
282. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 92, at 62 (noting early futility policies); Fletcher, supra
note 10, at S:228 ("Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) was the first to experiment with an
approach to futility disputes.., that gave institutional backing to physicians to write a DNR
order over the objections of a surrogate .... "); Hudson, supra note 66, at 26 (noting Santa
Monica adopted a policy in 1991); Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 243, at 526
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policies by actually taking unilateral action to stop LSMT requested by a
patient or surrogate.283 Providers understood that an institutional policy did
little to alleviate uncertainty about the legal implications of unilaterally
stopping LSMT.2 4
(referencing meeting in 1998 to discuss futility policies of twenty-six hospitals).
283. Fine et al., supra note 100, at 1221 (describing that before the Texas statute, "[i]n
-80% of such [futility] cases, the ethics consultants were able to persuade families .
However, in the other 20% of cases, families insisted on continued [LSMT], and physicians
complied, being unwilling to subject themselves to legal jeopardy by overruling the
family/surrogate"); Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at 744 ("It is unclear how effective such
guidelines could be in the face of legal uncertainty. Even when ethics committees agreed that
treatment was futile, treating physicians were generally unwilling to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment .... "); Amir Halevy & Amy L. McGuire, The History, Successes and Controversies
of the Texas "Futility" Policy, HOUSTON LAW., May-June 2006, at 38, available at
http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aamay06/page38.htm ("In spite of its adoption as hospital
policy.., no cases went through the entire process .... The most likely explanation is that
residual legal uncertainty regarding the policy still lingered."); Hudson, supra note 66, at 26
(noting that the hospital had "never reached the last two steps in the [futility] process"); Rivin,
supra note 30, at 390 ("Despite the recommendations of the physicians and the ethics
committee, the [Santa Monica] hospital refused to discontinue life support for fear of lawsuit.");
Anna V. Schlotzhauer & Bryan A. Liang, Definitions of Death, in HEALTH LAW AND POLICY: A
SURVIVAL GUIDE TO MEDICOLEGAL ISSUES FOR PRACTITIONERS 287,291 (2000) ("[N]othing can
be done in cases where families of PVS patients seek to continue treatment indefinitely .. ");
Swig et al., supra note 173, at 1218 ("[D]espite a policy that allowed them to do otherwise, ...
physicians at San Francisco General Hospital usually offered CPR to patients who they thought
were unlikely to benefit.").
284. See generally Cerminara, supra note 48, at 327 ("[G]ood process... will not insulate
a decision maker from being overturned in court...."); Fine, supra note 92, at 63 ("Guidelines
in the face of legal uncertainty, however, were not particularly effective.... [F]ew physicians
were willing to limit such treatment in the face of potential lawsuits from families who
disagreed."); Fine, supra note 100, at 1221 (noting when families insisted on continued LSMT
"physicians complied, being unwilling to subject themselves to legal jeopardy by overruling the
family/surrogate"); Flamm, supra note 10, at 4 ("[Tlhe previous ambiguity of legal
consequences often prevented clinicians from fulfilling ethical obligations against providing
medically inappropriate care."); Halevy & McGuire, supra note 283, at 38 ("[R]esidual legal
uncertainty regarding the policy still lingered."); Kopelman et al., supra note 256, at 393
("Uncertainty about the legal implications of acting against the patient's or surrogate's wishes
often prevents physicians from taking that [unilateral] step, despite agreement among all or
almost all clinicians."); Rivin, supra note 30, at 393 (noting that even when physicians thought
a case was futile, they were unwilling to invoke the futile care policy for "fear of a lawsuit");
Solomon et al., supra note 256, at 19 (reporting physician uncertainty about legal standards for
withdrawing treatment); Swig et al., supra note 173, at 1218 (citing "legal considerations" as a
possible explanation for why physicians did not utilize their hospital's futility policy); Belluck,
supra note 38, at 22 ("In the absence of laws like Texas's, hospitals often accede to a family's
wishes because they fear being sued."); Burling, supra note 66, at Al ("The weak point of
virtually all policies is that hospital leaders fear they would lose a lawsuit if they denied care
demanded by a family."); cf COMM. ON PALLIATIVE AND END-OF-LiFE CARE FOR CHILDREN AND
THEIR FAMILIES. BD. ON HEALTH Sci. POL'Y. WHEN CHILDREN DIE: IMPROVING PALLIATIVE AND
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To alleviate this uncertainty, some hospitals sought judicial permission to
implement their futility policies. 285 Declaratory judgments were designed to
address such cases of uncertainty.286 But this judicial approach suffered from
two serious drawbacks. First, given the time and resources required, it was
perceived as generally unworkable.287 Second, even if hospitals were willing to
invest the time and resources, courts have consistently declined to authorize
providers to implement their futility policies.288
Consequently, providers complied with requests for treatment that they
considered inappropriate, because they recognized that surrogates had a veto
authority over theirjudgment.289 In light of all the legal constraints and risks,
providers wanted legal protection before taking any unilateral action.29°
END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 322 (Marilyn J. Field & Richard E.
Behrman, eds., 2003) [hereinafter WHEN CHILDREN DIE] ("[T]he findings of an ethics committee
have no legal standing and cannot be used alone as the basis for termination of life support.");
Brett, supra note 70, at 289 (noting the "pragmatic problem with policies that confer no legal
protection"); Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 243, at 525 ("[T]he Baby K decision.. . had
a chilling effect on hospitals' willingness to implement futility policies.").
285. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406-07 (N.J. 1987); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 669 (N.J. 1976).
286. JAMES WM. MOORE, 12 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57 (3d ed. 2007).
287. Cf Farrell, 529 A.2d at 415 (resolving end-of-life disputes through ajudicial process
will "take too long"); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669 ("[A] practice of applying to a court to confirm
such decisions would generally be inappropriate . . . because that would be a gratuitous
encroachment on the medical profession's field of competence . . . [and] impossibly
cumbersome.").
288. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994) (denying motion by Fairfax
Hospital seeking declaratory judgment to withdraw treatment from anencephalic infant); Judge
Affirms Husband's Right to Continue Wife's Treatment, 53 BIOLAw § 12-6, at U:2161 (Aug.-
Sept. 199 1) (noting that "a county court judge... refused the doctors' request to appoint an
independent conservator to decide the patient's fate"); Frank Bruni, A Fight over Baby's Dignity
and Death: Parents Sue Hospital Over Shutdown of Life Support Equipment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1996, at A6 ("[W]hen hospitals go to court for permission to terminate treatment of a patient
over the objections of family, courts seldom give consent."); cf Hoffman & Schwartz, supra
note 218, at 37 (noting that some court have decided that futility issues "should be addressed by
the legislative rather than the judiciary").
289. See sources cited supra note 284.
290. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:231 ("The framers of such futility guidelines would
also be well-advised to seek amendments to existing health care legislation that strengthen the
authority of clinicians and health care organizations to resolve such disputes."); id. at S:229
("[A]ction was necessary in the Virginia legislature to assure physicians of legal backing if they
refused, in certain circumstances, to acquiesce to demands for overtreatment."); Carol Isackson,
Futile Treatment: The Needfor Legislation and Uniform Policies, 9 HEALTH CARE L. MONTHLY,
7, 10 (Oct. 1994) ("In order to protect providers from arbitrary decisions ... legislation should
be enacted .... "); Halevy & McGuire, supra note 283, at 38 ("Many institutions were
interested in pursuing policies that would allow physicians to refuse ... [but] the legal and
ethical uncertainties ... discouraged institutions from proceeding alone."); Susan Jacoby, The
Schiavo Factor: Now the States Are Rushing to Decide Who Decides, AARP BULLETIN, May
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IV. UNILATERAL DECISION STATUTES
Providers soon got the legal protection for unilateral decision making that
they were seeking. Beginning in the early 1990s, a significant number of states
began enacting legislation permitting health care providers to unilaterally refuse
to provide LSMT that they considered to be medically inappropriate.' 91
A. The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
Most notable among the unilateral decision statutes is the Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act (UHCDA).292 The UHCDA is notable for three reasons.
First, it has a significant and growing prevalence.293 It has now been adopted in
ten states, more than any other unilateral decision statute.294 Second, the
2005, available at http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/yourhealth/theschiavofactor.html ("In states
without such [futile care] laws, doctors frequently comply with the family's wishes for fear of
being sued .. "); Weiser, supra note 45, at Al (reporting how a doctor in the Baby Rena case
"felt the time had come to change the rules" to give doctors the authority they need in futile
cases).
291. See infra notes 298-307; see also Maggie Datiles, The Rising Role of Advance
Directives in Protecting the Sanctity of Human Life, in AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE,
DEFENDING LIFE 2008: A STATE-BY-STATE LEGAL GUIDE TO ABORTION, BIOETHICS AND THE END
OF LIFE 511, 512 (2008) ("The majority of states provide that physicians and healthcare
facilities may decline to comply [with requests for LSMT]"); Patrick Moore, An End-of-Life
Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment
that Physicians are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REv. 433 (2007); Monica Sethi, A
Patient's Right to Direct Own Health Care vs. a Physician's Right to Decline to Provide
Treatment, 29 BIFOCAL, Dec. 2007, at 21 (examining "provisions from all 50 states regarding
the various reasons for which a health care provider may refuse to comply with a patient's
demand for treatment").
292. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act: National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 83, 83-97 (2006) [hereinafter Uniform Act].
293. Id. at 83.
294. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' (NCCUSL)
website identifies only eight states as having adopted the UHCDA. A Few Facts About the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/
uniformacts-fs-uhcda.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) [hereinafter NCCUSL]. However, the
legislative history of both the California and Tennessee statutes confirms that they were largely
derived from the UHCDA as well. See Health Care Decisions for Adults Without
Decisionmaking Capacity, BillAnalysis ofA.B. 891 Before the Assem. Comm. on the Judiciary,
at 5 (Apr. 15, 1999) (noting that the bill is "[d]rawing heavily on the [UHCDA]."); Health Care
Decisions: Durable Power of Attorney, Bill Analysis of A.B. 891 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, at 2 (July 13, 1999) ("The provisions of the proposed Health Care Decisions Law
(HCDL) are drawn heavily from the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (1993), and implement
major parts of the Commission's recommendation[s]."); Charles M. Key & Gary D. Miller, The
Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act A Major Advance in the Law of Critical Care Decision
Making, 40 TENN. B.J. 25, 28 (2004).
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UHCDA has provisions specifically designed to handle futility disputes.295
Third, the UHCDA is a reasonably comprehensive statute, broadly authorizing
health care providers to take unilateral action in all types of futility disputes.2
1. Prevalence of the UHCDA
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
completed drafting the UHCDA in 1993.297 Over the next twelve years, it was
adopted in the following ten states: New Mexico (1995),298 Maine (1995),299
Delaware (1996), °° Alabama (1997),3 °1 Mississippi (1998),02 California
(1999), o3 Hawaii (1999), 304 Tennessee (2004), 3  Alaska (2004),306 and
Wyoming (2005).307 Together, these ten states comprise about one-fifth of the
U.S. population.08
Several other states have recently considered adopting the UHCDA,
including its unilateral decisions provisions.30 9 It is likely that the UHCDA will
continue to be adopted or will otherwise influence health care decision making
law in other states.310
295. See Uniform Act, supra note 292, at 84.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 83.
298. N.M. STAT. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (2000).
299. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to -817 (1995).
300. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2518 (2003).
301. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -14 (LexisNexis 2006).
302. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to -229 (2005).
303. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4806 (West Supp. 2007).
304. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327E-1 to -16 (Supp. 2005).
305. TENN. CODEANN. §§ 68-11-1801 to -1815 (2006).
306. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.52.010 to .395 (2006).
307. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-401 to -416 (2007).
308. U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Oct. 21, 2007)
(extrapolating total population from 2006 estimates for each of the ten states).
309. See, e.g., Utah S.B. 75 (effective Jan. 1,2008) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§
75-2a-1 103(6)(b) & 75-2a-1 114) (based on the UHCDA); Uniform Health Care Decisions Act:
Hearing on S.B. 229 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th Legis. (Mont. 2007).
Unfortunately, the Montana bill died in standing committee on April 27, 2007. See
http://laws.leg.mt.gov/pls/laws07/lawO2O3w$.startup (search "Bill Type and Number" for "S.B.
229").
310. See, e.g., REP. TO VERMONT ATTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM H. SORRELL FROM THE
COMMS. OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE ON END OF LIFE CARE 15 (2005) (recording
recommendations of committees reached by reviewing UHCDA); ADVANCE DIRECTIvES IN NEW
HAMPSHIRE: A STATUTORY REVIEW & SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2000) (considering advance
care planning); see also David M. English & Alan Meisel, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
Gives New Guidance, 21 EST. PLAN. 355, 357 (1994) ("It is likely that the Act will serve as an
influential model for many years to come.").
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2. Purpose of the UHCDA
Some have suggested that the UHCDA's unilateral decision provisions
were not written in contemplation of futility disputes, but rather exclusively "in
contemplation of the opposite situation" in which the family wants to reject
treatment but the health care provider wants to continue. 311  Indeed, the
UHCDA does focus on patient autonomy and the empowerment of patients and
surrogates.312
Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Uniform Act clearly shows this
charge to be untrue.313 The UHCDA commissioners specifically contemplated
and sought to relieve health care providers of any obligation to provide
inappropriate treatment.314 Moreover, the very logic of the UHCDA compels
an interpretation that authorizes providers to unilaterally terminate LSMT.315
311. See, e.g., ROBERT POWELL CENTER FOR MEDICAL ETHics, NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE
COMMITTEE, WILL YOUR ADVANCE DIRECTIVE BE FOLLOWED?, at 8 n.* (Apr. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/AdvancedDirectives/ReportRevised2007.pdf.
Indeed, some laws do allow only unilateral decisions to provide treatment. For example, until
this year, Pennsylvania provided immunity only for provision of treatment contrary to a
patient's living will. Compare 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5409(c) ("[T]he provision of life-sustaining
treatment to a declarant shall not subject a health care provider to criminal or civil liability or
administrative sanction for failure to carry out the provisions of a declaration."), with 20 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 543 l(a)(6) (stating that providers will not be subject to criminal or civil liability,
or administrative sanctions for "[r]efusing to comply with a direction or decision of an
individual [if] based on a good faith belief that compliance with the direction or decision would
be unethical" or would result in baseless medical treatment); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145C. 11(2) (West 1998) (addressing specifically the provision of treatment, but not addressing
a provider's refusal of treatment contrary to decision of the agent).
312. See Uniform Act, supra note 292, at 83.
313. See, e.g., Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in
Comm. of the Whole, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, July 30, 1993, at 33 (statement of
Comm'r David M. English) ("[T]hey are not obligated to provide me with the type of state-of-
the-art, all-out care ... [because] if a competent patient couldn't ask for it, then an agent
couldn't ask for it either."); id. at 183 (statement of Comm'r M. King Hill) ("We do not want to
impose upon physicians or other health-care providers.., the obligation to provide treatment
that will not be effective."); Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings
in Comm. of the Whole, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Aug. 2, 1993, at 268-69
(statement of Comm'r Richard V. Wellman) ("[Provision to decline treatment] is here as a...
needed qualification of duties imposed on health-care providers to follow instructions and
directions by surrogates and others."); id. at 269-70 (statement of Comm'r M. King Hill)
("medically ineffective" refers to costs--"This says to the physician that you don't have to
institute some new radical $200,000 procedure if it's only going to keep the patient alive for two
or three months, even though there may be many articles in the journals that say that's an
accepted health-care standard for a [twenty-two] year old.").
314. See sources cited supra note 313.
315. See Stith, supra note 273, at 62 (arguing that the UHCDA gives physicians the right to
"ignore desired but 'medically ineffective' treatment" and also contains "normative aspects that
cause it to favor death-hastening physician judgments: Only continuance of care can be
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3. Comprehensiveness of the UHCDA
The UHCDA requires that health care providers generally comply with
patient and surrogate health care decisions. 16 But it also makes clear that a
health care provider's obligation to comply with a treatment request "is not
absolute.",3' 7 A health care provider or health care institution may decline to
comply with an individual instruction that requires "medically ineffective
health care" or "health care contrary to generally accepted health-care
standards. 318 A health care provider may also decline to comply for "reasons
of conscience."319
ineffective."); id. at 63 ("The UHCDA's preference for the ability to discontinue care could not
be clearer.").
316. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(d) (1993).
317. Id. at Prefatory Note ("The obligation to comply is not absolute, however. A health-
care provider or institution may decline to honor an instruction or decision for reasons of
conscience or if the instruction or decision requires the provision of medically ineffective care
or care contrary to applicable health-care standards."); id. at § 4 cmt. ("[H]ealth-care
instructions ... are binding ... subject to exceptions specified in Section 7(e)-(f), on the
individual's health-care providers."); id. § 7 cmt. ("Not all instructions or decisions must be
honored, however.").
318. Id. §§ 7(f), 13(d); accord ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.52.060(f) (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4654,4735 (West Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2508(f) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-7(f) (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
A, § 5-807(f) (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(6) (2005); N.M. STAT. §§ 24-7A-7(F), 24-
7A-13(D) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808(e) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-
408(f), 35-22-414(d) (2007).
319. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(e); accord CAL. PROB. CODE §
4734(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("A health care provider may decline to comply with an individual
health care instruction or health care decision for reasons of conscience."). The conscience
exception is well established in the reverse situation, permitting providers to refuse to comply
with patient or surrogate requests to stop treatment. See, e.g., Morrison v. Abramovice, 253
Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("The prevailing viewpoint among medical ethicists
appears to be that a physician has the right to refuse on personal moral grounds to follow a
conservator's direction to withhold life-sustaining treatment...."); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986) (stating providers should not feel compelled "to take
active measures which are contrary to their view of their ethical duty toward their patients").
But see Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988) (finding providers must
acknowledge a patient's "right of self-determination" despite the provider's own personal
objections). The conscience exception applies to both individual and institutional providers,
though institutions must give notice. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987)
(stating that nursing home should have given patient's family notice of their policy regarding
artificial feeding); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
TREATMENT DECISIONS, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE
ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 44 (1983). However, the
conscience exception is thought to have limited applicability in the futility context because the
provider's values are not the central concern. See Gampel, supra note 59, at 101 ("[Tlhe values
at stake in that judgment are unlikely to be as central to an individual HCP, or to the medical
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The UHCDA's authorization of unilateral decisions is comprehensive in at
least four important respects. First, the UHCDA permits the provider to decline
to comply with a treatment request concerning any type of treatment.3 20 While
some state statutes only authorize unilateral decisions with respect to CPR,32'
the UHCDA authorizes unilateral decisions with respect to CPR, mechanical
ventilation, artificial nutrition and hydration, or any other type of medical
322intervention.
Second, the UHCDA is comprehensive in that it authorizes unilateral
decisions even when the patient or surrogate has made an explicit and
affirmative request for treatment or has demonstrated explicit and vehement
opposition.323  On the contrary, some state statutes authorize unilateral
decisions only where the patient's preferences are unknown-where the patient
has no available advance directive or surrogate.324
Third, the UHCDA leaves the provider with substantial discretion to
determine the circumstances under which treatment is inappropriate.3 25 The
UHCDA permits providers to decline to comply with requests for treatment that
would be medically ineffective. 326 "Medically ineffective" treatment is defined
as treatment that would not provide any "significant benefit., 32 7 However, the
UHCDA allows the health care provider broad discretion to determine whether
the benefit achievable by a treatment is "significant.,
32 8
profession, as the values that tell against acts such as assisted suicide or abortion."). Since many
futility cases are driven by providers' desire to avoid patient suffering, the conscience exception
may soon play a greater role. Cf Mark R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14
BIoETHICs 205, 216-17 (2000) ("The condition is that an appeal to conscience has significant
moral weight only if the core ethical values on which it is based correspond to one or more core
values in medicine."). This is especially true because of the increasing breadth and use of
conscience clauses in medicine. See, e.g., Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health
Care Conscience Clause: The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties
and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 779 (2007).
320. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 7(e)-(f), 13(d).
321. See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
322. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § l(6)(i)-(iii).
323. See id. §§ 7(e)-(f), 13(d).
324. See infra notes 376-77.
325. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 7(f), 13(d).
326. Id. § 7(f).
327. Id. §7(f) cmt. ("'Medically ineffective health care,' as used in this section, means
treatment which would not offer the patient any significant benefit."). As adopted, one UHCDA
state defines "medically ineffective treatment" more tightly, as medical procedures which, "to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty,... will not: (1) Prevent or reduce the deterioration of
the health of an individual; or (2) Prevent the impending death of an individual." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 2501(m) (2003).
328. See Ferguson, supra note 16, at 1220-21 ("The UHCDA provides a mere framework
... giv[ing] only broad platitudes... [with] sections [that] seemingly create an open-ended
excuse for a physician to withdraw treatment .... ").
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Fourth, as adopted in several states, the UHCDA explicitly confers
immunity on providers who exercise the unilateral decision provisions in good
faith.3 29 California, for example, provides that "[a] health care provider...
acting in good faith and in accordance with generally accepted health care
standards applicable to the health care provider.. . is not subject to civil or
criminal liability or to discipline for unprofessional conduct for any actions in
compliance with this division.,
30
4. Operation of the UHCDA
Most end-of-life decision making laws are designed to work extra-
judicially.3 The UHCDA is no exception.332 Providers need not go to court to
make a unilateral decision.333 They need only comply with the following
process outlined in the UHCDA.334
If the provider is going to decline to comply with a health care decision
under the UHCDA, the provider must first inform the patient or surrogate.
335
329. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 9. While UHCDA itself confers
immunity for several categories of conduct, it does not confer immunity for complying with the
unilateral decision provisions. See id.
330. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4740 (West Supp. 2007); accord ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a)
(LexisNexis 2006) ("shall not be liable for such refusal"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2510(a)(5)
(2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-809(a)(2) (1995); N.M. STAT. § 24-7A-9(A)(4)
(2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-410(a)(v) (2007). Providers in other states may qualify for
immunity under related statutes. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7(b) (Supp. 2005) ("There
shall be no civil liability for any member of an ... ethics committee, or... for any acts done in
furtherance of the purpose for which the... ethics committee... was established .... ).
331. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650(c) (West Supp. 2007) ("In the absence of a
controversy, a court is normally not the proper forum in which to make health care decisions,
including decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment."); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 637
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he decision-making process should generally occur in the clinical
setting without resort to the courts .... "); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976)
(suggesting that applying to a court for authority to stop LSMT is generally inappropriate, being
both cumbersome and an encroachment on the medical profession); Jesse A. Goldner et al.,
Responses to Medical Futility Claims, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 404 (Alice Gosfield ed.,
1997) ("The final key background theme is that the courts express a clear preference for limiting
judicial involvement in these questions."). But see Maureen Kwiecinski, To Be or Not to Be,
Should Doctors Decide? Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Futility Policies, 7 MARQ.
ELDER'S ADVISOR 313, 353-55 (2006) (suggesting that judicial review should be required).
332. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, PrefatoryNote ("[T]he Act is in general
to be effectuated without litigation .... "); id. § 14 cmt. ("[T]he provisions of the Act are in
general to be effectuated without litigation .....
333. See id. at Prefatory Note, § 14 cmt.
334. While neither the UHCDA itself nor the statutes that are modeled on it make any
reference to ethics committees, institutional policies almost invariably provide a role for an
institutional committee. Most providers supplement the process in their state's statute with that
outlined by the AMA.
335. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(g)(1); see also id. § 7(a) ("Before
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This is a sensible requirement, since mutual agreement is reached in most
cases.336 Furthermore, notice gives the surrogate an opportunity to either seek
review of the decision or transfer the patient to another physician or institution
or both.337 Informing the surrogate addresses the notorious lack of transparency
associated with unilateral DNR orders in the 1980s.338
After the provider informs the patient or surrogate of their refusal to
comply with the treatment request, the provider must then try to transfer the
patient to another provider who is willing to comply with the treatment
request. 339 The UHCDA states:
[U]nless the patient or person then authorized to make health-care decisions
for the patient refuses assistance, [the provider shall] immediately make all
reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer of the patient to another health-care
provider or institution that is willing to comply with the instruction or
decision.
340
Thus, prior to transfer, the provider must comply with the treatment request.
341
implementing a health-care decision made for a patient, a supervising health-care provider, if
possible, shall promptly communicate to the patient the decision made and the identity of the
person making the decision.").
336. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
337. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DEcIsIONs ACT § 7(g).
338. Where providers were unable to write a unilateral DNR order and CPR was
considered inappropriate, providers were known to affix color dots to the patient's wristband or
write "N.T.B.R." (Not to Be Resuscitated) in pencil on the chart to be erased after the patient
died. See Hoffmnan, supra note 46, at 6; Kapp, supra note 122, at 173. Some providers did a
"Hollywood Code" or "Show Code" in which they performed a half-hearted or mock
resuscitation. George P. Smith, II, Euphemistic Codes and Tell-Tale Hearts: Humane
Assistance in End-of-Life Cases, 10 HEALTH MATRix: J. L.-MED. 175, 184 (2000); Rosenthal,
supra note 66, at A 1. Still other providers performed "Slow Codes" in which they moved very
slowly. See Smith, supra, at 180; Editorial, Slow Codes, Show Codes and Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1987, at A26; cf. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 657 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the medical
practice of "judicious neglect").
339. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(g)(2)-(3); see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §
4736(b) (West Supp. 2007). It is unclear whether the care in this interim period can be billed
once a formal decision has been made that the care is inappropriate. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)
(2007). The United States Code uses the following language:
It shall be the obligation of any health care practitioner and any other person (including a
hospital or other health care facility, organization, or agency) who provides health care
services for which payment may be made (in whole or in part) [by Medicare or Medicaid]
under this chapter, to assure, to the extent of his authority that services or items ordered or
provided.., will be provided economically and only when, and to the extent, medically
necessary."
Id.
340. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(g)(2).
341. Id. § 7(g)(2).
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Interestingly, however, the UHCDA does not specifically address what
happens if transfer is not possible.342 This is significant because those patients,
for whom providers deem LSMT inappropriate, typically cannot be transferred.
343 There is almost never a facility available and willing to take such
patients. 344 Even in cases where a facility is available, these patients are often
not sufficiently stable to be transferred. 45
The UHCDA requires only that the provider make "all reasonable efforts"
to transfer the patient.3 46 If the provider is unable to transfer the patient, then
342. See id. § 7.
343. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting no hospitals with a
pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) were willing to accept Stephanie Keene from Fairfax
Hospital, although she was temporarily transferred to a nursing home); Causey v. St. Francis
Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (noting physician sought unsuccessfully
to transfer patient); Lee, supra note 31, at 487 ("[T]ransfer of care is difficult in a medical
futility case .... "); Miles, supra note 74, at 513 (reporting family of Helga Wanglie
unsuccessfully tried to transfer her); Keith Shiner, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 803, 845-46 (1996) (stating that the "transfer option, by itself, is an
incomplete solution to the problem of medical futility"); Ackerman, supra note 43, at BI
("Memorial Hermann officials said that other pediatric hospitals they consulted concurred with
their treatment plan and decision to discontinue care."); Murphy, supra note 43, at 37 (reporting
that while the family of Joseph Ndiyob eventually found a Los Angeles hospital willing to
accept him, the hospital recanted when it learned he lacked health insurance); Baylor Response,
supra note 144 ("Ultimately, twelve different health care facilities refused to accept the patient
in transfer."); News Release, Memorial Hermann, Statement to the Media Regarding Kyna
Dismuke-Howard, (May 3,2005), http://www.memorialhermann.org/newsroom/050305a.htm
("[O]ur physicians contacted premier children's hospitals across the country ... [but] each one
reviewed the facts and refused to accept her transfer."). Texas provides a registry of providers
willing to accept patients possibly subject to unilateral decisions. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 166.053 (Vernon 2006). But the registry currently includes only one provider. Texas
Department of State Health Services, Registry of Health Care Providers and Referral Groups,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/THCIC/Registry.shtm (last updated Sept. 25, 2007).
344. See sources cited supra note 343. Once in a while, providers are able to transfer
patients who request inappropriate treatment. See, e.g., Alexander M. Capron, Baby Ryan and
Virtual Futility, 25 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 20 (reporting that the parents of
Ryan Nguyen found a facility willing to provide the requested treatment); Paris, supra note 185,
at 1013 (reporting parents transferred Baby L's care to a consultant pediatric neurologist); Todd
Ackerman, Hospital to End Life Support: Houston Woman Faces Second Fight in 2 Months
Over Husband's Care, HouSTON CHRON., Apr. 28, 2005, at B5 (noting report by St. Luke's
Hospital in Houston that "more than 30 facilities had rejected Nikolouzos before Avalon Place
surprised them and agreed to take [him]"); Beck, supra note 185, at A 13 (stating the guardian
ad litem for Baby L "found a pediatric neurologist from another hospital who was willing to do
everything the mother wanted").
345. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 3, 21, Duarte v. Chino Comty. Hosp., No. E020473
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1998) (arguing that while a transfer would have resolved a conflict
where the provider refused to withdraw treatment at the surrogate's request, the patient "was
never stable enough to transfer to the proposed facility").
346. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(g)(3).
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the provider may decline to comply with the treatment request. 347 California,
for example, rejected an ultimatum approach which requires the provider to
transfer or comply.348 Tennessee similarly clarifies that if a transfer cannot be
made, then the provider shall not be compelled to comply.349
If the patient is transferred, then she will receive the requested treatment.35 °
If the patient is not transferred, the inability to transfer should serve as
confirming evidence that the requested treatment was outside the standard of
care and that the provider's refusal to comply with the request was
appropriate. 351 To the extent there is variability among providers' judgments of
medical appropriateness, transfer thereby serves as an important safety valve
function.
3?F
347. See id. § 7(e)-(g).
348. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2007).
349. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808(d) (2006).
350. Schwartz, supra note 105, at 162 (stating that "[i]f a patient who desires a particular
course of treatment can find a healthcare provider--any healthcare provider-who believes that
the proposed course of treatment is within the realm of reasonable medical alternatives, that
patient will have access to that course of treatment").
351. See Anne L. Flamm & Martin L. Smith, Letter to the Editor, Advance Directives, Due
Process, and Medical Futility, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 402, 404 (2004) ("The absence of a
facility willing to accept transfer may indicate that a community consensus exists on the futility
of particular medical interventions for a patient."). On the other hand, the inability to transfer
may show nothing about the consensus over medical inappropriateness. First, many facilities do
not make a diligent effort to locate potential transferee providers. Second, many providers
refuse transfer for purely economic and risk management reasons.
352. AMA Council, supra note 53, at 940. The report describes the "fair process
approach" as "insist[ing] on full and fair deference to the patient's wishes, placing limits on this
patient-centered approach only when the harm to the patient is so unseemly that, even after
reasonable attempts to find another institution, a willing provider of the service was not found."
Id.; see also Halevy & McGuire, supra note 283, at 38 ("[T]he fact that the registry [of willing
transfer providers] is so sparse supports the underlying ethical principle.., of a professional
consensus . . . ."); Lee, supra note 31, at 486 ("'Transfer of care' is used as a legal device to
ensure the physician's professional rights are balanced against those of the patient-surrogates.");
James J. Murphy, Comment, Beyond Autonomy: Judicial Restraint and the Legal Limits
Necessary to Uphold the Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the
Medical Profession, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 451,483-84 (1993) (stating that where
no physician will agree to a transfer, this demonstrates consensus); Schwartz, supra note 105, at
163 ("When there is universal agreement among healthcare providers that the patient's request
seeks something beyond the limits of medicine, that should constitute very strong evidence that
the request is inappropriate."). This assumes that the patient's request for a particular course of
treatment is based on medical reasons. Schwartz, supra note 105, at 162-63.
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B. Other Comprehensive Unilateral Decision Statutes
While the UHCDA may be the most common unilateral decision statute, it
is not the only one. Other states have adopted comprehensive unilateral
decision statutes similar to those in the ten UHCDA jurisdictions.
353
Like the UHCDA, these statutes are comprehensive in that they authorize
providers to make unilateral decisions concerning any type of requested
treatment, including situations where the surrogate has made an affirmative
request for treatment.354 Similar to the UHCDA, many of these statutes not
only authorize unilateral decisions but also offer immunity for the providers
who make those decisions.355
The key difference among the non-UHCDA comprehensive unilateral
decision statutes concerns the definition of "medically inappropriate." Some
statutes provide no definition or standard, leaving providers with maximum
353. See generally sources cited infra note 355 (citing state statutes containing unilateral
decision provisions similar to UHCDA). Many of these states' laws were based on earlier
NCCUSL uniform acts. See generally Thomas J. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the
Terminally llAct":A CriticalAnalysis, 1 IssuEs L. & MED. 441,474 (1986) (observing that the
Act "gives the physician almost unfettered discretion to decide what will be done"); Leslie B.
Oliver, The Right to Die in North Dakota: The North Dakota Living Will Act, 66 N.D. L. REV.
495, 525 (1990) ("Allowing physicians discretion to enforce the terms of a declaration may
require them to become the ultimate authority as to whether life-prolonging treatment will be
provided, withheld or withdrawn.").
354. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-7(2) (2006) (stating that a provider may refuse to
comply with a surrogate's request, but must aide in seeking transfer for the patient to another
provider who will comply with the treatment request).
355. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-208(b) (2005) ("A physician or other health care
provider, whose actions under this subchapter are in accord with reasonable medical standards,
is not subject to criminal or civil liability or discipline for unprofessional conduct with respect
to those actions."); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b) (2006) ("No person shall be civilly liable for
failing or refusing in good faith to effectuate the living will of the declarant patient."); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-36-8(2) (2006) ("No such provider or person shall be subject to any type of civil or
criminal liability or discipline for unprofessional conduct .. "); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-8(3)
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4513(2) (Supp. 2007); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/4-8(b), (c)
(West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.9(2) (West 2002); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.633(3)-(4) (no
penalties by anyone) (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-609(a) (LexisNexis
2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C. 11 (West 1998) (establishing immunity to providers if the
provider acts in good faith or acts according to a surrogate's decision); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
9-204(2) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-410(2) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.630(2)-(3)
(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.640(2) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:8(II) (2005); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-322(d) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-12(2) (2002); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2133.11 (A)(4) (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.10 (West 1995);
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.044(a), 166.045(d), 166.166 (Vernon 1999); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9713(c)(3) (2006) (giving protection to hospital employees only from
adverse employment decision); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2988 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE §§
70.122.051, .122.060(3) (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(l)(a)(3) (West 1998); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 155.50(1)(b) (West 2003).
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discretion to determine the circumstances under which they will refuse to
comply with treatment requests.35 6 Virginia, for example, provides that a
physician is not required to "render medical treatment to a patient that the
physician determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate.,, 357 Other
states' statutes provide a more precise formulation, authorizing providers to
decline to comply with treatment requests that would require treatment outside
their professional medical judgment.358 States articulate this standard in
different ways, but all the formulations are analogous to the UHCDA's
standard of "generally accepted health care standards., 359 The most common
formulation of medical appropriateness is one based on "reasonable medical
practice,, 360  "reasonable medical standards,, 361 "responsible medical
practice, 3 62 "medical judgment,, 363 or "usual and customary standards of
medical practice.364 Other statutes refer to "professional reasons, '365
356. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-8(b), 31-36-7(2) (2006) (mentioning that
physicians may refuse to comply with a living will, but not addressing when they may or may
not refuse treatment); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-8(2), (3) (2006) (requiring that physician's
refusal to comply with treatment request must be "substantially in accord with reasonable
medical standards"); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 35/3(d), 45/4-7(b) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-36-4-13(e) (LexisNexis 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-7-4(b) (LexisNexis 2000); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144A.8(l) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06(l) (West 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145C.15(b) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.030(1) (West 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.628, 449.640 (1997); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 1337.16(B), 2133.02(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.9
(West 1998); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
154.07(1)(a) (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.50(1)(b) (West 2003).
357. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990(A) (2005).
358. Like the UHCDA, the statutes in most states allow providers to refuse to comply with
surrogate treatment requests for moral reasons. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734 (West
2007); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (a) (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990
(2005). While these provisions have rarely been used in the context of futility disputes, they are
applicable and may soon be invoked more frequently. See supra note 319.
359. See infra notes 360-69.
360. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13 (West 1991) ("reasonable medical practice").
361. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-8(3) (2006) ("substantially in accord with
reasonable medical standards at the time of reference").
362. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-J:7(I) (2006) (complying "within the bounds
of responsible medical practice").
363. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(3) (1985) ("It is the intent of the
legislature that nothing in this Part shall be construed ... to require the application of medically
inappropriate treatment or life-sustaining procedures to any patient or to interfere with medical
judgment with respect to the application of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures.").
364. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(a) (West 2002) (shielding providers from
liability where "the decision to withhold or remove such life support system is based on the best
medical judgment of the attending physician in accordance with the usual and customary
standards of medical practice"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.040 (West 1985).
365. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4513(2) (Supp. 2007) (allowing provider to
withhold LSMT if unwilling to provide treatment for "professional reasons").
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"professional grounds, 366 or "professional standards ' 367 as means for
determining medical inappropriateness. Like the UHCDA, the other
comprehensive unilateral decision statutes operate extra-judicially.
368
Additionally, these state statutes require the unwilling provider to attempt to
transfer the patient before taking unilateral action.369
C. Narrow Unilateral Decision Statutes
While most states with unilateral decision statutes have adopted
comprehensive provisions similar to the UHCDA, a few have taken a more
"narrow" approach. New York, for example, enacted a narrow unilateral
decision statute in 1987.370 Other states soon enacted statutes similar to New
York's, permitting unilateral decisions only in narrowly defined
circumstances.
371
As compared to the UHCDA and other comprehensive unilateral decision
statutes, these narrow statutes offer a stricter range of circumstances under
which providers can unilaterally stop LSMT.372 In particular, the statutes are
tightly delineated with respect to the following: (1) the type of treatment, (2)
the presence of a surrogate request for treatment, and (3) the expected effect of
the treatment.373 First, certain types of medical interventions have been the
focus of special attention. Consequently, some statutes limit types of treatment
by authorizing unilateral decisions to withhold only CPR,3 74 while others
366. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(3) (LexisNexis 2007) (allowing providers to
refuse treatment on "professional grounds").
367. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-62(d) (1992) ("Nothing in this act shall be
construed to require... care in a manner contrary to law or accepted professional standards.").
368. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-66 (1992) (implementing a dispute resolution
process to resolve disagreements between patients, patient's surrogates, and doctors); cf sources
cited supra note 355 (referencing statutes which give providers immunity from civil and
criminal liability for treatment or refusal of treatment, implying that the judicial process may not
lead to a satisfactory result for the patient or surrogate).
369. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5424(b) (West Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTI-GEN. § 5-613(a)(1)(iii) (LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 (2005) ("An
attending physician who refuses to comply.., shall make a reasonable effort to transfer the
patient....").
370. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2961(12), 2966(1) (McKinney 1988).
371. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 127.635(1) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.7(1)
(2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(1) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 9708(a) (Supp.
2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30C-6(e) (LexisNexis 2006); see also VHA-NEC REPORT,
supra note 109, at 6 ("VA physicians are not permitted to write a DNR order over the objection
of the patient or surrogate, but they are permitted to withhold or discontinue CPR based on
bedside clinical judgment at the time of cardiopulmonary arrest.").
372. See sources cited supra note 371.
373. See sources cited supra note 371.
374. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2966(1) (McKinney 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 9708(a) (Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30C-6(e) (LexisNexis 2006).
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authorize unilateral decisions to withhold only artificial nutrition and
hydration.375 Second, the narrow unilateral decision statutes limit not only the
type of treatment, but they also limit unilateral decisions to situations where
neither the patient nor the patient's surrogate has made a contrary decision.376
The health care provider can only unilaterally stop LSMT when no other
decision maker is available.377 Third, the narrow unilateral decision statutes
authorize a provider to make unilateral decisions only in narrow, verifiable
circumstances of medical inappropriateness. 37 Rather than giving providers
discretion to determine medical inappropriateness, these narrow statutes
authorize unilateral decisions only in cases of brain death, physiological futility,
or permanent unconsciousness.
375. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.580(1), 127.635(1) (2005); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS §
59-7-2.7 (2004).
376. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966(1) (McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §
127.580 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(1) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9708(a)
(Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30C-6(e) (LexisNexis 2006). The New York
Department of Health has apparently expanded the exception to permit physicians to write DNR
orders even over the objection of a surrogate. See Edward F. McArdle, New York's Do-Not-
Resuscitate Law: Groundbreaking Protection of Patient Autonomy or a Physician's Right to
Make Medical Futility Determinations?, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55, 73-74 (2002-2003).
377. See sources cited supra note 376.
378. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(1) (2005). Oregon's unilateral decision statute
requires one of four specified conditions:
Life-sustaining procedures [such as artificial nutrition and hydration] ... may be withheld
or withdrawn . . . if the [patient] has been medically confirmed to be in one of the
following conditions: (a) A terminal condition; (b) Permanently unconscious; (c) A
condition in which administration of life-sustaining procedures would not benefit the
principal's medical condition and would cause permanent and severe pain; or (d) The
person has a progressive illness that will be fatal and is in an advanced stage, the person is
consistently and permanently unable to communicate by any means, swallow food and
water safely, care for the person's self and recognize the person's family and other people,
and it is very unlikely that the person's condition will substantially improve.
Id. South Dakota similarly enumerates three circumstances:
[A]rtificial nutrition or hydration may be withheld or withdrawn if: (1) Artificial nutrition
or hydration is not needed for comfort care or the relief of pain and the attending physician
reasonably believes that the principal's death will occur within approximately one week; or
(2) Artificial nutrition or hydration cannot be physically assimilated by the principal; or (3)
The burden of providing artificial nutrition or hydration outweighs its benefit, provided
that the determination of burden refers to the provision of artificial nutrition or hydration
itself and not to the quality of the continued life of the principal ....
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.7 (2004).
379. See sources cited supra note 378.
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V. EFFECTS OF THE UNILATERAL DECISION STATUTES
In the early 1990s, health care providers were unwilling to make unilateral
decisions to stop LSMT without legal protection.380 Consequently, over the
past eighteen years, state legislatures have promulgated statutes that purport to
provide this protection. 381 Now, it is time to assess the effects of these statutes.
While little empirical data exists, there is sufficient evidence to detect four
broad trends and identify focused issues for empirical research. The first two
trends are reasonably negative, at least from the perspective of statutory
effectiveness. First, even in states with comprehensive unilateral decision
statutes, many hospitals still do not have futility policies. 382 Second, those few
hospitals with futility policies rarely implement them to make a unilateral
decision in cases of intractable 
conflict.
38 t
Two additional trends have more positive attributes. First, the unilateral
decision statute in one state, Texas, does appear to work.384 Texas hospitals
both have and implement futility policies.385  Second, unilateral decision
statutes appear to facilitate the informal resolution of futility disputes, reducing,
although not eliminating, the need to resort to unilateral decision making.3
A. Hospitals Do Not Have Futility Policies.
Unfortunately, there is a "disturbing lack of information" on the prevalence
of hospital futility policies. 387 The two most populated states in the country
failed to implement any reporting mechanism as part of their unilateral decision
statutes.388 Consequently, as one distinguished health law scholar concluded,
"No data exist on futility policies adopted by [institutions] in California [or
Texas], much less across the nation.
' 3 9
380. See supra notes 276-84.
381. See supra note 355.
382. See infra notes 387-97.
383. See infra notes 398-403.
384. See infra notes 404-13.
385. See infra notes 404-08.
386. See infra notes 409-13.
387. Kwiecinski, supra note 331, at 329.
388. In 2002, California, a UHCDA state, considered legislation that would "study the
extent to which health care providers and institutions are denying patients life-sustaining health
care that they desire." Hearing on S.B. 1344 Before the S. Assembly Comm. on Appropriations
(2002). Unfortunately, that legislation was never enacted. S.B. 1344 Status Rep. (2002),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1301-1350/sb_1344bill20021130status.
html. Similarly, Texas failed to monitor the use of its unilateral decision statute. See Ramshaw,
supra note 84. A bill introduced in March 2007 proposed to change this, H.B. 3474, 80th Leg.
(Tex. 2007), but that bill died with the close of Texas's 8 0 th legislative session. Texas
Legislature Online, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (search by bill number).
389. Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 243, at 529; see also Kwiecinski, supra note
331, at 329 ("At the writing of this essay, no reports surveying the circumstances in which
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In fact, a distinguished group of scholars conducted an empirical research
study in 1996 on this very issue. They surveyed 1,990 large hospitals in the
United States and received 537 responses.39' Of these, only 29 (about 5%)
were "clearly denominated as medical futility policies and. . . reached beyond
DNR orders, more traditional life-sustaining treatment decisionmaking, and the
determination of death.''392 Moreover, most of these 29 policies "envisioned a
primarily consultative, consensus-building approach. ''393 Almost none of the
hospitals resolved what would happen if neither consensus nor transfer were
possible in a case.394 Additionally, there was no specification or authorization
of a mechanism for the unilateral termination of LSMT.395
These statistics have not improved over the past decade. Recent evidence
indicates that while unilateral decision statutes authorize health care providers
to refuse compliance with inappropriate treatment requests, providers in these
jurisdictions reluctantly continue to comply with such requests. 396 Although a
number of health care institutions would like to have futility policies, only a
few have adopted such policies.397
institutional futility policies have been invoked have been published.").
390. Sandra H. Johnson et al., Legal and Institutional Policy Responses to Medical
Futility, 30 J. HEALTH L. 21, 27 (1997).
391. Id.
392. Id. Within the study, 137 hospitals responded that they had futility policies. Of those,
115 hospitals submitted their policy to the research team, who determined that most of the
policies just pertained to traditional LSMT decision making with consent or determining brain
death. Id.; Goldner, supra note 331, at 412.
393. Johnson, supra note 390, at 32.
394. Id. ("Because these transfer .. provisions provided for permissible or optional
courses of action, many do not resolve what will happen if transfer is not available, is
burdensome, or is not desired by the patient/surrogate.").
395. Id. ("It was quite frequently the case that a policy.., failed to specify an ultimate
decisionmaker or decisionmaking body if conflict were to persist after all the processes were
followed.").
396. See Bowman, supra note 89, at 1527 ("The reluctance of providers to act unilaterally
comes in part... from a lack of medical agreement on a workable definition for futility and a
lack of legal support for overriding patient choice.").
397. See id. at 1528 ("'A lot of people want to have policies, but a lot of people don't
[have them]."' (quoting Shirley J. Paine)); Moldow, supra note 12, at 39 ("Fear of legal action
has previously discouraged many institutions from adopting policies in the area of medical
futility .... ); Nasraway, supra note 89, at 216 ("[I]t is much more common for hospital
lawyers to argue in favor of doing the easy thing, i.e., to acquiesce to unreasonable demands...
."); Email from Ronald Cranford, Faculty Associate, Univ. of Minn.'s Center for Bioethics, to
Thaddeus Pope, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law (July 11, 2004, 07:41 PM) ("Many hospital lawyers, much more concerned about legal
liability and adverse publicity for their institutions, have been extremely tentative, if not outright
hostile, to ethics committees formulating and implementing futility policies, even though many
of us in the field of clinical ethics feel these guidelines are badly needed."); cf Anderson-Shaw,
supra note 159, at 299 ("Absent state or federal statutes specifically guiding futile care activity,
many institutions work under a much more informal approach to futile care.").
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B. Hospitals Do Not Enforce Their Futility Policies
While a hospital without a futility policy is unlikely to make a unilateral
decision to stop LSMT, the existence of a futility policy hardly means it will be
fully utilized. It appears that many institutions that have futility policies either
are not implementing them at all or are implementing them only in a very
narrow and infrequent manner.
398
For example, a health care provider in an institution with a futility policy
may invoke that policy in an attempt to resolve a dispute.399 However, if the
dispute is intractable, the provider may be reluctant to invoke the unilateral
decision provisions of the policy.400 Instead, the provider will ultimately accede
to the surrogate's treatment request.40' In sum, while futility policies facilitate
the informal resolution of disputes, providers defer when the dispute proves
intractable.
The unilateral decision statutes in most states seem to have had limited
effect. Commentators noted that before the passage of state statutes authorizing
unilateral action, hospitals typically deferred to family wishes because they
feared being sued.40 2 Now, even with such laws, hospitals still accede to family
wishes for fear of being sued.40 3  The statutes have failed to change the
behavior of providers.
C. Hospitals in Texas Enforce Their Futility Policies
There is an exception to this general failure in unilateral decision statutes:
Texas's statute appears to have had a significant impact since its adoption in
398. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 89, at 1527 ("While physicians sometimes disagree
with patients or their surrogates over end-of-life care, however, they rarely end care in violation
of patient wishes .... 'If you're still at an impasse, the hospital continues to provide maximum
support."'); Bums, supra note 217, at 3 ("[D]espite an increasing number of ethics consults on
questions of futility we do not invoke our own futility policy."); Mary Pat Flaherty, Right to Die
Decision Has Little Impact Here, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 27, 1990, at A l (reviewing policies
at Pittsburgh-area hospitals and observing that "[clare usually continues-full bore-when an
incapacitated patient's family or his designated decision-maker cannot agree with
recommendations made by doctors that further care would be futile"); Fletcher, supra note 10,
at S:230 (noting a "moratorium" on the use of UVA's policy after the Baby K decision);
Wlazelek, supra note 46 (reporting reluctance at Lehigh Valley Hospital-Muuhlenberg in
Bethlehem to utilize its unilateral decision policy). Reporter Ann Wlazelek remarked that the
option to refuse treatment "takes courage on the part of the physician because he or she will
most likely be sued. No doctor at LVH has refused to treat a patient but some patients have
been transferred to other facilities." Id.
399. See supra Part I.D.
400. See supra note 398.
401. See supra note 398.
402. See supra notes 276-81.
403. See infra notes 415-18.
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1999.404  In one study at Baylor University Medical Center in Dallas,
researchers found that the statutory authorization gave physicians "more
comfort," thereby increasing ethical consultations regarding futility disputes by
67%.405 Not only did physicians and hospitals across Texas begin the dispute
resolution process but also, in approximately two percent of cases that were
proven intractable, the providers gave notice that they were going to unilaterally
stop LSMT. 406
A broader study of sixteen Texas hospitals over a five-year period found
that, on average, each hospital made the decision to unilaterally stop treatment
at least one time each year.40 7 Indeed, Texas hospitals unilaterally stopped or
decided to stop LSMT, even in the face of significant controversy and mass
media coverage urging otherwise.40 8 In short, the Texas statute has truly
changed provider conduct.
D. Unilateral Decision Statutes Facilitate the Informal
Resolution of Futility Disputes
Even in cases where the unilateral decision statutes do not facilitate
unilateral decisions, the statute may still help the informal resolution of futility
disputes because most disputes are not intractable.40 9 These statutes help
ensure that earlier steps in the dispute resolution process work better.410 They
facilitate informal resolution by setting "temporal and conceptual
boundaries."'411 For example, surrogates might say, "If you are asking us to
agree with the recommendation to remove life support from our loved one, we
cannot. However, ... if the law says it is OK to stop life support, then that is
what should happen."'4 2 The existence of a hospital policy and state law helps
404. Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at 744.
405. Id. at 744-45.
406. Ramshaw, supra note 84.
407. Id.
408. See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, Transfer Resolves Latest Futile-Care Case: Nursing Home
in Lubbock to Take Memorial Hermann Patient, HOUSTON CHRON., July 31, 2006, at B1;
Ackerman, supra note 43, at B1; Todd Ackerman, Relocation of Heart Patient on Life Support
Called Off: The Controversy is Not Put to Rest as Midwest Facility Says Her Condition is Too
Complicated, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 29, 2006, at BI [hereinafter Ackerman, Relocation of
Heart Patient]; Ackerman, supra note 344, at B5; Belluck, supra note 38, at Al; Robert H.
Frank, Weighing the True Costs and Benefits in a Matter of Life and Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19,2006, at C3; Murphy, supra note 45, at A29; Emily Ramshaw, Judge Gives Family Time to
Move Woman, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 16, 2007, B2; Ramshaw, supra note 45, at B1;
Mary Ann Roser, Where Doctors See Futility, Family Sees Hope, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr.
28, 2006, at Al.
409. See supra notes 91, 331-36 and accompanying text.
410. See Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at 744 (noting statute provides for consultations to
address disputes between providers and patients or surrogates concerning treatment options).
411. Fine, supra note 92, at 70-71.
412. Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at 745 (internal quotations omitted).
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families accept the fact that death cannot be postponed forever and that,
eventually, LSMT is inappropriate.413
VI. CAUSES OF UNILATERAL DECISION STATUTE DISUSE
Providers in unilateral decision statute jurisdictions, other than Texas,
generally do not make unilateral decisions to stop inappropriate treatment.
Why is this? Why do providers continue to accede to surrogate requests for
treatment that they consider medically inappropriate? Why do the unilateral
decision statutes remain unused?414 Many have suggested that the primary
reason unilateral decision statutes are not working is because of legal
uncertainty and the fear of litigation.4t 5 Surely, other factors, such as the fear of
413. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 48, at 80 ("[F]amilies come to understand that there is a
finite limit... [and] that they are not in total control of the situation."); Fine, supra note 92, at
70-71; Fine, supra note 100, at 1221 ("[T]he family was relieved because they had 'put up the
good fight'. . . but now the decision was out of their hands."); Fine & Mayo, supra note 84, at
746 ("[T]he greatest significance of the law is how it changes the nature of conversations...
about futile-treatment situations by providing conceptual and temporal boundaries."). But see
Bums, supra note 217, at 3 (suggesting that a formal futility policy leads to "confrontation" and
"polarization").
414. Unfortunately, non-anecdotal, statistical evidence of the prevalence and use of
hospital futility policies is unavailable. It is imperative that academics and policymakers engage
in more empirical research to uncover the reasons why providers accede to inappropriate
requests. This research and analysis will aid in identifying the problems with sufficient
precision and in developing appropriately tailored solutions.
415. See, e.g., WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 284, at 322 ("[lI]t is increasingly clear that
before a physician may terminate life support on any patient [where the family objects] ... she
or he should assume that it is necessary to ask a court for an order."); Brett, supra note 70, at
283-84 ("[T]he threat of litigation is an important reason, perhaps the major reason, that
physicians are reluctant to withhold or withdraw 'futile' life-sustaining treatment unilaterally
against the wishes of family members."); Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:230 (noting that health
care organizations must "wait for clarification of the law ... on which futile treatments can be
withheld or withdrawn" and in the meantime must "treat until the dispute is resolved"); Hall,
supra note 246, at 119 ("[T]o the extent that a crisis is in fact widely perceived, it has the
quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy ..."); Kapp, supra note 122, at 242 (recommending that in
the absence of "unambiguous legal guidance," providers should accede to surrogate requests);
Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes, 19 ISSUEs L. &
MED. 111, 119 (2003) (discussing how a "broad fear of regulatory sanctions for providing too
little aggressive LSMT" and the likelihood of civil malpractice actions means that "demand for
aggressive LSMT virtually always controls the situation regardless of how inappropriate that
demand may be"); Lantos, supra note 12, at 587 (explaining that many doctors are unwilling to
"take the risk that punishment, rather than forgiveness, may come their way"); Valerie A. Palda
et al., "Futile" Care: Do We Provide It? Why? A Semistructured Canada-Wide Survey of
Intensive Care Unit Doctors andNurses, 20 J. CRITICAL CARE 207 (2005) (finding that 75% of
physicians provided futile care because of legal pressures). Notably, whatever the actual risks,
they may be overestimated by providers. See McArdle, supra note 376, at 71 ("Numerous
articles have warned physicians of the serious legal risk in unilaterally writing a DNR order
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adverse publicity, also intimidate providers from making unilateral decisions.
4 6
However, legal factors appear to be the most material cause and, therefore, will
be the focus of this Article.
In 1999, when the American Medical Association encouraged hospitals to
adopt futility guidelines, it noted that "the legal ramifications of this course of
action are uncertain. ' 4 7 Now, even with statutory authorization, there is still
411significant legal uncertainty.
There are three potential sources of this uncertainty. First, the unilateral
decision statutes are vague, leaving providers and hospital counsel unsure of
what standards are required to obtain safe harbor status.41 9 Second, there is
uncertainty concerning whether and when these state statutes are preempted by
conflicting federal law.420  Third, there is uncertainty concerning the
constitutionality of the statutes.42'
It is impossible to conclude that these sources of uncertainty affect a
providers' willingness to use unilateral decision statutes. To definitively
answer this question, empirical research must be employed to assesses the
motivation for provider behavior. But although no such evidence currently
exists, one state presents a case study: Texas. The Texas statute effectively
facilitates unilateral decisions, yet it is equally subject to federal preemption
and constitutional requirements.422 Therefore, it seems that the only material
uncertainty must concern that of the non-Texas unilateral decision statutes
themselves.
.... 1').
416. See, e.g., WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 37, at 134 ("[I]fthe decision to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment became known to any of the patient's friends or to the public, the hospital
might have to face embarrassing publicity (or, as they put it, 'bad headlines')."); Fletcher, supra
note 10, at S:226 (observing hospitals can .'engender ill will in their communities"' (quoting
Alan Meisel)); Rivin, supra note 30, at 391 ("The 'pay or leave' demand is probably too
coercive for the hospital or the physician's malpractice carrier or public relations advisor to
accept."); Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 243, at 525-26 ("[I]n a survey of representatives
of all 43 children's hospitals in the country ... almost all acknowledged [that] their own
hospital would probably yield to demands for life-sustaining treatment... because of fears of
lawsuits and bad headlines."); Ackerman, Relocation of Heart Patient, supra note 408, at B1
("St. Luke's was flooded with angry calls about the plan to pull the plug on Clark .... ");
Andrea Clarke's Struggle for Life, Posting to ProLifeBlogs.com, http://www.prolifeblogs.com/
articles/archives/2006/04/andreclarkes s.php (Apr. 25,2006,01:04 AM) (describing unilateral
decision making as a "flagrant act of (passive) euthanasia").
417. AMA Council, supra note 53, at 940.
418. See infra Part VI.A-C.
419. See infra notes 423-68.
420. See infra notes 440-51.
421. See infra notes 452-64.
422. See infra Part VII.B.
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A. Uncertainty from Statutory Vagueness
Lawyers, bioethicists, health care providers, and policymakers have had
enormous difficulty defining "medically inappropriate. 'A23 Years of debate
have failed to produce any consensus.424 As a result, policymakers designed an
approach with vague standards, thereby5 giving substantial discretion to the
health care providers and institutions. 42 Rather than establishing a clear
framework for determining medical inappropriateness, the statutes leave that
determination to the judgment and discretion of the individual health care
423. See generally Anderson-Shaw, supra note 159, at 303 (noting that all state statutes
use similar terms like "medically inappropriate" or "medically ineffective" to define futility, yet
the definitions of these terms are left to the discretion of the providers); Tomlinson & Czlonka,
supra note 59, at 33 (arguing "against any attempt to base a futility policy on some concrete
definition offutility"); David G. Warren, The Legislative Role in Defining Medical Futility, 56
N.C. MED. J. 453, 454 (1995) ("[T]here may be another wave of proposals in state legislatures
to address the question of... medical futility. Drafting difficulties are obvious .... ).
424. See Moseley, supra note 4, at 211 ("[D]espite years of debate in scholarly journals,
professional meetings, and popular media, consensus on a precise definition eludes us still.");
see also Burt, supra note 66, at 249-50 ("[W]ithin the medical community no consensus has
emerged to give practical content to the futility concept .. "); Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the
Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. a Physician's Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241,
1246 (1993) (viewing this struggle as a "clash at the bedside"); Goldner, supra note 331, at 416
(empirical research study "suggests an absence of consensus"); Lee, supra note 31, at 482; Mark
Strasser, The Futility of Futility? On Life, Death, andReasoned Public Policy, 57 MD. L. REv.
505, 514 (1998) (describing current formulations of the term as either under-inclusive, over-
inclusive, or both); Richard L. Wiener et al., A Preliminary Analysis of Medical Futility
Decisionmaking: Law and Professional Attitudes, 16 BEI-V. Sci. L. 497,499 (1998); Zientek,
supra note 82, at 251 ("Because of the difficulty in defining futility... the [Texas] statute is
vague on a number of central issues."). But see Levine, supra note 10, at 73 (suggesting that
there is a general consensus among health care providers that some types of treatment are
medically inappropriate).
425. See, e.g., THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 17, § 13.02 at 13-6 to 13-7; AMA Council,
supra note 53, at 939 (rejecting an absolute definition in favor of a process-based approach);
Ferguson, supra note 16, at 1220 ("[T]he statute provides no clear standard regarding the
propriety of such decisions."); id. (arguing that the UHCDA does not "provide a clear definition
of futility and fails to supply adequate ethical context or constraints to guide difficult
decisions"); Keith Shiner, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept? 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 803,
810 (1996) (stating that the legislative bodies failed to deal with the problem of medical futility,
instead creating undefined statutes); cf Johnson, supra note 390, at 36 ("Developing clarity in
the boundaries of futility is fundamental.").
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provider.426 In this sense, the statutes can be described as "purely enabling
legislation.
'A27
It is not unusual for policymakers to delegate responsibility when they
cannot agree on rules or guidelines.428 Moreover, this deference is typical with
respect to the medical profession. 429 The discretion afforded by the unilateral
decision statutes, however, is purchased at the expense of significant
uncertainty. 430 Because of the statutory vagueness, providers have difficulty
ensuring that they are satisfying the required standards.43'
426. The legislature's failure to create a clear framework to determine medial
inappropriateness is hardly surprising. The inappropriate treatment question "address[es] issues
concerning the meaning that we attach to life, particularly diminished life; self-determination;
the nature of the physician-patient relationship; and the just allocation of scarce health care
resources." Shiner, supra note 425, at 808-09.
427. MASON & LAURIE, supra note 77, at 596; see Ferguson, supra note 16, at 1220 ("The
UHCDA provides a mere framework... [and] gives only broad platitudes .... "); id. at 1221
("These sections seemingly create an open-ended excuse for a physician to withdraw treatment.
..."); see also DwORKIN, supra note 124, at 144-45 (arguing that given factual variability of the
issues and the lack of public consensus, matters should be left to the medical profession with
minimal legal oversight); Elizabeth Day, Do Not Resuscitate-and Don 't Bother Consulting the
Family, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH [UK], Mar. 14, 2004, at 22, available at 2004 WL 4176646
("There is the possibility of legislation, but in a field as controversy-strewn as medical ethics, a
blanket law remains an imperfectly blunt tool.").
428. Cf Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's
Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2244-45 (1991) (discussing the 'rule-building
discretion"' which arises from a "direct and deliberate grant of discretionary authority").
429. Cf Carl E. Schneider, Voidfor Vagueness, 37 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at
10 ("In short, lawmakers have essentially established rules intended to hold medicine to its own
standards and then mostly left the system to work unmolested.").
430. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 78, at 451 ("On balance, it is difficult to offer much
assurance about the existing legal climate regarding futility policies."); Ferguson, supra note 16,
at 1243 (noting that the statute fails to provide a "usable, clear standard that protects the
physician"); Flamm, supra note 10, at 4 ("The promise of immunity, of course, is not
guaranteed; patients can challenge a provider's adherence to [the statute] or more generally
dispute the reasonableness of actions taken."); Kwiecinski, supra note 331, at 349-50 ("When
treatment can be or should be described as 'inappropriate' is not defined by the statute.... This
lack of boundaries and oversight allows the providers far too much discretion."); Meisel &
Jennings, supra note 11, at 75 ("[T]he law is unclear on what should be done."); Rowland,
supra note 214, at 297 ("[T]hese statutes provide little guidance in regards to the limiting of the
obligation for physicians to provide ongoing care they believe futile."); Schneiderman &
Capron, supra note 243, at 528 ("For if limits to physicians' obligations are not defined, end-of-
life outcomes are likely to be determined less by medical circumstances and justifiable standards
and more by individual healthcare providers' tolerance for risk, patients' and families' varying
degrees of knowledge and rhetorical skills, and economic considerations."); Tovino &
Winslade, supra note 4 1, at 29 (observing that in futility cases "no widely accepted ethical and
legal framework exists to govern decision-making"); cf In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 738
(Wash. 1980) (noting, with respect to brain death, that "[a]doption of [a legislative] standard
will alleviate concern among medical practitioners that legal liability might be imposed when
life support systems are withdrawn .. "). But cf Goldner, supra note 331, at 409 ("[C]ourts
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Indeed, the drafters of the UHCDA recognized this very shortcoming,
observing that the statute really "provides no immunity at all... [because]
virtually every question of reasonable care is a jury question. '432 The lack of
immunity was "one of the reasons why [providers] want[ed] to get something in
the black letter that talks about acceptable health-care standards.
433
Some have suggested that the unilateral decisions statutes could have been
effective, despite their vagueness, if "the medical profession... articulate[d]
and thereafter follow[ed] uniform practice standards regarding futile care."
434
For example, recognizing the dynamic advancement in technology, the drafters
of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) did not specify any exact
diagnoses in the statute itself.435 Providers did, however, develop clinical
criteria necessary to implement the UDDA. 436 In contrast, with respect to
medical inappropriateness under the UHCDA, providers have neither
articulated nor adhered to any clear universal standards of practice.437
are hesitant to penalize physicians who reasonably rely on what they perceive to be professional
standards .... ).
431. Cf Blumstein, supra note 172, at 1049 (noting that flexibility is not a desirable
objective for a safe harbor); Final Rule: Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and
Abuse; Safe Harbor for Federally Qualified Health Centers Arrangements Under the Anti-
Kickback Statute, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,632, 56,639 (Oct. 4,2007). A trade association commented
that requiring health care centers to implement and document "reasonable, consistent, and
uniform standards" provides "insufficient guidance" as well as "a chilling effect on parties'
participation in safe harbored arrangements, as parties would be unsure whether their standards
would satisfy the requirements of the safe harbor." Id. On the other hand, at least one statute
defines the provider's discretion subjectively rather than objectively. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. §
24-7A-7(F) (2006) ('Medically ineffective health care' means treatment that would not offer
the patient any significant benefit, as determined by a physician.") (emphasis added).
432. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Comm. of the
Whole, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, July 30, 1993, at 141-42 (statement of Comm'r
Windsor Dean Calkins). Louisiana, for example, had a unilateral decision statute in 1998
exempting providers from care that was "medically inappropriate" and "contrary to medical
judgment." Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
Because these terms were not defined, however, an appellate court remanded a malpractice case
for further litigation to determine the standard of care. Id.
433. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Comm. of the
Whole, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, July 30, 1993, at 144 (statement of Comm'r
Michael Franck).
434. Isackson, supra note 290, at 11; see also Kapp, supra note 122, at 172 (noting the
need for "broad consensus within the medical community" and "societal agreement").
435. See Bemat, supra note 119, at 39 (stating that the "distinction between the brain's
clinical functions and brain activities, recordable electronically or through other laboratory
means," was not found within the UDDA).
436. See Bemat, supra note 119, at 40.
437. See supra notes 214-17. There are a few narrow exceptions. For example, providing
only comfort care for anencephalic infants is a well-settled standard of care. Not even the
opposing experts in Baby K contracted this. Brief of Appellants at 15-16, In re Baby K, No. 93-
1899 (4th Cir. 1993), 1993 WL 13123742.
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Consequently, the practice of deferring to surrogate demands has become the
standard of care.
43P
B. Uncertainty from Fear of Preemption
439
Even if providers could be reasonably certain of compliance with state
unilateral decision statutes, this clarity would provide no legal comfort to
providers if unilaterally stopping LSMT violated federal law. Preemption
outside the futility context remains an obstacle to state efforts to develop more
rational allocation systems.440 Preemption may similarly stand as an obstacle to
the effectuation of state unilateral decision laws.
Notably, the Fourth Circuit has held that Virginia's unilateral decision
statute was preem~ed by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA). 1 Some commentators have since suggested that the
preemptive scope of EMTALA is "limited" and that the duty imposed by
EMTALA "cannot be invoked to require treatment in the vast majority of
futility cases.' 2 After all, EMTALA does not apply to inpatients. 43 Once the
438. Cf Peter Albertson, A 72-Year-Old Man With Localized Prostate Cancer, 274 JAMA
69, 73 (1995) ("[T]here's an interesting catch-22-the medicolegal standard of care becomes
what physicians do. If... physicians all [provide inappropriate treatment] ... for fear of being
sued if they don't, then eventually if enough of them do it, they'll create the truth of their
fear."); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician
Liability, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 97-98 (1991) ("Customary medical practices have
evolved in the United States under systems of paying for medical care that create economic
incentives for both physicians and patients to overutilize services, spending more on marginal
benefits than they are in any sense worth.")
439. While this Article does not fully develop the preemption analysis under each of these
statutes, Part VI.B. examines the scope of potential preemption.
440. Cf Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L.
REv. 179, 181 (1995-1996) (discussing the preemption effect of the Americans with Disabilities
Act on providers' attempts to ration health care).
441. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 1994).
442. THERIGHT ToDIE, supra note 17, § 13.06[C] at 13-30.
443. See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349,353 (4th Cir. 1996).
The court acknowledged the "legal reality" that "[o]nce EMTALA has met that purpose of
ensuring that a hospital undertakes stabilizing treatment for a patient, who arrives with an
emergency condition, the patient's care becomes the legal responsibility of the hospital and the
treating physicians." Id. In the court's analysis, "the legal adequacy of that care is then
governed not by EMTALA but by the state malpractice law that everyone agrees EMTALA was
not intended to preempt." 1d. The court also distinguishing Baby K in part because that case
did not focus on the temporal duration of obligation. Id.; see also In re AMB, 640 N.W.2d 262,
289 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that there was no EMTALA violation where patient had
been admitted to hospital for more than a week before withdrawal of LSMT); Causey v. St.
Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1075 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("Agreeing with Bryan, we
find that EMTALA provisions are not applicable to the present case.").
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hospital has screened and stabilized a patient, it no longer has any obligation
under EMTALA to provide medical services. 44
While EMTALA's preemptive scope is circumscribed, the restrictions that
it continues to impose on the scope and applicability of state unilateral decision
statutes remain noteworthy. In particular, while the requisite treating period
under EMTALA is limited, it is significant under the circumstances in which
medically inappropriate care is often requested." 5 Specifically, EMTALA does
not apply to inpatients; however, the subjects of many futility disputes were not
inpatients. For example, in Baby K, by the time Fairfax Hospital sought
declaratory relief, Baby K had already been transferred to a nursing home." 6
Yet over the next four months, she returned to the hospital three times due to
breathing difficulties." 7  This status is even more common among adult
patients, who are transferred from nursing homes to hospitals upon the
occurrence of an acute event." 8  Furthermore, in similar circumstances,
unilateral decisions to stop LSMT may be preempted by competing obligations
under other federal statutes, including the following: (1) the Americans with
Disabilities Act,449 (2) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,450 and (3)
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.
45'
C. Uncertainty from Fear of Unconstitutionality
Generally, there is little guidance regarding which state futility statutes
violate the U.S. Constitution, because futility disputes are rarely litigated and
444. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2) (2007).
445. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at S:230 (expressing concerned about patient who spent
"seventeen days in intensive care").
446. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593; In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1024-27 (E.D. Va. 1993).
447. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593; Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1024-25. It is unclear whether Baby
K was discharged from the nursing home and presented at the emergency department of the
hospital or was transferred from the nursing home to the hospital. Regardless, EMTALA would
be triggered in either case. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 594-95 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g)).
448. See, e.g., Causeyv. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
("Having suffered cardiorespiratory arrest, Sonya Causey was transferred to St. Francis Medical
Center (SFMC) from a nursing home."); Barriers, supra note 22, at 16 (reporting "an increasing
number of terminally ill nursing home patients coming to the emergency department... when
they experience life threatening symptoms"). Spiro Nikolouzos was transferred from St. Luke's
Hospital to Avalon Place, a nursing home, but then back to Southeast Baptist Hospital after he
developed pneumonia; Southeast Baptist sought to unilaterally terminate care. Ackerman, supra
note 344, at B5.
449. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027-28; Bopp & Coleson, supra note 45, at 842-44;
Crossley, supra note 440, at 202-05.
450. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026-27; Bopp & Coleson, supra note 45, at 842.
451. See Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Sadath A.
Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human Services and the Born-Alive
Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal Practice, 116
PEDIATRICS e576, e580-81 (2005).
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courts tend to avoid deciding constitutional questions. Nevertheless, limited
accounts of judicial treatment and academic legal commentary suggest that
there is a reasonable risk of unconstitutionality for some unilateral decision
statutes.
Where surrogate insistence on treatment is based on "religious
convictions," the unilateral termination of LSMT may implicate the patient's
First Amendment rights. 452  Where the patient is a prisoner, unilateral
termination of LSMT could implicate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.453 Further, some have argued that
unilateral termination is inconsistent with equal protection,
454 the right to life, 455
and.the freedom of expression.456
Some litigants and commentators have even argued that the unilateral
termination of LSMT would effectively constitute a usurpation of the patient's
fundamental right to refuse LSMT.45 However, to the extent that Cruzan
established such a constitutional right, it is probably only a negative right to be
free from unwanted treatment, not an affirmative right to LSMT.458
Nevertheless, more than one court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause prohibits unilaterally stopping LSMT.
459
In any case, there is state action and a constitutionally protected interest in
life is at stake. 460 Therefore, the procedures attendant to the deprivation of this
452. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029; see also Darren P. Mareiniss, A Comparison ofCruzan
and Schiavo: The Burden of Proof Due Process, andAutonomy in the Persistently Vegetative
Patient, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 233,252-53 (2005) (presenting the argument that the very concept of
futility might offend one's belief in faith healing and the absolute sanctity of life).
453. George P. Smith, II, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding
Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. &POL'Y 1 (1995).
454. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 45, at 837-39.
455. Id. at 839-40.
456. Id. at 841-42.
457. See, e.g., Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57, 62 (Dauphin County
Ct. C.P. Dec. 29, 1995) (No. 872S1995), 1995 WL 924561 (reasoning that hospital had violated
the constitution and usurped the patient's interest in her own life when the hospital unilaterally
disconnected her life support).
458. See Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1495 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)); Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied
No. 07-444, 2008 WL 114305 (Jan. 14, 2008); Mareiniss, supra note 452, at 251, 258.
459. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("A parent has a
constitutionally protected right to 'bring up children' grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause .... [and] '[w]hen parents do not agree on the issue of termination of life
support... this Court must yield to the presumption in favor of life."'); Rideout, 30 Pa. D. &
C.4th at 83-84 (allowing parents to assert right to life claim on behalf of child because "their
privacy-based rights were violated under both state and federal constitutions").
460. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Hospital Ethics Committees as a Forum ofLast Resort under
The Texas Advance Directives Act: A Violation of Procedural Due Process (unpublished
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interest must provide sufficient protection from error or abuse. 46' At a
minimum, the surrogate must be afforded proper notice, an opportunity for a
meaningful hearing, and access to an impartial tribunal. Otherwise,
463unilateral termination could violate procedural due process.
In sum, unilateral decision making may be constrained by constitutional
and federal statutory constraints. Determining the parameters of those
constraints merits further legal analysis. Yet, regardless of the nature of those
constraints, they are not deterring Texas providers from making unilateral
decisions to stop LSMT.464 Therefore, it seems that somewhere deep in the
heart of Texas lies the answer to making other state unilateral decision statutes
more effective.
VII. SOLUTIONS: MAKING THE SAFE HARBOR NAVIGABLE
Because the unilateral decision statutes are too vague and open-ended, their
purported safe harbors are not navigable. Can we make them more navigable?
Can we reduce the uncertainty? There are two alternatives: (1) make the
statutory standards concrete and precise or (2) abandon substantive standards
altogether and use a purely process-based approach, like that used in Texas. 465
A. Eliminating Uncertainty with Precise Standards
Consensus on precise, substantive, and legislatable measures of medical
inappropriateness has proven unachievable.466 Perhaps this should not be too
surprising. Very few areas of medicine have professional standards that are
"sufficiently mandatory and concrete" to operate as a safe harbor.467 Rarely do
providers have what is necessary for immunity: "a precise and plain statement
of the acceptable medical practice." 468 Instead, professional standards are
typically set "ex post by selectively drawn expert witness testimony.'
469
manuscript) (on file with author).
461. Kwiecinski, supra note 331, at 347.
462. Id.
463. See id. at 345-47.
464. See supra note 404-08 and accompanying text.
465. Cf John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 999-1000 (1984) (proposing that the uncertainty
may be reduced by an enhanced fact-finding process, the promulgation of enforcement
guidelines, or the implementation of a bright-line test).
466. See supra notes 214-17 and 423-37 and accompanying text.
467. See Hall, supra note 246, at 121, 127-28, 144-45.
468. Id. at 134.
469. Blumstein, supra note 172, at 1028; see also Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So.
2d 1072, 1075-76 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that because the statute failed to define
"medically inappropriate" and "medical judgment," the case had to be sent to a medical review
panel to determine the appropriate standard of care).
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If doctors cannot achieve even professional consensus, they are even less
likely to achieve the social consensus necessary for legislation. 470 Therefore, it
seems that only a pure process-based approach like that adopted in Texas could
be effective in inducing the conduct that the futility statutes intended.47'
B. The Texas Pure Process Approach
In Texas, when a provider refuses to honor a surrogate's request for
continued LSMT, the provider must commence a multi-stage review process.
LSMT must be provided during this review process. 72 The first stage entails• • • • 473
an ethics committee review of the attending physician's determination. The
surrogate must be notified of the ethics committee review process at least forty-
eight hours before the committee meets.474 The surrogate is also entitled to
attend the meeting and to receive a written explanation of the committee's
decision.475
If the ethics committee agrees with the treating physician that LSMT is
inappropriate, the provider must attempt to transfer the patient to another
provider that is willing to comply with the surrogate's treatment request.476 The
provider is obligated to continue providing LSMT for ten days after the
surrogate is given the ethics committee's written decision.477 If the patient has
not been transferred or granted an extension, then the provider may unilaterally
stop LSMT on the eleventh day.
478
When the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) first went to Governor
Bush in 1997, he vetoed the bill because it "eliminate[d] the objective
negligence standard for reviewing whether a physician properly discontinued
the use of life-sustaining procedures., '479 However, replacing the objective
470. Perhaps with the growth of palliative care and greater awareness of resource
limitations, our culture will become less death-defying and more reluctant to conclude that more
is better.
471. House of Delegates Action, supra note 53, at 91 (referencing the Wisconsin Medical
Society Resolution 1-2004, which "support[s] the passage of state legislation which establishes
a legally sanctioned extra-judicial process for resolving disputes regarding futile care, modeled
after the Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999").
472. TEx. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a) (Vernon 2003).
473. Id.
474. Id. § 166.046(b)(2).
475. Id. § 166.046(b)(4). The surrogate is also entitled to a copy of a registry with the
name of providers willing to accept the patient upon transfer. Id. § 166.046(b)(3)(B).
476. Id. § 166.046(d).
477. Id. § 166.046(e). A court may extend this time period only if "there is a reasonable
expectation" that a transfer can be made. Id. § 166.046(g).
478. Id. § 166.046(e) ("The physician and the health care facility are not obligated to
provide life-sustaining treatment after the 10th day after the written decision ....").
479. Tex. Legis. J. 4926 (June 20, 1997), vetoing Tex. S. Bill 414, 76th Leg. (1997); see
also Interim Report, supra note 113, at 33-34 (referencing Governor Bush's veto proclamation
of the first TADA).
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standard of negligence with measurable procedures was precisely the point, as
reflected in the 1999 legislation that Bush did sign:
A physician, health care professional acting under the direction of a
physician, or health care facility is not civilly or criminally liable or subject to
review or disciplinary action by the person's appropriate licensing board if
the person has complied with the procedures outlined in Section 166.046.480
Unlike the UHCDA and other unilateral decision statutes which specify
vague substantive standards such as "significant benefit," the safe harbor of
TADA is defined solely in terms of process.481 Texas providers who follow
TADA's prescribed notice and meeting procedures are therefore immune from
disciplinary action and civil and criminal liability.482 Because the statute's
requirements are concrete and measurable, there is little, if any, uncertainty of
compliance.
The TADA is far from perfect. Ten days may not be a reasonable or
sufficient time for surrogates to locate an alternative facility willing to accept
the patient.483 There may be procedural due process implications by placing the
ultimate decision in the hands of an institutional ethics committee, which is
comprised of physicians and administrators who look to the hospital for their484
economic livelihood. However, these mechanics of the TADA process can
and are being considerably refined.485 The TADA demonstrates that a pure
process approach works and that such an approach now serves,486 and should
continue to serve, as a model for other states.
CONCLUSION
Unilateral decision statutes provide the legal protection that health care
providers have long sought for their hospital futility policies. Yet without more
480. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.045(d) (emphasis added).
481. See Iliana L. Peters, Perspectives on the Texas "Medical Futility Statute," as
Amended in 2003, HEALTH LAW. WKLY., Oct. 22, 2004, available at
http://www.ahla.org/hlw/issues/041022/041022 a art 01 Peters.cfin ("Importantly, the statute
does not attempt to define 'medical futility.' Any attempt to do so might result in a definition
that is either too broad or too narrow.").
482. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.045(d); see also Truog & Mitchell, supra
note 98, at 20 ("Clinicians in Texas may therefore be much more confident and bold in applying
the policy, knowing that they are protected by the law.").
483. Hearing on S.B. 439 Before the S. Comm. on Health and Human Servs., 80th Leg.
(Tex. 2007).
484. Id; see also Hearings on Advance Directives Before the H. Comm. on Public Health,
80th Leg. (Tex. 2007); Burns & Truog, supra note 214, at 1990-9 1; Pope, supra note 460.
485. See, e.g., S.B. 439, 80th Leg. (Tex. 2007) (amendments relating to advance directives
and health care and treatment decisions).
486. State medical societies in Wisconsin and North Carolina have formally considered
recommending TADA-type statutes to their state legislatures.
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precise formulation, this authority is only illusory. The illusion will remain
until there is consensus on (1) the proper ends of medicine, (2) the acceptable
criteria for rationing, and (3) the legitimate restrictions on patient autonomy.
Such consensus is not imminently forthcoming, however. In the meantime,
providers and policymakers should look to Texas's pure process approach as a
model, just as California, Vermont, and other states look to Oregon for
guidance on physician-assisted suicide legislation.

